Evidentiality and Assertion in Tibetan

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics

by

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PRESENTATIONS


This dissertation examines the three major evidential categories in Standard Tibetan—ego, direct, and indirect. Indirect is argued to be a performative epistemic modal; its performativity accounts for its highly restricted distribution. Direct is argued to be complex, consisting of a demonstrative component, which requires that the marked situation be stage-level, and a pragmatic component, which requires that the marked situation have been observed. Evidence from conditionals and from the Amdo variety of Tibetan show that these two components can be disentangled from each other. Ego is
argued to be a morphologically zero, default, ‘elsewhere’ case, which indicates either immediate or groundless knowledge.

Aside from its contribution to Tibeto-Burman linguistics, this dissertation touches on various theoretically important issues in pragmatics and the philosophy of language. First, in discussing ego, it is argued that a property-based semantic view of attitudes *de se* has no advantage over a proposition-based pragmatic theory. Special uses of ego with names *de se* and performatives highlight this point.

Second, it is suggested that questions be analyzed as in the traditional answer set approach to the semantics of questions; but rather than taking a question to denote a set of propositions, it is argued that a question should denote a set of assertions instead.

Third, a new division among conditionals is proposed. Based primarily on the behavior of Tibetan evidential constructions in conditional protases, but also on the behavior of English ‘will’ in the same position, a category of ‘interactional’ conditionals is introduced. Interactional conditionals differ from ‘hypothetical’ conditionals in that the speaker does not simply represent the protasis as unknown, but as something which can and should be immediately verified or countered by another discourse participant.
Evidentiality has become an increasingly popular topic in linguistics. It is now possible to fill a small shelf with work on the subject, which includes several collections of papers (Chafe & Nichols 1986, Guentchéva 1996, Johanson & Utas 2000), detailed studies of individual languages (Floyd 1999), typological work (Willet 1988, de Haan 1998), and many journal articles.

In this dissertation I take a close look at the dominant evidentials in Standard Tibetan, the lingua franca spoken throughout central Tibet and the Tibetan diaspora. Little reference is made to other languages aside from English. The data for this study comes partly from published sources, but mostly from my own fieldwork with Tibetans in America, Nepal, and Tibet.

This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. This, the first, introduces basic concepts and aims. The remaining six chapters each present a different topic in the study of Tibetan evidentiality. Although linked by common pragmatic ideas to be discussed below, the chapters are relatively independent of each other.
1.1. Situating the study

Evidentiality is concerned with information sources. How do we come to know what we say? If I tell you that snow is white, what makes me believe what I say? Is it because I was told that snow is white, or because it’s common knowledge that snow is white? Or is it that I’ve seen snow, and boy is it ever white? Or is it intimate and personal knowledge to me, the kind of fact that is so close to my heart that I don’t need to tell you how I came to believe it?

I began this project intending to work on the syntax of evidentiality, expecting to be attracted most by the grammatical constraints on evidentials. Before long, my study had metamorphosed into a primarily semantic endeavor. But the semantic stage was also short-lived, and when the dust cleared what remained was an almost exclusively pragmatic and philosophical investigation.

The primary questions I explore, and the arguments I make, concern the relations speakers have to sentences in context. Few of the issues here have much to do with sentences’ truth-values. Yet in spite of this, for Tibetans, evidentiality is an incredibly important and central notion. Evidentials are so ubiquitous in Tibetan that nearly every sentence is marked with one. While foreigners learning Tibetan struggle with the evidentials,
ending sentences with whichever one strikes their fancy, Tibetans make such judgments unthinkingly and instantaneously. There are no crises, no moments of indecision.

And yet, the ease of the decision belies the profundity of the evidential distinctions. Tibetan’s three evidential categories—ego, direct, and indirect—provide a map of mental structure that overlaps and enhances the maps of philosophers. For example, ego evidentials cover a range of uses that subsume self-knowledge, and perhaps even do away with the need for self-knowledge as a separate concept. What’s interesting about Tibetan is that, unlike philosophers, it’s a natural phenomenon.

There are two ways of doing philosophy of language. The first way is to start with a concept, and then try to find evidence and justification for the concept in language. The second way is to start with language, and then find the concepts. My approach here has been in the second mode, which is particularly helpful when studying an ‘exotic’ language. One finds that categories that have so concerned semanticists and philosophers in the first mode of investigation may disappear in the second mode.

As a linguist, the primary message I want to convey is that careful attention to empirical features of languages such as Tibetan can help semanticists and philosophers to avoid tempting errors and wrong paths.
Semanticists and philosophers should not avoid obscure data, not only because such data will tell them increasingly more about the subject matter they study, but also because in the long run it will save them effort! It would heed both linguists and philosophers to focus on the crude details of language itself.

1.2. Evidentiality

Two general notions serve as important background for the study of evidentiality. The first is what Asif Agha calls the ‘evidential origo’. According to Buhler (1990), the origo is “the I, here, and now from which expressions are chosen,” although for my purposes the origin of the term ‘origo’ doesn’t matter much. Following Agha, I will just use the term to refer to the person from whose perspective a given evidential is evaluated. Thus, I will speak of ‘the origo of this sentence’, ‘origo shifts’, and other such things. The notion of origo is tied up with evidentiality, since evidentials are always evaluated from the point of view of someone. That is, evidentials are always used to indicate the evidence that someone has for something.

The second important notion is ‘evidential modality’. By this I mean the kind of evidentiality marked by a given construction. Cross-linguistically, evidentials are used to indicate a variety of different modalities, including
hearsay, inference, perception, and so forth. With an evidential one can indicate that one knows something because one heard it from someone, or because one concluded by reasoning that it must be so, or because one saw the event transpire.

In Tibetan, there are three major evidential modalities. First there is ‘indirect’, which is used when the origo has indirect evidence for her assertion. Indirect includes inference and hearsay. Second there is ‘direct’, which indicates that an assertion is based on perceptual evidence: normally, direct is used when the origo has seen a situation, although other sensory modalities also qualify as direct.

Third and finally, there is ‘ego’, a category of evidentiality apparently unique to the Tibeto-Burman language family. Ego evidentials are used when the origo has intimate and immediate knowledge of a situation. Ego knowledge includes self-knowledge, but there are other subcategories of ego as well.

The majority of this study is devoted to exploring the differences among these three modalities. Although there are some commonalities among them, and they are all part of the same paradigm, there are also substantial differences. The chapters to come should make it clear that at some level, the three modalities are rather dissimilar creatures.
I have divided the bulk of this study into six chapters. Chapters 2 through 4 examine the three modalities. I start with indirect in Chapter 2. In Tibetan, indirect is the most syntactically restricted evidential modality. I argue that this is because indirect is a performative epistemic modal. In claiming that it is performative, I build on Palmer’s (1990) work on the subjectivity of epistemic modality. My informal semantic implementation follows Izvorski’s (1997) reading of Kratzer’s (1981) possible worlds theory of modality. My proposal in Chapter 2 supports Izvorski’s claim that indirect evidentiality is a kind of epistemic modality.

In Chapter 3, I look at direct evidentiality. My central claim is that direct evidentiality is complex. On the one hand, I argue that direct consists in part of a demonstrative component. This component establishes a link to the external world, and requires that situations marked by direct be stage-level (locatable), in the sense of Carlson (1977) and Kratzer (1995). On the other hand, I show that the evidential meat of direct comes from $Know$, a pragmatic property of assertion. In the presence of the demonstrative component, $Know$ imposes the restriction that direct-marked sentences denote observable situations. In support of my hypothesis, I show that the demonstrative component can be separated from the pragmatic component, i.e. that there are environments where only the demonstrative component occurs.
In Chapter 4, I turn to ego evidentiality. I argue that this kind of evidentiality is a morphologically zero ‘elsewhere’ case, and that ego interpretations arise by default in the absence of overt indirect or direct marking. I argue that ego evidentiality indicates ‘immediate’ or possibly ‘groundless’ knowledge, a subcategory of which is self-knowledge or attitudes de se. I argue against Chierchia’s (1989) property-based view of de se, and explore performatives and special ego uses of names.

The remainder of the chapter is about the first-person restriction on ego. According to this restriction, sentences with ego evidentiality must have a first-person argument in a prominent grammatical position, usually subject position. I show, however, that the restriction varies in strength according to the aspect of the construction, and I conclude by arguing that the restriction is weakest of all in generic aspect. I argue that this is because the evidential grounding for generic claims is different from that for particular claims, an idea which supports Carlson’s (1995) ideas on generics.

While Chapters 2 through 4 focus on simple clauses, Chapters 5 through 7 examine complex and embedded clauses. Chapter 5 looks at embeddings which retain all evidential oppositions, mainly complements of verbs of speech or thought. I argue that embedded evidential oppositions are available only to those heads which embed assertive speech acts. I also
compare evidentials with logophors, another phenomenon that depends on assertion.

Chapter 6 is about questions. In questions, the evidential origo shifts from first person to second person. That is, while in statements evidentials are evaluated from the perspective of the speaker, in questions they are meant to be evaluated from the perspective of the hearer. To account for this, I suggest that questions be analyzed according to Hamblin (1973) or Karttunen’s (1977) traditional answer-set analysis, but that the answer-set consists of assertive speech acts rather than propositions.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I examine the antecedents or protases of conditionals. I argue that there is a distinction between hypothetical and interactional conditionals. Interactional conditionals require active involvement on the part of the hearer or some other discourse participant. Such conditionals implicate that someone other than the speaker is in a position to judge whether or not the protasis (antecedent) is true. The properties of this category of conditional help to explain some otherwise puzzling person asymmetries related to evidentiality in Tibetan conditionals.
1.3. Assertion

Chapters 2-7 could probably be read in any order, since they are relatively independent of each other. However, if there is a theme that links these chapters together, it is the idea of ‘assertion’, along with the commitments it entails. Generally speaking, indirect, direct, and ego are in complementary distribution: clauses are marked for one modality, not two or three. But I argue that all three modalities are crucially dependent on assertion.

In the case of indirect, there is a direct connection to assertion. I argue that indirect is a performative epistemic modal. I define ‘performative sentences’ as sentences which—in the normal case—become true by virtue of being uttered. In contexts where assertions cannot be made—for example, in the protasis of a conditional—performatives do not occur. Therefore, since indirect is performative, and performatives depend on assertion, there can be no indirect without an assertion.

Assertion is also crucial for the direct modality. In Chapter 3, I advance the view that direct evidentials get their observability restriction from \textit{Know}, a fundamental pragmatic property of assertion, namely the property that when a person says something, she presents herself as knowing that thing. I further develop this view in Chapter 7, where I show that in non-assertive
embedded contexts, specifically conditional protases, direct markers occur, but without the observability restriction.

I also claim that ego evidentiality only arises because of assertion. As with direct, ego comes about because when someone asserts something, she must present herself as knowing it. Ego may be default evidentiality, but it is still crucially dependent on assertion.

Assertion is also central to the properties shared by the evidential modalities. All three modalities are found in matrix declaratives, as Chapters 2 through 4 discuss. But they are also all found in contexts of embedded speech and thought—namely, in those embedded contexts which can be said to involve (embedded) assertions. Presuppositional embeddings—i.e. those embeddings which presuppose rather than assert the truth of their content—do not support evidential oppositions.

Finally, as mentioned above, in Chapter 6 I look at questions, where the origo shifts from speaker to hearer. This leads me to argue that questions denote sets of assertions—from the point of view of the hearer. Thus, in Chapter 6, I argue that the traditional answer-set view of questions is correct, but that the answer-set consists of assertions and not propositions.
1.4. A brief introduction to Tibetan

My aim in this section is to introduce you to the constructions and grammatical features that will be referred to throughout this study. I will only give a few simple examples of each construction. If you are already familiar with Tibetan, you might nevertheless read on just to familiarize yourself with my terminology and notation.

1.4.1. Constructions

I focus on the constructions in (1) below. Most of the cells are indexed with the number of an example sentence to be given shortly. I give no examples of the perfect, since this construction lies outside the scope of this dissertation. The ELPA construction, so named by Nancy Caplow, includes existential, locative, possessive, and attributive sentences.

(1) Tibetan evidentials (cf. DeLancey 1986):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EGO</th>
<th>DIRECT</th>
<th>INDIRECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERFECT</td>
<td>V-yod</td>
<td>V-‘dug</td>
<td>V-yod.red</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11
Notice that ego constructions are normally built up from a ‘y-verb’, either the copula *yin* or the ELPA verb *yod*. Direct constructions occur with *song* (in the simple past), or with the ELPA verb ‘*dug*’. Indirect constructions always have either *red* or *yod.red*.

In example sentences throughout this dissertation, I gloss the main verb, if there is one, and then the construction as a whole. For example, with the verb (V) as ‘*gro* ‘to go’, I gloss ‘*gro-gi-yin* as go-[ego fut], while *yod.red* on its own is glossed [ind ELPA]. I do not separately gloss nominalizers, tense, or aspect, for example *pa* and *gi*, which Agha (1993) glosses as ‘presupposed’ and ‘unrealized’, respectively.

The examples break down as follows. Line one is given in Tibetan script, since this is easiest for Tibetans and scholars of Tibetan to read. Line two is a morphological parse of the Tibetan sentence, encoded in a variant of the Wylie transliteration format for Tibetan (Wylie 1959), with some adjustments made to enhance readability for linguists.1 Although Tibetan script does not mark word or morpheme boundaries, in line two I mark (relevant) morpheme boundaries with dashes, syllable boundaries with periods, and word boundaries with white space. Note that the transliteration system includes consonants that have not been pronounced for over a
millenium, so care should be taken when trying to reproduce these examples in public.

The following examples are illustrations of each of the constructions I will focus on in this work. I include them without discussion, as the point is simply to give you an initial feel for Tibetan word order, syntax, and evidentiality.

(2) ego copula

\[
\text{nga dge.rgan yin}
\]

I teacher [ego cop]

‘I am a teacher.’

(3) indirect copula

\[
yang.chen dge.rgan red
\]

Yangchen teacher [ind cop]

‘Yangchen is a teacher.’

(4) ego past

\[
kha.sa nga khong-gi-nang-la phyin-pa-yin
\]

yesterday I he-gen-house-loc go-[ego past]

‘Yesterday I went to his house.’

---

I adopt a version of the ‘extended Wylie’ transliteration scheme proposed by scholars at the University of Virginia. Precise details of this system are not important to the content of this work.
(5) direct past

kho phyin-song
he go-[dir past]
‘He left.’ [eg. I saw him]

(6) indirect past

kho phyin-pa-red
he go-[ind past]
‘He left.’ [eg. I infer, it is known]

(7) ego future

sang.nyin nga khyed.rang-gi-nang-la yong-gi-yin
tomorrow I you-gen-house-loc come-[ego fut]
‘Tomorrow I’ll come to your house.’

(8) indirect future

kho ‘gro-gi-red
he go-[ind fut]
‘He’ll go.’ [eg. I assume]

(9) ego imperfective

nga nyi.ma rtag.par ‘bras za-gi-yod
I day always rice eat-[ego imp]
‘I eat rice every day.’
(10) direct imperfective

kho da.lta kha.lag za-gi-'dug
he now food eat-[dir imp]
‘He’s eating now.’ [eg. I see him]

(11) indirect imperfective

nyi.ma rtag.par bkra.shis-gis tshong.khang de thong-gi-yod.red
day always Tashi-erg store that see-[ind imp]
‘Tashi sees that store every day.’ [eg. I’m told, I assume]

(12) ego ELPA

nga skyid.po yod
I happy [ego ELPA]
‘I am (generally) happy.’

(13) direct ELPA

dir mo.Ta mang.po 'dug
here car many [dir ELPA]
‘There are a lot of cars here.’ [eg. I see them]

(14) indirect ELPA

dei.ring 'dir mchod.chang spro.bo zhe.drag yod.red
today here wine tasty very [ind ELPA]
‘The wine here today is very delicious [I’ve been told; I assume]’
1.4.2. Concepts

In this section I introduce a few of the key recurring concepts in the study of Tibetan evidentiality. I start with a conceptual supercategory, the idea of ‘privileged access to information.’ Two subcategories of privileged access that are especially important in Tibetan, but seldom found or noticed in other languages, are ‘volitionality’ and ‘observability’. Below I treat these three concepts in turn.

1.4.2.1. Privileged access

Some say that first-person knowledge is more authoritative than non-first-person knowledge, while others believe that claims to knowledge can be equally authoritative regardless of who makes them. While the debate rages on, I have nothing to add.

A less controversial thesis is that certain kinds of things can be known in certain ways only by certain people. By ‘privileged access’, I refer to this less controversial position. According to privileged access, there are facts I can know in a certain way, which others cannot know in that same way.

Numerous constraints on Tibetan evidentiality cannot be explained without assuming privileged access. Frequently, a particular evidential $E$ cannot be used with predicate $P$ and subject $s$, because the origo cannot
possibly know in way $E$ that $P$ applies to $s$. Typically, problems arise when
the origo tries to claim something about someone else, when this knowledge
can only be gained via privileged access. Examples are given below.

1.4.2.2. Volitionality

In Tibetan, verbs can be divided into two general classes: ‘volitional’, and
‘involuntary’ or ‘non-volitional’. Volitional verbs describe events over which
their agent has control, at least in the sense of controlling the ‘force dynamic’
behind the event (Hargreaves 1991b). In contrast, involuntary verbs, normally
stative, describe situations that the agent or experiencer cannot control.

The two verb classes are distinguished by numerous mostly semantic
tests. Only volitional verbs can occur with intentional adverbs, and only
volitional verbs can occur as imperatives or with purposive clauses. Also,
while involuntary verbs that lack overt agents are not necessarily assumed to
have agents, overly agentless volitional sentences are always interpreted as
having implicit agents.

There are other differences, but I refer the reader to Agha (1993). For
my purposes none of these tests is particularly important. What is important is
DeLancey’s (1986) claim that first-person volitional sentences occur with ego
evidentiality because the origo has privileged access to her own acts of volition (see also Hargreaves 1991b).

The fact is that some ego constructions—including the future and the past—can only occur if the subject is first-person and the verb is volitional:

(15) Volitional verb  
a.  

\[ \text{kho} \text{ go-[ind fut]}/*\text{go-[ego fut]} \]

‘He’ll go.’

b.  

\[ \text{nga} \text{ go-[ego fut]} \]

‘I’ll go.’

(16) Non-volitional verb  
a.  

\[ \text{kho-s see-[dir past]}/*\text{see-[ego past]} \]

‘He saw it.’

b.  

\[ \text{nga-s see-[dir past]}/*\text{see-[ego past]} \]

‘I saw it.’
While (15b) is fine with the ego future, (15a) is not: the verb ‘gro ‘go’ may be volitional, but the subject is not first-person. Neither kind of subject may occur with ego if the verb is involuntary, as in (16) with thong ‘to see’.

Although the association of evidentiality with volitionality appears to be restricted to Tibeto-Burman, volitionality itself is an areal feature of South Asia. It has been identified as a significant factor in the grammars of languages such as Bengali (Klaiman 1980), Hindi (Pandharipande 1981), and Sinhala (Gair 1970; Inman 1992,1993). Volitionality will play an important role in Chapters 2, 4, and 7.

1.4.2.3. Observability

The second important and unique kind of privileged access involves direct evidentials and certain body-internal experiences. Sun (1993) noticed the importance of the notion of ‘observability’ to certain constructions. Some Tibetan predicates, such as ‘to be hungry’, are conceptualized as totally internal events, i.e. events with no external manifestation. As a result, such predicates cannot occur in assertions with direct and non-first-person experiencers. The idea is that one can only observe (have direct evidence for) something that is observable, and when it comes to someone else’s states, only
those internal experiences with substantial outward manifestations count as observable to the origo.

The effect of observability is shown below:

(17)  \[
\text{ngag/}^{*}\text{khyed.rang/}^{*}\text{kho} \quad \text{grod.khog} \quad \text{ltogs-gi-'}\text{dug}
\]
\text{I/*you/*he} \quad \text{stomach} \quad \text{hunger-[dir imp]}

‘I’m hungry.’

Since \text{grod.khog ltogs} ‘to be hungry’ is an unobservable predicate, this sentence can only occur with the direct imperfective if the experiencer is first-person.

Observability will be very important at various points in this dissertation, particularly in Chapters 3, 4, and 7.

1.5. Previous work

Previous work on Tibetan evidentiality includes papers by Chang and Chang (1980, 1981, 1984), and DeLancey (1986, 1990), and books by Agha (1993), Tournadre and Dorje (1998), and Denwood (1999). Those who want an overall introduction to Tibetan that is easily accessible to linguists without prior knowledge of the language should consult Denwood’s book, which is a
more general grammar than Tournadre and Dorje’s pedagogically focussed work.

Aside from these authors, other linguists have worked on and are continuing to work on evidentiality in closely related Tibeto-Burman languages, such as Newari (Hale 1980; Hargreaves 1991a,b) and Sherpa (Schöttelndreyer 1980). There is much other work on evidentiality in Tibeto-Burman, as well as much work in progress. Evidentiality has become one of the hottest areas of research in Tibeto-Burman linguistics.

I will not do a general survey and comparison of previous authors’ views on Tibetan. Instead, I will just bring their views up where appropriate. In part this is because my dissertation is not an oppositional reaction to the work of any of these authors. Rather, I see it as a further investigation, an attempt to take seriously issues that have so far been unexplored. Principally, I intend to broaden the scope of the investigation, by emphasizing the important influence the Tibetan data can and should have on theories of semantics, pragmatics, and philosophy. I hope to stimulate further research by clarifying issues and terminology, and drawing a rough map of this largely uncharted territory.
In this chapter, I examine Tibetan’s indirect evidentials. My basic claim is that Tibetan’s indirect markers, such as *red* and *yod.red*, are ‘performative epistemic necessity modals’. As such, they are (a) performative, and (b) epistemic necessity modals.

What is a performative modal? Naturally, it is something which merges two concepts, the concept of performativity and the concept of modality. I execute this merger in an informal way, with somewhat counterintuitive results. Still, the idea pays off empirically. Indirect evidentials have extremely limited distribution in Tibetan—they are only allowed in core assertive environments (matrix clauses; embedded assertions, cf. Chapter 5; and questions, cf. Chapter 6). I will argue that this is because of their performativity.

In Section 2.1, I present my picture of what a performative epistemic modal is. I start by looking at performatives in 2.1.1, and then I turn to epistemic modality in 2.1.2. Section 2.1.3 then explains what the merger of the two notions should look like.
In Section 2.2., I look at indirect evidentiality, and in particular at Tibetan. Section 2.2.1 examines ordinary uses of indirect in Tibetan, which include hearsay, inference, impersonalization, and in the apodoses (consequents) of counterfactual conditionals. Section 2.2.2 considers Izvorski’s (1997) argument that indirect evidentiality is a kind of epistemic modality. I adopt her view, with an added performative dimension. Section 2.2.3 considers the empirical payoff of making indirect a performative epistemic modal.

2.1. Performative epistemic modality

2.1.1. Performatives

According to Austin (1962), performative sentences are used to ‘do things with words’. So, if we take the following examples,

(1) I promise to finish my dissertation on time.
(2) I christen this ship ‘Lucy’.

we notice that the main purpose of saying them is not so much to report how the world is, as it is to perform an action in the saying. Saying *I promise...* is a promise, and saying *I christen this ship ‘Lucy’* is a christening. Compare (1) and (2) with their past tense versions:
(3) I promised to finish my dissertation on time.
(4) I christened this ship ‘Lucy’.

These sentences are in contrast simply reports about what happened. The past tense versions of (1) and (2) lose their performativity.

Austin began by distinguishing performatives like (1) and (2) from non-performatives like (3) and (4). He suggested that performative sentences had ‘felicity conditions’ rather than ‘truth-values’. For example, instead of searching for the truth-conditions of (2), he stressed that what is important in (2) is whether or not the speaker has the authority to christen the ship. If not, then the sentence ‘fails’. Otherwise an utterance of the sentence successfully performs a christening.

Since Austin’s work, the dominant view of performatives has changed. Now, most semanticists and philosophers believe that performative sentences can be true or false, just like any other sentences (please see Chapter 4 for discussion and references). On this approach, sentences like (1) and (2) may seem to be doing things with words, but really they are not all that special. I call this the truth-functional view of performatives.

The difference between performatives and non-performatives on the truth-functional view is that performative sentences, unlike non-performatives, play a causal role in establishing their own truth. So, it is not
that (1) and (2) are neither true nor false. Rather, (1) and (2) are almost always true. In the normal case, an utterance of (1) makes (1) true, and an utterance of (2) makes (2) true. Note, however, that the truth-functional view does not dispense with felicity conditions, so it still admits that (2) can be false, for example, if the speaker does not have the authority to christen the ship.

The advantage of the truth-functional view is that it treats performatives like other declarative sentences, which seems correct, since performatives are declarative sentences.

In this dissertation, I refer to the fact that the utterance of a performative plays a causal role in establishing its truth as ‘truth by say-so’ (cf. Chapter 4). I do not mean by this that performative sentences are always true, but rather that they are normally true provided that their felicity conditions are met.

When dealing with performatives, it is helpful to distinguish the ‘communicated message’ from the ‘represented message’. The represented message of (1) is that the speaker is making a promise, i.e. it is the actual semantic message of the sentence. Since the represented message of a performative is nearly always true, it is seldom the communicated message of
the sentence. The communicated message of (1) is that the speaker will finish his dissertation on time.

In general, if someone utters a performative like (1) and is disagreed with, the disagreement concerns the communicated message and not the represented message. Therefore, (5) is a more typical response to (1) than (6) is:

(5) Ok, but I don’t think you will.
(6) No you don’t.

This is important to keep in mind, since in this respect performatives differ from non-performatives. (8) seems more natural in response to (3) than (6) does in response to (1):

(7) Yeah, but still you didn’t finish on time!
(8) No, you didn’t. You said you *might* finish it on time, not that you *would*.

2.1.2. Epistemic modality

Modals are propositional operators concerned with possibility or necessity. In this section, I focus on epistemic necessity modals, i.e. necessity modals that have to do with knowledge-based attitudes. In (9), ‘must’ is an epistemic necessity modal:
(9) John must be on his way.
(10) John is on his way.

By uttering (9), the speaker judges that John is on his way, based on the (indirect) evidence available, i.e. based on what relevant knowledge is available. (9) differs from (10), which is a simple unmodalized claim.

Kratzer’s (1981) theory is a popular approach to the semantics of modality. She exploits possible worlds semantics, which takes a ‘world’ to be a set of propositions, namely those propositions that are true at the world. In this approach, a proposition is a function from worlds to truth values, or to put it another way, a set of worlds, namely those worlds at which the proposition is true.

Intuitively, a world is an alternate vision of how the actual world could be. We live in the actual world, but for semantics and philosophy of language it is sometimes helpful to also consider distorted worlds, i.e. worlds in which different propositions hold. For example in this world I am a student, but in another world I might be a fugitive. What would that world be like?

If a world can only be fully specified by a complete list of what propositions are and are not true in it, then in an important sense we don’t know what world we are in. Why? Because unless we are omniscient, there are some things about our world that we don’t know.
Therefore, it is often helpful to refer to sets of worlds, for example, the set of worlds that are consistent with what is known about the actual world. If we don’t know what world we are in, then this set might be a useful set, for sometimes I might want to talk about things that are not true ‘come what may’, but rather are contingent on available knowledge. This set of worlds may be referred to as the set of ‘epistemically accessible worlds’.

In Kratzer’s theory, epistemic modality requires us to quantify over the set of epistemically accessible worlds. While the unmodalized (10) states, plain and simple about the actual world, that John is on his way; the modal sentence in (9) makes a different statement. According to Kratzer, (9) says that in all the epistemically accessible worlds, it is true that John is on his way. This can be paraphrased as *In light of what is known, John is on his way*. Therefore, (9) is not a categorical statement that John is on his way.

The locution *in light of what is known* is meant as shorthand for the set of epistemically accessible worlds. However, it is shorthand for what could be called an ‘objective’ set of epistemically accessible worlds. There is no knower in the locution. Apparently, *what is known* means something like *what is generally known*. Disapproving of this objectivity, Palmer (1990:7) proposes that “epistemic necessity, indicated by *must*, is thus not to be
paraphrased as, *In the light of what is known it is necessarily the case that...*, but by something like, *From what I know the only conclusion I can draw is...”*

In the same spirit, Kratzer (1981:57), noting Lyons’ (1977) work on the subjectivity of modality, recognizes that modal constructions may differ depending on whether they are ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’. I take the locution *from what I know* to be subjective, and therefore I will refer to the worlds it determines as a subjective set of epistemically accessible worlds.

2.1.3. Performative epistemic modality

The crucial property of performatives is truth by say-so, i.e. the causal role the utterance plays in promoting its own truth. The crucial property of epistemic (necessity) modals is that they involve (universal) quantification over epistemically accessible worlds. A performative epistemic modal, then, is a modal which has both of these properties. Let me start by examining epistemic modality as it stands, and seeing whether or not it has the property of truth by say-so.

Consider first the case where the relevant set of worlds is an objective set of epistemically accessible worlds, which can be paraphrased by the locution, *in light of what is known*. For convenience I repeat (9) below:

(9) John must be on his way.
If Lucy says (9), then there are two ways she could be mistaken. On the one hand, since the epistemically accessible worlds are objective, she could be ignorant about what is known, and therefore her reasoning might be good but she might be wrong because she doesn’t know what’s known. Given this error, her assertion might be countered as in (11):

(11) No, he’s not on his way, because he had an accident this morning.

On the other hand, Lucy could have bad logic. She might know what’s known, and yet reason to the wrong conclusion.

This sense of epistemic modality is therefore not performative. Lucy’s utterance of (9) is not true by say-so, because surely it is not a felicity condition of (9) that she know all that is known.

Next consider the case where the relevant set of worlds is a subjective set of epistemically accessible worlds, which can be paraphrased by the locution, from what I know. Now, if Lucy says (9) according to this background, then again she may be mistaken on two separate grounds. As before, Lucy’s logic may be poor. She may conclude that John is on his way, even though it does not follow from what she knows.
Alternatively, Lucy could be mistaken because what she in fact knows is not what she thinks she knows. Suppose that I know what Lucy knows better than she does. Then she could err in stating (9), because although she concludes that John is on his way from $P$, in fact she should conclude that John isn’t on his way from $Q$, which I know to be her true knowledge state.\(^2\)

There is something especially odd about the above mistake. Notice that in my correction I am only concerned with Lucy’s knowledge state, and not about facts in general. Consider the following set of facts:

\begin{align*}
    (12) & \text{ A = John comes to everyone’s parties.} \\
    & \text{ B = John said he would leave at 9pm} \\
    & \text{ C = John got in a terrible accident this morning. }
\end{align*}

From the cumulative force of facts A, B, and C, it follows that John \textit{isn’t} on his way. From facts A and B alone, it follows that John \textit{is} on his way.

Suppose furthermore that Lucy knows facts A and B, but that she also mistakenly believes that John never does what he says (D). She thinks she knows A, B, and D (that John never does what he says), and so she concludes that John \textit{isn’t} on his way, letting B + D outweigh A. In fact, however, since I know that D is false, I know that all Lucy knows is A and B. Therefore, I

\[^2\text{Although instances may be rare, one can challenge someone else’s knowledge:}\]

A: I know he’s still alive.
B: No you don’t—you can’t—he’s dead.
correct her, telling her that she should conclude that John *is* on his way, even though I know perfectly well (and keep to myself) the fact that John *isn’t* on his way, given C.

I draw two conclusions from this discussion. First, the subjective sense of epistemic modality is not performative. Lucy’s utterance is not true by say-so, since it can be challenged on grounds not related to felicity conditions. (It is not a felicity condition of (9) that Lucy has good logic, or that she is able to correctly determine what she knows.) Secondly, the subjective sense of epistemic modality allows for seemingly unnatural and unattested challenges, as just discussed—and so perhaps it should not be adopted as it stands.

What needs to be done, then, to make epistemic modals performative? One possibility is that the candidate epistemic modal should become something like the verb ‘infer’ in *I infer that John is on his way*. ‘Infer’ does have the properties we are looking for. It has the right meaning, for one, and it is performative as well. Below I suggest a way of making epistemic modals performative, and therefore more like ‘infer’.

A sentence with an epistemic necessity modal $m$ and a proposition $p$ is true if, for all worlds in the accessibility set $W$, $p$ is true. To make this performative, then for each situation, $m$ must determine a set of worlds $W$
specific to that situation such that \( p \) is true at each world in \( W \). So, if Lucy says (9), and ‘must’ is a performative epistemic modal, then the accessibility set \( W \) should be chosen in a way that ensures that \textit{John is on his way} is true at each world in \( W \).

To ensure that the right set \( W \) is chosen, we can let ‘must’ itself assist in determining the set. Let the informal locution determining \( W \) be \textit{in the light of what must be}, where ‘must’ is relativized to a given speaker and situation, so that a different set of worlds is determined in each situation. In the case at hand—Lucy’s utterance of (9)—we let \( W \) be the set of worlds in which all that Lucy thinks must be is. By saying \textit{John must be on his way}, Lucy tells us that \textit{John is on his way} is one of the propositions that must be. Therefore, \( p \) is automatically true at all worlds in \( W \)—or rather, it is true at all worlds in \( W \) because the utterance of (9) makes it true at all these worlds.

I remain agnostic about whether or not English ‘must’ is a performative modal. Palmer (1990:11) is less restrained, although whether his definition of ‘performative’ would agree with mine is not clear:

... with epistemic modals speakers actually make a judgment about the truth of propositions, while with deontic modals they actually give permission or lay obligations ... None of this is surprising if the modals are essentially performative, for a performative is ‘performed’ by the action of speaking. (Palmer 1990:11)
There are two possible advantages to taking a performative view of ‘must’. First, it might help to account for the kinds of responses one finds to modal claims. Recall from the section on performatives that when a performative sentence is disagreed with, what is challenged is the communicated message rather than the represented message. In the case of epistemic modality, if the represented message is true by say-so, then we might similarly expect that disagreements with a modal assertion would concern the communicated message rather than the represented message.

Judging from the following reactions to (9), this expectation seems to be fulfilled:

(13) a. %No, John must not be on his way.
    b. %No, it’s not the case that John must be on his way.
    c. No, you’re wrong, he isn’t on his way.

If (13a) is acceptable, it is either with reduced ‘mustn’t’, in which case ‘must’ takes on a non-epistemic obligational reading; or with stress on ‘not’, in which case ‘not’ scopes under ‘must’, and so what is negated is not the modal claim itself. (I would paraphrase this reading as: *No, it must be that John is not on his way.*) I find (13b) to be of dubious status; while (13c), a negation of the communicated message, is the most natural response.
A second advantage of the performative view is that it might explain why epistemic ‘must’ and ‘may’ don’t occur in conditional protases (antecedents): “Strictly, neither epistemic nor deontic modals can occur in protases. They are performative in the sense that the speaker actually expresses a judgment or a ‘directive’, and that cannot be conditional” (Palmer 1990:182). In this way, Palmer relates the anomaly of If John must be arriving tomorrow... to the impossibility of If I promise to be there... read performatively.4

The above anomaly hinges on the fact that to be performative, it is not enough for a string of words of a particular sort to be uttered: they must also be uttered in assertive mood. For a performative to be true by say-so, it must be presented as being true by say-so, which means there must be a saying, or something very near a saying. Conditional sentences do not assert their protases; therefore their protases cannot be performative.5

3 Note that with example sentences, % marks pragmatic infelicity, ? marks questionable grammaticality, and * marks ungrammaticality.

4 Palmer (1990:54) notes that must plus the progressive disambiguates in favor of the epistemic reading. Must plus a bare verb is often interpreted as a ‘dynamic’ modal (see below). Although Palmer was the first to frame the discussion in terms of performativity, Jenkins (1972:96) preceded him in the observation that epistemic modality does not occur in conditional protases.

5 According to Palmer, “an epistemic or deontic modal can, however, occur if it echoes what has already been said, eg: If he may come tomorrow ... This could mean ‘If you say he may come tomorrow’, in either an epistemic or deontic sense” (Palmer 1990:182).
2.2. Indirect evidentiality

I start this section by briefly examining the core uses of indirect in Tibetan. Then I turn to Izvorski’s (1997) argument that indirect evidentials are epistemic modals. Finally, I demonstrate the main empirical payoff of adopting the view that Tibetan indirect is a performative epistemic modal.

2.2.1. Indirect in Tibetan

In this section I look at the various uses of indirect in Tibetan. I will be considering the views and contributions of Agha (1993), Chang and Chang (1980, 1984), DeLancey (1986, 1990), Denwood (1999), and Tournadre and Dorje (1998).

I take over the term ‘indirect’ from DeLancey (1986, 1990). His theory leans heavily on what he calls the ‘cognitive model of event structure’. As he points out, (controllable) events originate with an act of volition in the mind of their agent. This act of volition leads to an event, which itself leaves behind a resultant state. According to DeLancey, different evidentials indicate that the speaker has knowledge of different links of this causal chain. If the

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6 Here I construe volition in either a wide sense or a narrow sense. That is, it need not imply planning ahead (the wide sense). It is enough for an act to involve narrow volition, i.e. everyday agentive control, in which we do things employing our free will but without foresight.
speaker uses indirect, then she implicates that she has no direct evidence for any link in the chain.

Denwood characterizes indirect in a similar way, calling it the ‘unwitnessed evidential modality’. Agha calls indirect an ‘impersonal factive’, a non-evidential used for ‘objective statements of fact’.

Before giving examples of how indirect is used, a preliminary point should be emphasized. Although indirect is associated with indirect forms of evidence, the knowledge it represents is still presented as certain knowledge. In other words, the speaker must be committed to what she is saying. Therefore, violations of Moore’s paradox—which accounts for the pragmatic infelicity of \textit{John left, but I don’t believe he did}—are disallowed here as with the other evidentials; one cannot assert $p$ and profess disbelief at the same time: \footnote{The word ‘intended’ before a translation means that this is a reading I want you to think about, but one which the sentence cannot have, either because the sentence is ungrammatical or because it must have a different reading. When a translation is preceded by ‘actually’ or nothing at all, then this is what the sentence actually means.}
Similarly, one can’t assert a proposition on one evidential grounds and deny it on another, as in (15). These examples show that although indirect invokes a less direct form of evidential grounding than other evidentials, it does not imply that there is any lower degree of commitment to the proposition expressed.

In the following sections, I briefly discuss several standard uses of indirect in Tibetan:
2.2.1.1. Hearsay

Indirect is often used for hearsay (Chang & Chang, DeLancey, Denwood). By ‘hearsay’ I don’t mean information that the speaker deems unreliable (see above), but rather just information that the speaker has learned through others. The following sentences are from Chang & Chang (1984:618-619), who cite numerous other examples in addition to these.

(16)

\begin{verbatim}
de.ring 'dir mchod.chang spro.bo zhe.drag yod.red
today here wine tasty very [ind ELPA]
\end{verbatim}

‘The wine here today is very delicious [I’ve been told; I assume]’

By saying (16), the speaker implies that she hasn’t tasted the wine.

Relatedly, indirect forms are standard in non-personal narratives and stories:

(17)

\begin{verbatim}
sngon.ma sngon.ma gcig-la spo'o gcig dang rmo'o cig yod.red
before before one-loc man one and woman one [ind ELPA]
\end{verbatim}

‘Once, a long, long time ago, there was an old man and an old woman’
Indirect is also typically used in cases of inference. This is true in the following case, where the inferential background comes from the context:

(18) After the leaders in a nunnery have given birth to children, the other nuns can come to only one conclusion:

```
da gdan.gdan nga.tsho'i dkyil-la khyo.ka gcig slebs yod.red
```

‘Now, there must certainly be among us a man who has come here.’
(Chang & Chang 1984:621)

It is also true when the facts that guide the inference are overt. Imagine an amnesiac studying a sheet of paper with two columns: the left column has a list of names, and the right column tells us, for each person, where he went for holiday last year. Fortunately our amnesiac knows his own name (Tashi), so he looks for his name on the list, and then finds out where he went, thinking out loud as follows:

(19) a. `Tashi went to New York.'
b. $-/g-;Ü<-8Ü,Ê

I Tashi [ego cop]
‘I am Tashi.’

(c) byas.tsang nga New.York-la phyin-pa-red/*phyin-pa-yin
therefore I New York-loc go-[ind past]/*go-[ego past]
‘Therefore I went to New York.’

(19c) with [ego past] V-pa-yin implies not only that the speaker knows that she went, but also that she knows it in the ego way (cf. Chapter 4). Although she can, if logically adept, infer the content of fact (c) from facts (a) and (b), no amount of inference ensures that she will know (c) in the ego way. On the other hand, [ind past] V-pa-red occurs naturally in (c).

2.2.1.3. Impersonalization

The three evidential modalities form a hierarchy: ego > direct > indirect. Ego marks the most intimate kind of evidence, direct the next most intimate, and indirect the least intimate. In the usual case, it is a Gricean implicature that if you use an evidential lower on the hierarchy, then you lack stronger evidence for your assertion.
One place where indirect is often used unexpectedly with first-person volitional subjects is in statements about the distant past. Tournadre and others have noticed the tendency of ego to shift to indirect as a past event gets more and more remote:

(20) \[
\text{ nga} \quad lha.sa-r \quad \text{phyin-pa-red}
\]
I Lhasa-loc go-[ind past]
‘I went to Lhasa (for example, when I was small; i.e. I was taken there).’ (Chang & Chang 1980:17)

We see the same shift in (21), part of Jigme’s life history:

(21) \[
\text{bslab.grwa-la ma-phyin gong-la}
\]
school-loc neg-go before
\[
\text{ngas.gis nga.rang-gi skor-la ha.go-gi-med}
\]
I-erg myself-gen about-loc know-[ego neg imp]
‘As far as before I went to school, I don’t know much about myself.’
‘Because I don’t know what I was doing before I was five years old.’

‘Because at that time, I was small.  I was a kid.’

When an event is remote, often the speaker no longer recollects directly participating in it.  In this case, it is not uncommon to see examples like the two above.  The key parts of (21) are the parts in bold: there Jigme says that he was little, that he was just a kid (when he was five), which is why he doesn’t remember very much from that time.  We find indirect since he no longer has any direct knowledge of his early years.

Indirect verbs can also be used to make neutral or objective statements of fact about oneself:

(22) 

‘I’m a student.’ (Agha 1993:174)
Here, Agha (1993:175) writes, “the speaker speaks impersonally about himself… To speak this way is to speak of the self impersonally, detachedly, as if to say ‘that is simply the way things are.’”

2.2.1.4. Counterfactual apodoses

Indirect is usually the only member of a given tense/aspect construction that can occur as the apodosis (consequent, i.e. main clause) of a counterfactual conditional.9

Starting with the future, which consists of the opposition between ego \( V\text{-gi-yin} \) and indirect \( V\text{-gi-red} \), we see that only indirect is allowed in the apodosis of a counterfactual conditional; focus especially on the parts in bold:

(23)  

8 It is not clear to me what contextual factors trigger this kind of impersonalization, which is especially common in copular clauses. It may be relevant that such knowledge is public and general, something that anybody could know. For more examples and discussion, see Agha (1993), as well as Chang and Chang (1980:18-19).

9 For discussion of factors that constrain conditional protases (antecedents, i.e. subordinate clauses), see Chapter 7.
Even though I don’t have [work] papers I have to work. If I had papers I’d do some other work. I wouldn’t work in the store.

Other indirect constructions are found in the apodoses of counterfactual conditionals, not just the indirect future $V$-$gi$-$red$. According to both Denwood, and Tournadre and Dorje, the most common auxiliary used in the apodosis of counterfactuals is the indirect perfect $V$-$yod$-$red$. As before, other members of the evidential paradigm (direct and ego) are blocked:

(24)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sman} & \quad \text{bzas-pa-yin-na} \\
\text{medicine this} & \quad \text{eat-[past]-if} \\
\text{gzugs.po} & \quad \text{bsdad-yod.red/\text{*yod/\text{*dug}} \\
\text{body} & \quad \text{well become stay-[ind perf]/\text{*ego perf/\text{*dir perf}}
\end{align*}
\]

‘If I had taken this medicine, I would have got better.’

(Denwood 1999:160)
The ELPA verb *yod* is also found in counterfactual apodoses:

\[(25)\]

\[
\text{mdangs.dgong} \quad \text{gangs rgyab} \quad \text{med-na} \\
\text{last night} \quad \text{snow} \quad \text{[neg perf]-if}
\]

\[
\text{ta.lta nga} \quad \text{las.khung-la} \quad \text{*yod/*'dug} \\
\text{now I} \quad \text{office-loc} \quad \text{[ind ELPA]/*[ego ELPA]/*[dir ELPA]}
\]

‘If it hadn’t snowed last night, I’d be in the office now.’

2.2.2. *Indirect evidentiality as epistemic modality*

We have just looked at several common uses of indirect. These include hearsay, inference, and impersonalization; plus we find indirect in the apodoses of counterfactual conditionals. What do these ordinary uses of indirect have to do with epistemic modality?

Here I turn to Izvorski (1997), who has argued that indirect evidentiality is a kind of epistemic modality, largely on the basis of Bulgarian

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\[10\] The examples in this section exhibit neutralization to indirect. However, this does not mean that indirect is semantically bleached here, and is therefore occurring as the default, ‘elsewhere’ case. As Chapter 4 shows, that role is reserved for ego evidentiality; and whenever there is evidential neutralization, it is to ego and not indirect.
Izvorski’s theory is modeled on Kratzer’s theory of modality, with only minor modifications.

For Kratzer, epistemic modality involves quantification over worlds belonging to an accessibility set $W$. This set can be called the ‘conversational background’. It consists of epistemically accessible worlds, which are determined objectively or subjectively, as discussed above.

According to Izvorski, indirect evidentials share the same basic interpretational structure. However, in the case of indirect evidentials, the conversational background is determined in a different way. Instead of being the set of epistemically accessible worlds, it is the set of worlds in which all propositions that constitute the available indirect evidence for the speaker’s claim in this world, are true. This set is actually a subset of the set of known propositions, since not all known facts constitute indirect evidence for the speaker’s claim.

Therefore, we have an indirect evidential $i$, modifying a proposition $p$; in a situation with available evidence $E$, which determines a set of worlds $W$. The sentence $i$ applied to $p$ is true if $p$ is true at each world in $W$. In other words, the sentence is true if $p$ follows from the available indirect evidence.
As an account of indirect evidentiality, I find Izvorski’s proposal appealing. Like epistemic modality, indirect evidentiality involves reasoning from a network of facts, rather than direct confrontation with the event or situation reported. In this respect, indirect evidentiality differs from both direct evidentiality and ego evidentiality, which require direct witnessing and an immediate evidence relation, respectively. Cases of hearsay, inference, impersonalization, and even the conclusions of counterfactual arguments, are all based on reasoning from a network of facts, and not on experience in a direct and unmediated way.

For Tibetan, however, I suggest that indirect must also be augmented with a performative component. That is, indirect should be a performative epistemic modal, as outlined earlier. As before, in order to acquire the property of truth by say-so and thus become performative, indirect must ensure that the conversational background $W$ is chosen in such a way that the speaker’s claim is automatically true at each world in $W$.

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11 In this chapter I have simplified the exposition by ignoring a significant component of both Kratzer’s and Izvorski’s theory, namely what they call the ‘ordering source’. For details, please see their papers.
Again, one way to do this would be to let the set of worlds $W$ be those in which whatever (indirect) evidence there is supports the speaker’s conclusion $p$. In other words, we make sure that the sentence is true by ensuring that only evidence that the speaker takes as constituting evidence for his claim be considered.

Notice that if this is the right way of looking at indirect evidentiality in Tibetan, we should not consider, as Izvorski recommends, the available indirect evidence in the actual world, since we must ensure that the speaker’s assertion is true even if his evidence is faulty. Therefore, in determining the set $W$ in a given situation, we need only consider those bits of evidence that the speaker actually considers evidence.

2.2.3. Empirical payoff

Because of the similarities between epistemic modality and indirect evidentiality highlighted by Izvorski’s work, I have suggested that Tibetan indirect is a kind of epistemic modality. However, the real empirical payoff comes from adding the performative dimension. Indirect evidentiality is severely restricted in Tibetan. It can only occur in core assertive environments (matrix clauses; embedded assertions, cf. Chapter 5; and
questions, cf. Chapter 6). However, it cannot occur in conditional protases, nor can it occur in other non-assertive embeddings.

Therefore, the following sentences, showing each of the various indirect constructions as a conditional protasis, are all ungrammatical. (For detailed discussion of conditionals, please see Chapter 7.)

(26) Future

* kho \text{ \textit{gro-gi-red-na...}}
he \text{ \textit{go-[ind fut]-if}}
‘If he’ll go...’

(27) Copula

* kho \text{ \textit{dge.rgan red-na...}}
he \text{ \textit{teacher [ind cop]-if}}
‘If he’s a teacher...’

(28) Past

* kho \text{ \textit{na-pa-red-na...}}
he \text{ \textit{sick-[ind past]-if}}
‘If he was sick...’
As Palmer noted, the protases of conditionals may not be performative. Performatives are dependent on assertion (assertive speech acts), for without an assertion one cannot have truth by say-so. If Tibetan indirect is obligatorily performative, then the above facts follow immediately, for the same reason that *If I promise to finish my dissertation on time...* no longer has a performative reading.

In contrast, if indirect were a non-performative epistemic modal, then the above facts would be mysterious, since—as far as I’m aware—there exist no independent grounds for excluding epistemic modality from conditional protases.

For discussion of other embeddings, please see Chapter 5.
Chapter 3

Direct Evidentiality

The use of a direct evidential, as its name suggests, implies that there is a direct information link between the origo and the situation reported. To say Tashi left with direct is to say that you saw Tashi leave, you heard him leave, or that you have some other kind of direct perceptual evidence.

In this chapter I argue that what I’ve called ‘direct evidentiality’ actually has considerable internal complexity. Focusing on the ELPA (existential, locative, possessive, and attributive) verb ‘dug, I break direct evidentiality down into three parts: a non-evidential verbal component, a demonstrative component Dem, and the pragmatic feature of assertion, Know. The components have the following functions.

First, the ELPA verb itself projects a situation, by which I mean a rather general state of affairs, i.e. an event or state. The verbal component of ‘dug is the same as the verbal component of the two other ELPA verbs, that is, ego yod and indirect yod.red.

The demonstrative component Dem requires that the situation projected by the verb be stage-level, or as I will often say, locatable. I follow Kratzer (1995) in assuming that stage-level predicates have a spatiotemporal...
argument. With Fernald (2000), I agree that the stage-level quality of a verb must be present at the clausal level, and not just at the level of the predicate. As a result, I will sometimes talk of ‘stage-level situations’ rather than ‘stage-level predicates.’

The third property of direct evidentiality is contributed by assertion. I refer to this property as $\textit{Know}$, which is just a convenient label for the fact that when a person says something, he presents himself as knowing that thing. While $\textit{Dem}$ imposes a locatability restriction on direct evidentiality, $\textit{Know}$, when combined with $\textit{Dem}$, enforces an observability restriction, which requires the situation described to have been directly observed by the origo.

My proposal is able to account for some otherwise difficult facts. Putting part of direct evidentiality into $\textit{Know}$, and thus pragmatics, rather than into the verb ‘dug’ itself, opens up the possibility that some uses of ‘dug’ might have $\textit{Dem}$ but not $\textit{Know}$. That this is true is shown by the behavior of ‘dug’ in conditional protases, where the observability restriction is absent. In addition, the separation of $\textit{Dem}$ and $\textit{Know}$ makes direct evidentiality more like ego evidentiality. In Chapter 4, I show that $\textit{Know}$ plays an important role in ego interpretations.

Finally, the postulation of $\textit{Dem}$ forges explicit links between evidentiality and aspect (stage-level vs. individual-level), and between
evidentials and demonstratives. This may help to connect the little studied
topic of evidentiality to a wider domain of linguistic research.

Before presenting my proposal and the arguments for it, I first delimit the
topic and introduce the constructions I will focus on.

3.1. The Topic

In Tibetan, direct evidentiality encompasses a variety of sensory modalities,
including vision, hearing, touch, and internal sensation. Direct is found in
several constructions (cf. DeLancey 1986):

(1) Direct evidentials$^{12}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EGO</th>
<th>DIRECT</th>
<th>INDIRECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copula</td>
<td>yin</td>
<td></td>
<td>red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELPA</td>
<td>yod</td>
<td>‘dug</td>
<td>yod.red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>V-pa-yin</td>
<td>V-song</td>
<td>V-pa-red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfect</td>
<td>V-yod</td>
<td>V-‘dug</td>
<td>V-yod.red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperfective</td>
<td>V-gi-yod</td>
<td>V-gi-‘dug</td>
<td>V-gi-yod.red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>V-gi-yin</td>
<td></td>
<td>V-gi-red</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the chart shows, there are at least two direct markers, the ELPA
(existential, locative, possessive, and attributive) verb ‘dug and the auxiliary
verb song. What I say in this chapter applies only to ‘dug. song has a
different etymology, and may well have a different analysis; not all varieties of
direct evidentiality have a common source. I will further restrict my
attention to only the ELPA and imperfective constructions. The perfect lies outside the scope of this thesis.

In the ELPA construction, direct ‘dug’ alternates with two other evidentials, ego yod and indirect yod.red. ELPA sentences include existentials: *There is a fly in my soup*; locatives: *A fly is in my soup*; and possessives: *My friend has a fly*. These three sentence types are alike in Tibetan, as in many languages (Freeze 1992), in consisting of a PP (the location or possessor) and a DP (the locatum/possessum). The different interpretations are disambiguated in a familiar way by word-order. Finally, the attributive construction consists of an AP predicated of a DP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2) ELPA</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existential</td>
<td>PP DP&lt;sub&gt;indefinite&lt;/sub&gt; V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locative</td>
<td>DP&lt;sub&gt;specific&lt;/sub&gt; PP V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possessive</td>
<td>PP&lt;sub&gt;animate&lt;/sub&gt; DP V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributive</td>
<td>DP AP V</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same three verbs found in the ELPA construction are also used as auxiliaries in the imperfective, which in Tibetan encompasses stative, performative, progressive, and habitual meanings. Both the ELPA and the imperfective are compatible with either present or past tense. In the absence of a past time adverbial, they are interpreted as present.

12 Gaps in the chart indicate gaps in the paradigm, i.e. non-existent items.
3.2. The Proposal

In an extensive typology of evidentials, de Haan (1999) finds that direct evidentials typically arise from one of two sources: either from deictic or demonstrative morphemes; or from (default) tense or aspect markers. He finds that the deictic to visual path of development has been followed in Northern California as well as the Amazon, in languages such as Wintu, Hupa, and Sanuma.\(^\text{13}\)

The development of direct evidentials from deictics or demonstratives makes good sense. As de Haan puts it, “when a speaker uses a visual evidential based on a demonstrative marker, he or she is saying that the action was witnessed personally because it occurred in the same deictic sphere as the location of the speaker.”

In Tibetan, the verb ‘dug’ has a long history. In late Old Tibetan onwards, it meant ‘to sit, to stay, to remain’ (Jäschke 1881). Eventually, it grammaticalized into an ELPA verb, although in some varieties of Tibetan it still retains its original sense. In remarks on the historical development of ‘dug, Tournadre suggests that its deictic characteristics may have led to its grammaticalization as a marker of direct evidence.
In this chapter I pursue the view that ‘dug’ marks a demonstrative brand of direct evidentiality. I show that various facts follow from this view. As noted above, there are three parts to ‘dug’. First, there’s the verbal dimension: a non-evidential (default) ELPA verb. Second, there’s the deictic dimension: the Dem morpheme itself. Third and finally, there’s the pragmatic dimension: Know, an attitude associated with assertion by which the speaker presents himself as knowing what he says to be true.\textsuperscript{14}

Following Kratzer, I take stage-level predicates to have a spatiotemporal argument, which I will mark as $l$. In many cases, the value of this argument may be contextually supplied. In a sentence with direct ‘dug’, however, $l$ is bound by Dem, the spatiotemporal demonstrative predicate. So, an example like (3a) is to be analyzed as (3b):

\begin{itemize}
  \item (3)\textsuperscript{a} Tashi is eating.
  \item (3)\textsuperscript{b} $[\exists l][(\text{Dem}(l) \land \text{eat}(l, \text{Tashi}))]$
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{13} Direct evidentiality seldom arises from the grammaticalization of verbs like ‘to see’, \textit{pace} Anderson (1986).

\textsuperscript{14} What I call the ‘default ELPA verb’ is basically \textit{yod}. The ego ELPA verb \textit{yod} itself has no intrinsic evidential features (see Chapter 4); I analyze it as the default. In Section 3.8, I show that in Amdo varieties of Tibetan, the equivalent of Standard Tibetan ‘dug’ is overtly realized as \textit{yod} plus another morpheme.
By hypothesis, *Dem* is reserved for demonstrative identification of spatiotemporal regions, and therefore it can only be used with predicates that take spatiotemporal arguments.\(^{15}\)

In some respects, my *Dem* differs from demonstratives as classically discussed by Perry (1993), Kaplan (1989,1990), Evans (1982), and others. Unlike demonstratives, but like ‘pure indexicals’ such as ‘I’, ‘now’, and ‘here’ (Kaplan 1989), there is no demonstration associated with *Dem*. That is, to use a sentence with *Dem* the speaker need not call the hearer’s attention to any particular region of space-time. This differs from a demonstrative use of ‘that man’, which to be felicitous requires not only that the speaker have someone in his immediate environment in mind, but also that the hearer recognize who he is talking about.

Unlike pure indexicals, however, and like demonstratives, *Dem* has some flexibility as to what it can demonstrate. So, while ‘I’ has a fixed linguistic rule whereby it must always refer to the speaker, *Dem* can demonstratively identify a variety of spatio-temporal regions, depending on which one is meant, just as ‘that book’ may refer to different books depending on which book is demonstrated.

---

\(^{15}\) I do not want to suggest that it must be the verb which introduces the spatiotemporal argument. In many cases it may be aspect or some other functional category.
In yet another way, *Dem* differs from demonstratives as discussed in the philosophical literature. Recall that in both the ELPA and imperfective constructions, the tense of a direct sentence may be either present or past. Furthermore, to use direct, the origo does not need to be in the immediate environment of the location he demonstrates. In fact, it is enough that *he has been* in the immediate environment of this location.

Therefore, to use direct the origo must either be able to make a direct demonstrative identification of a present region; or to make a *m*(emory)-demonstrative identification of a region. By ‘m-demonstrative’, I mean that the origo must once have been in a position to demonstratively identify the relevant region.

Although traditional discussions of demonstratives focus on the immediate perceptual environment, I see no reason to make a major division between ordinary demonstrative thought and m-demonstrative thought. Indeed, if Kaplan (1989) is correct, the crucial contextual element accompanying a demonstrative is not the physical demonstration, but rather the ‘directing intention’:

What should we think of as the contextual feature relevant to the evaluation of a demonstrative? In the formal semantics, it may be taken to be the demonstratum. But at the preformal level, I think of it as the *directing intention*. The directing intention is the element that
differentiates the ‘meaning’ of one syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative from another, creating the potential for distinct referents, and creating the actuality of equivocation. (p. 588)

Although it is difficult to imagine a physical demonstration targeting something in the past, there is no such natural constraint on directing intentions.

What unifies demonstrative and m-demonstrative thought is the notion of an information link, a precondition for demonstrative identification according to Evans (1982). Both varieties of thought provide the origo with a direct information-link to his environment, unmediated by inference or belief. Even when demonstrative identification is mediated by memory, there is (normally) no process of inference on the part of the origo.

The presence of a demonstrative component in ‘dug’ has significant ramifications. Since Dem demonstrates a location, it follows that the situation that takes place there must be locatable. I will present arguments to the effect that the situation must be stage-level, in the sense of Carlson (1977) and Kratzer (1995). Non-locatable situations are not in the domain of Dem. In Section 3.5, I show that this feature of ‘dug’ accounts for what Goldstein (1984) has called its ‘specificity’.

Strictly speaking, nothing I have said so far accounts for the evidentiality of ‘dug’. That is, why, when one uses ‘dug’, does one need to
have directly perceived the situation in question? To answer this question, I suggest that the evidentiality of ‘dug’ comes from the third dimension of its meaning, namely Know, the pragmatic contribution of assertion. Assertion is associated with the mental attitude of knowledge: if someone says something, then they present themselves as knowing it to be true. That is,

(4) An assertion $A$ from $s$ to $h$ of a proposition $p$ implicates that $s$ presents $\text{Know}(s,p)$ as true.

This doesn’t mean that $s$ has to be correct about what he says. It just means that $s$ presents himself as knowing what he says. By invoking Know, I am not proposing anything new: the epistemic version of Moore’s paradox (cf. Chapter 2) already establishes its necessity, cf. *John left, but I don’t know that he did* (Hintikka 1962).

Presumably, (4) follows in some way from Grice’s (1989:27) maxim of Quality, which gently compels language-users to make contributions they believe to be true. More importantly for the present purposes, Quality also compels language-users to have sufficient evidence for what they say. So if $s$ presents himself as knowing something, then he had better be in a position to justify his claim.

If direct is used, then the speaker presents himself as knowing the content of something like (3b). If he knows $\text{Dem}(l)$ to be true, then he must
know it in a certain way. Because he did not use indirect, he doesn’t know it by inference, hearsay, or other forms of indirect evidence. The alternative is that he knows it through a direct information-link, unmediated by inference or belief. This dimension of meaning accounts for the fact that situations marked by direct must have been directly perceived (usually seen) by the origo. For perception or sensory experience are the most direct kinds of information-link.\footnote{Crucially, for this argument to go through, \textit{indirect(Dem(l))} must be an impossible configuration. That is, indirect must not be able to combine with \textit{Dem}. Morphologically, this is correct, as forms such as ‘\textit{dug-red}’ are unattested. Why such forms do not exist will be discussed in Section 3.5.}

My proposal is unique in work on Tibetan in its claim that, strictly speaking, the evidentiality of direct ‘\textit{dug} has the same source as the evidentiality of ego \textit{yod} (cf. Chapter 4). The demonstrative element of ‘\textit{dug} is responsible for demonstratively specifying the spatiotemporal extension of a situation, but the evidentiality itself comes from the pragmatics of assertion (\textit{Know}), just as with ego. In contrast, standard analyses of Tibetan take direct evidentiality to be of a fundamentally different type from ego evidentiality (DeLancey 1990, Agha 1993).

Far from being a mere notational difference, my proposal has significant grammatical consequences. In particular, since ‘\textit{dug} as a grammatical word does not itself have the pragmatic feature of evidentiality,
we may expect to find ‘dug’ in non-evidential environments. That this is correct is shown in Chapter 7, where direct ‘dug’, but not ego yod or indirect yod.red, is allowed in conditional protases, where evidential contrasts are clearly disallowed. (For introductory discussion, see Section 3.6 of this chapter.)

Similarly, the distinctness in my account of the locatability (stage-level) restriction and the observability restriction suggests that the two restrictions may be disentangled. Again, that this is true is shown by the behavior in ‘dug’ in conditional protases, where the stage-level restriction remains while the observability restriction is lost.

To summarize: there are three elements to assertive uses of direct ‘dug’—its default verbal component (ELPA), its demonstrative component (Dem), and its pragmatic component (Know)—which can be found independently of each other.

3.3. Locatability
An important intuition in much work on the stage-level vs. individual-level contrast is that stage-level predicates tend to express rather more temporary properties than individual-level predicates. This is partly why Kratzer (1995)
suggests that stage-level predicates (SLPs), unlike individual-level predicates (ILPs), have an additional spatiotemporal argument position.

The question of which predicates are stage-level and which are individual-level is a difficult one to answer. What seems clear, though, is that the idea that SLPs express temporary properties whereas ILPs express permanent properties is an oversimplification. While this may often be true, we can always find counterexamples. For example, by all accounts, NP predicates are individual-level. Yet, we can easily imagine that *John is a teacher* could hold for only a few days, or maybe just a few hours or minutes, due to especially unusual circumstances. However, this would not suddenly turn ‘a teacher’ into a SLP (cf. Fernald 2000).

Therefore, accounts such as those in Kratzer (1995) and Fernald (2000) assume that there is a type-theoretic distinction between SLPs and ILPs, in which only SLPs take an \( l \) (spatio-temporal) argument. In this way, various differences between the two predicates can be enforced in terms of whether or not there is an \( l \) available for binding.

Crucially, then, the difference in predicate argument structure is essential to the SLP/ILP contrast. It is more important than the temporary/permanent distinction, which may help us to partition the classes, but which cannot be the final arbiter.
In what follows, I emphasize the importance of locatability for direct evidentiality in Tibetan. For a situation to be perceived, it must be locatable (i.e. stage-level). One cannot use direct evidentials with non-locatable situations. Locatability, in turn, is a precondition for observability. No non-locatable or ILP-based situation can be directly perceived.

Before asking, does ‘dug’ only occur with SLPs?, I start by asking, are constructions that disallow direct, e.g. ‘dug’, necessarily non-stage-level? Notice in particular that direct is lacking in the future and copula constructions (cf. 1 above).

3.3.1. Gaps: what can’t be located?

3.3.1.1. No direct in the future

The absence of direct in the future was noted by DeLancey (1990), who found the gap quite natural. He pointed out that since future situations have yet to occur, the speaker cannot have observed them. I believe that this argument is essentially correct.

According to DeLancey, [ego fut] V-gi-yin indicates that the origo has direct knowledge of volition (i.e. the intention to perform an act, cf. Chapter 4). Since the origo’s future mental states are inaccessible, the volition in question must be present volition rather than future volition.
If there were a [dir fut] form, it would encode that the origo had directly observed somebody else’s volition. I assume that this is impossible, because intentional states like volition share with internal states like hunger the property of being unobservable by anyone other than the person who is in the state.

There remains the question of why intentional states occur with ego evidentiality instead of direct evidentiality, but this is a more general issue, one that affects not only the future, but every other evidential construction as well (cf. Chapter 4).

3.3.1.2. No direct copula

The second major gap is in the copular construction, where again only ego *yin* and indirect *red* are available. This gap comes from the fact that copular situations cannot be located, i.e. are not stage-level. To see this, let’s take a look at the main uses the copulas are put to, with some examples below:

(5) Copulas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Identity</th>
<th>DP DP V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Nominal predication</td>
<td>DP NP V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Benefactive/Inherent belonging</td>
<td>DP PP V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Attributive</td>
<td>DP AP V</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) Identity

\[ \text{ kho } \text{ bkra.shis } \text{ red} \]

he Tashi [ind cop] ‘He is Tashi.’

(b) Nominal predication

\[ \text{ khong } \text{ dge.rgan } \text{ red} \]

he teacher [ind cop] ‘He is a teacher.’

(c) Benefactive

\[ \text{ 'di } \text{ khong-la } \text{ red} \]

this he-loc [ind cop] ‘This is for him.’

(d) Attributive

\[ \text{ snyu.gu ‘di } \text{ nag.po } \text{ red} \]

pen this black [ind cop] ‘This pen is black.’

Identity and nominal predication require copulas, and cannot occur with ELPA verbs. Still, one wonders why there is no equivalent of direct in sentences with DP or NP predication. This absence is reminiscent of restrictions on DP and NP predicates in English deriving from their individual-level nature. For example, in existential ‘there’-constructions, DP and NP predicates are disallowed: *There’s a man a teacher. *There’s a man
John. To account for this restriction, Carlson (1977), following Milsark (1974), proposed that the predicate in ‘there’-sentences has to be stage-level; hence *There’s a man intelligent but There’s a man sick. NP and DP predicates are not stage-level, at least not according to this diagnostic.

The most interesting case of the above bunch is (5d), the attributives. For with adjectival predication, both copulas and ELPAs are possible. Example (5d) shows an adjective with the indirect copula red, and the following example shows an adjective occurring with the direct ELPA ‘dug’:

\[(6)\]

Q: blo.bzang-gi deb ‘di-gi tshon.mdog ga.’dras ‘dug-gas Lobsang-gen book this-gen color how [dir ELP]
‘How is the color of Lobsang’s book?’

A: dmar.po ‘dug red [dir ELP]
‘It’s red.’

The situation with AP predication is complex. Many adjectives occur freely with either copulas or ELPAs, while some have a strong preference for one or another verb type. Among the adjectives that strongly prefer copulas are color words, as in (5d). Even if we set up a seemingly perfect scenario for
direct with a color adjective, it generally won’t occur—(6) is highly exceptional. Suppose, for example, that you think your pen is blue, then you pick it up and write with it, and discover that it’s red. Then you would say (7a), not (7b):

(7) a.  

\[ \text{dm} \text{ar\textunderscore po} \quad \text{red\textendash bzhag} \]  
\[ \text{red} \quad \text{[ind cop]\textendash inference} \quad \text{‘It’s red!’}^{17} \]

b.  

\[ \* \text{dm} \text{ar\textunderscore po} \quad \text{‘dug} \]  
\[ \text{red} \quad \text{[dir ELPA]} \quad \text{Intend: ‘It’s red!’} \]

Using direct with color adjectives as in (6) is far less common than using [ind cop] as in (5d), and sentences like those in (6) appear to have a slightly non-standard interpretation. Such sentences are particularly appropriate if the color is viewed as a temporary or impressionistic quality of the object in question.

Under an approach which did not define observability in terms of locatability, the rarity of examples like (6) is unexpected. Clearly, colors

\[^{17} \text{red\textendash bzhag} \text{ alternates freely with red\textendash ’dug}. \]  
This construction can mark that the speaker has made a surprise discovery of a situation. This is an epistemic use of ‘dug, and it is discussed briefly in Section 3.6.
themselves are observable. Therefore, if direct ‘dug’ only imposed an observability restriction, these facts would remain unexplained.

On the other hand, if color adjectives are recognized as ILPs, and direct imposes a locatability restriction, then the data are not surprising. In English, too, color adjectives are probably ILPs rather than SLPs: witness the impossibility of sentences like, *I saw the pen red* and *There’s a pen red*.

This leaves the question of what to do with acceptable uses of color adjectives with direct, like (6). Here, I believe that an ILP adjective has been ‘coerced’ into being an SLP adjective. Fernald (2000:66-69) discusses similar cases, which he calls ‘evidential coercion’. Please see his work for further discussion.

What I have said in this section is only a partial explanation. The difference between [ind cop] red (5d) and [dir ELPA] ‘dug’ (6) with adjectives does not just reflect the difference between indirect and direct evidentiality. It also reflects the difference between copular predication and ELPA predication. Consider the following sentence:

8) cha tsha.po yod’dug/yod.red/yin/red tea hot [ego ELPA]/[dir ELPA]/[ind ELPA]/[ego cop]/[ind cop]
Here, the words ‘tea’ and ‘hot’ can be followed with any of five verbs, depending on the reading, which is why I’ve left it unglossed. Possible readings include, *The tea is hot. Ouch!*, with [dir ELPA], *Tea is generally hot*, with [ind ELPA], and so on (Agha 1993). There are two different indirect forms, and two ego forms, neither pair of which is synonymous.

Therefore, it is also necessary to distinguish between copular predication and ELPA predication, irrespective of evidential modality. For adjectives that can go either way, my hunch is that copulas are used for marking inherent features of objects, while ELPA verbs are used for marking more subjective qualities of objects, perhaps along the lines of the distinction between the Spanish verbs *ser* and *estar*.

3.3.2. What can be located?

Now I turn to constructions in which all members of the ELPA paradigm, including direct ‘*dug*, are found. In such constructions, what special contribution does ‘*dug* make? I first consider the ELPA construction and then the imperfective.
3.3.2.1. **ELPA**

Consider first existentials and locatives:

(9) Existential

\[ \text{'dir mo.Ta mang.po 'dug} \]

‘There are a lot of cars here.’

(10) Locative

\[ \text{kho'i mo.Ta pha.gir 'dug} \]

‘His car is over there.’

Since many existential and locative predicates are SLP, it is not a surprise to find temporary properties such as those in (9) and (10) occurring with direct ‘dug.

Attributives were discussed briefly in the previous section in connection with color adjectives. There it appeared that ‘dug imposed a stage-level restriction, which was inconsistent with normal uses of color adjectives. Other data suggests a similar conclusion. Take a predicate such as \text{skyid.po} ‘happy, pleasant, fun’. This is often used with first-person experiencers in sentences such as the following:
Here, on the basis of his internal mental states, the speaker says that he’s happy. Compare this with (12), which is the same except that ego replaces direct:

As the glosses suggest, the two sentences are quite different. (11) conveys the speaker’s current mental state, while (12) conveys a general condition, which may or may not be the speaker’s current state. As a result, (12) but not (11) can be contradicted by, *But today I’m not happy*, as below:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ng}a & \quad \text{skyid}.po & \quad \text{yod} & \quad \text{yin-na’i} \\
\text{I} & \quad \text{happy} & \quad \text{[ego ELPA]} & \quad \text{but} \\
\text{de.\text{ring}} & \quad \text{ng}a & \quad \text{skyid}.po & \quad \text{mi-’dug} \\
\text{today} & \quad \text{I} & \quad \text{happy} & \quad \text{[dir neg ELPA]}
\end{align*}
\]

‘I am (generally) happy, but today I’m not happy.’
Notice from the presence of ‘today’ in (13a) that there is no incompatibility between (somewhat) extended durations and direct. The problem arises when

\[ \text{[dir ELPA] ‘dug is meant to mark a general condition rather than a relatively short-term situation.} \]

Example (11) involves a stage-level reading, while (12) involves an individual-level reading. Since the predicate is ‘happy’ in both cases, it must be generic aspect which turns (12) into an ILP-based sentence. It is well known that generic constructions are individual-level, and Chierchia (1995) has even suggested that ILPs are nothing more than inherently generic expressions. So, it is not surprising that (11) but not (12) occurs with \[ \text{[dir ELPA] ‘dug.} \]

\[ \text{[dir ELPA] ‘dug is also used in apparent possessive constructions, which resemble existential sentences in word order but have animate subjects:} \]
If possessive verbs are individual-level rather than stage-level, then examples like (14) would run counter to my hypothesis that direct only occurs in SLP-based sentences.

The evidential warrant for (14) is “an objective (usually visual) sighting of the camera in Pema’s possession” (Agha 1993:168). So there is indeed a specific perceptual event linking the origo to the situation. However, I have found no evidence to show that (14) involves permanent rather than temporary possession. The postposition \( \text{\textit{r}} \) (an allomorph of the postposition \( \text{\textit{la}} \) has a diverse range of functions: among other functions, it marks locations, goals, and possessors. It also marks temporary possessors:

(15) \[ \text{\textit{ nga-r dpar.chas ‘dug}} \]
I-loc camera [dir ELPA]
‘(Oh!) I have a camera!’ (Agha 1993:167)
said for example when the speaker reaches into his bag and discovers, to his surprise, that he has brought a camera with him after all. This kind of possession is temporary (cf. *I have a camera with me*) and stage-level.

My suggestion, then, is that (14) involves a SLP, and thus reports temporary rather than permanent possession.

3.3.2.2. Imperfective

Discussion of habitual and generic uses of the imperfective will be held off until Section 3.5. In the meanwhile however two stage-level uses can be discussed.

The imperfective is used as a (present or past) progressive:

(16) 

\[ kho \quad da.lta \quad kha.lag \quad za-gi-\text{'dug} \]

he now food eat-[dir imp]

‘He’s eating now.’

As expected, nothing prevents direct from occurring here. As indicated by various tests, progressive predicates are clearly stage-level.
Stage-level statives also occur in the imperfective construction with ‘dug’.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{align*}
  \text{17) } & \textit{nga‘i bu na-gi-‘dug} \\
  & \text{my boy sick-[dir imp]} \\
  & \text{‘My son is sick.’}
\end{align*}

\section*{3.4. Observability}

The stage-level requirement is a precondition for observability. Not every locatable or stage-level situation can be observed, but non-locatable or individual-level situations are never observable. In this section, I presuppose locatability, and explore the second component of meaning in direct sentences, namely the dimension of observability.

A situation can be observed in one of two ways: either \textit{exophorically} or \textit{endopathically}. When one knows a situation in an ‘exophoric’ way, then that situation is an objective part of the external world, for example the eating situation in (16). If a situation can be observed exophorically, then anybody is in a position to observe it in that way. For example, if both Dorje and I see

\textsuperscript{18} As Fernald (2000) remarks, all eventive predicates—and thus, all predicates that occur in the progressive, at least in English—are stage-level. The SLP/ILP contrast does not neatly align with the eventive/stative contrast, however, since some stative predicates are also stage-level.
Tenzin eating, then either of us can say (16). Although I cannot know the exact manner in which Dorje observed the situation—because I may not know the angle at which he stood in relation to Tenzin, or I may not know what it’s like to be as farsighted as Dorje—I do know roughly what it’s like for Dorje to observe the situation, because if I observe the situation then my experience is pretty much the same as his.

Even the speaker himself may use direct ‘dug in place of ego yod if he has only just discovered that a certain situation holds, or if he is watching another aspect or guise of herself.

If the speaker is watching himself on television, he might say (18) with direct, but he could not say it with ego. (15) is a similar sort of example.¹⁹

In contrast, the ‘endopathic’ way of knowing is subjective. To know that one is sick in an endopathic way is to feel sick. You may come to know

¹⁹ Other contexts which trigger a shift from ego to direct include talking about what one did in a dream, and surprise discoveries. For more such examples and interesting commentary, see Agha (1993:Ch. 4).
that I am sick, but you cannot know it endopathically. For if you feel sick, it is you who are sick, not me. If you know that I am sick, then you can only know it through some other means, e.g. by visual observation, hearsay, etc.

Some Tibetan verbs, like *na* ‘to be sick, to be hurting’, can cooccur with [dir imp] ‘*dug*’ on both exophoric and endopathic readings:

**(19)**

\[
\text{nga} \quad \text{na-gi-’dug} \\
\text{I} \quad \text{sick-[dir imp]} \quad \text{‘I am sick.’}
\]

**(20)**

\[
\text{kho} \quad \text{na-gi-’dug} \\
\text{he} \quad \text{sick-[dir imp]} \quad \text{‘He is sick.’}
\]

Direct requires a direct information-link between the origo and the situation. In (19), that link is endopathic, because the speaker bases her assertion on what it feels like to be sick. In (20), the link is exophoric, since the speaker bases her assertion on what it is like to see somebody who is sick, an information link which is accessible in principle to anybody.\(^{20}\)

---

\(^{20}\) The terms ‘exophoric’ and ‘endopathic’ are taken over from Tournadre (1996). It is interesting to note that exophoric and endopathic uses pattern together, both occurring with direct. That is, our experience of internal states like hunger, sickness, and so on is modeled on direct perception of external situations rather than on intentional knowledge, e.g. knowledge of intention, belief, and so forth, which are marked with ego (cf. Chapter 4).
On the other hand, there is also the class of what Sun (1993) calls *unobservable* predicates. Such predicates project situations that can be directly observed only in an endopathic way. As a result, such predicates, which include *grod.khog ltogs* ‘to be hungry’ and *kha goms* ‘to be thirsty’, can occur with [dir imp] V-gi-‘dug only if the origo and the experiencer are one and the same person.²¹

²¹ These judgments are quite robust, shared by all speakers I have consulted. For standard Tibetan, unobservability was first noted by Melvyn Goldstein, who also observed that the same judgments do not hold in the direct perfect construction. Note that one of my consultants accepted the following sort of case:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{deng.sang} & \text{kho} & \text{grod.khog} & \text{mang.po} \\
\text{ltogs-gi-‘dug} & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

These days he stomach much hunger-[dir imp]

‘These days he’s very hungry. He eats so many different things.’

Still, nobody, not even her, would accept examples such as

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{* nga'i bu} & \text{da.lta rang} & \text{grod.khog} & \text{ltogs-gi-‘dug} \\
\end{array}
\]

my son now just stomach hunger-[dir imp]

Intended: ‘My son is hungry just now.’

So it appears that, for at least some speakers, being hungry may become an observable predicate if it projects a situation which is stretched out over time; although (instantaneous) hunger is never observable.

In Standard Tibetan, the class of unobservable predicates seems rather small, while in Amdo varieties it is substantial. I do not fully understand why this is the case, although see Section 3.8 below for some speculations. Some speakers I have consulted also find adjectival predicates such as *skyid.po* ‘happy’ to be unobservable.
These sentences show that observability and locatability are distinct notions. Regardless of who is hungry, ‘to be hungry’ is an SLP. However, a person can only directly observe his own hunger.\(^\text{22}\)

As I remarked in the introduction to this chapter, there are empirical advantages to separating the stage-level requirement from the observability requirement. In conditional protases, observability restrictions such as those in (22) disappear:

\(^{22}\) Predicates projecting situations that can be known in an ‘endopathic way’ correspond closely to what Shoemaker (1968:565) calls \(P^*\)-predicates. For him, a \(P^*\)-predicate is a (psychological) predicate “which can be known to be instantiated in such a way that knowing it to be instantiated in that way is equivalent to knowing it to be instantiated in oneself.” Similarly, endopathic knowledge is a special way of knowing a predicate which implies that the knowledge is self-knowledge.
even though $V$-gi-‘dug continues to be restricted to the same episodic, SLP-based sentences it occurs with in matrix declaratives.

This shows that while the stage-level requirement must be part of the grammatical word ‘dug, the observability requirement is in contrast a property of assertion. More specifically, the stage-level requirement comes from $Dem$, while the observability requirement comes from the pragmatic feature $Know$. The observability requirement vanishes in (23) because the speaker does not present herself as knowing the protasis to be true. (See Chapter 7 for further details and discussion.)

3.5. Specificity and genericity

According to Denwood (1999: 122), ‘dug “often refers to a particular, even momentary state of affairs, and frequently conveys a sense of surprise, recency or discovery.” Glossing ‘dug, Denwood often emphasizes its

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23 Another possibility given the data so far is that observability is a feature of ‘dug, but that it is canceled or negated in conditionals. However, since there are no other embeddings which permit ‘dug but not other evidentials, this alternative cannot be empirically distinguished from my suggestion.
particular’ character as opposed to the ‘general’ character of its two paradigm mates, ego yod and indirect yod.red. One can find similar remarks in Goldstein (1984:xvi):

The ‘dug’ verb is used when one has firsthand knowledge ... and certainly conveys this; but, and this is important, it also conveys a dimension I shall call “specificity.” Specificity refers to the fact that ‘dug’ is always used with respect to knowledge deriving from a specific situation or state and is never used for general, usual, or commonly known situations or states. For these the yodred form is used. When ‘dug’ is used in a sentence such as “There are three soldiers there,” it means roughly that the speaker was “there” and found out that there were three soldiers.

Let us suppose that you are standing in a parking lot and want to say that there are a lot of cars there. You would have to use the ‘dug’ verb because it is a specific statement based on firsthand knowledge. However, if you wanted to say that there are lots of cars in America, you would use the yodred form because this is a general statement of a commonly known fact. If the ‘dug’ form were used in a sentence such as “There are many cars in America,” it would only be in the context of, say, a Tibetan who has come to America for the first time and has just found out that there are many cars in America. In other words, for this imaginary Tibetan, the fact of cars in America was not common or general knowledge, and his use of ‘dug’ emphasizes this as well as the visual aspect. Thus, no Tibetan would ever use ‘dug’ in this sentence: “There are yaks in Tibet.”

Both Denwood and Goldstein thus emphasize the particularity or specificity of ‘dug’, which Goldstein takes to show that ‘dug’ is not just a
marker of perceptually gained information. Although these authors are correct, there is a clear relation between the two dimensions of meaning, specificity and perception (‘the visual aspect’). They correspond directly to what I have referred to as the stage-level requirement and the observability requirement.

As I have stressed, the stage-level (or specificity) requirement is a precondition for observability; so, non-stage-level situations just can’t be observed. Still, this does not mean that the two requirements overlap and do the same job. The point is not that stage-level situations are observed, but that they can be observed. Naturally, in a given case a stage-level situation may be observable in principle, without actually having been observed.

As these authors suggest, and as I indicated above, genericity blocks specificity. We saw one example of this already, example (13), repeated below:

(13) a.  

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{ nga} & \text{skyid.po} & \text{yod} \\
I & \text{happy} & [\text{ego ELPA}] \\
\text{de.ring} & \text{ nga} & \text{skyid.po} \\
\text{today} & \text{I} & \text{happy} \\
\end{array}
\]

\text{yin-na'i} \\
\text{but} \\
\text{mi-' dug} \\
[\text{dir neg ELPA}]

‘I am (generally) happy, but today I’m not happy.’
In both (a) and (b), the second conjunct, *Today I’m not happy*, is marked by direct. If the first conjunct is marked by ego, then we have no contradiction, but if it is marked by direct, we do. This suggests that ego but not direct can be generic.

As a second example, consider the following generic claim:

\[(24)\]

\[\text{a.} \quad \text{སེམས་དཔེ་དེ་ཡོད་][\text{b.} \quad \text{སེམས་དཔེ་}\]

\begin{align*}
\text{mi mang.po} & \quad \text{yod.red} \\
\text{person many} & \quad [\text{ind ELPA}] \\
\text{‘There are many people (i.e. many people exist).’}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{mi mang.po} & \quad \text{‘dug} \\
\text{person many} & \quad [\text{dir ELPA}] \\
\text{‘There are many people (here/there/etc.).’}
\end{align*}
As Goldstein implied, while a sentence like (24a) can be completely generic, one like (24b) with direct ‘dug’ must refer to a specific spatiotemporal location and a specific evidentiary event. This suggests that indirect but not direct can be generic.

The examples looked at so far have been generic, but not overtly quantificational. Interestingly, overtly quantificational structures such as the following do not prohibit direct ‘dug’:

(25) །་ཐ་ནད་བོད་ཁྱེར་གྱུབ་པ་བོད་པ།

/*ni.ma  rtag.par     chu.tshod     gnyis.pa-la
day    always       hour       two-loc

nga       grod.khog     ltogs-gi-‘dug/ltogs-gi-yod
I         stomach       hunger-[dir imp]/hunger-[ego imp]

‘I’m hungry every day at two o’clock.’

(26) །་ཐ་ནད་བོད་ཁྱེར་གྱུབ་པ་ཐ་ན་པ།

/*ni.ma  rtag.par     bkra.shis-gis
day    always       Tashi-erg

tshong.khang de   thong-gi-‘dug/thong-gi-yod.red
store that       see-[dir imp]/see-[ind imp]

‘Tashi sees that store every day.’
The interpretation of (25) is straightforward. As for (26), it implies that the speaker goes with Tashi every day and sees that he sees the store.

Although direct may cooccur with a universal temporal quantifier, it may not cooccur with an epistemic possibility modal:

\[(27)\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q:</th>
<th>ghyed.rang-gi deb ga.bar yod.red/*dug you-gen book where [ind ELPA]/[dir ELPA]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A:</td>
<td>ghyed.rang-gi deb ga.bar yod.red/*dug you-gen book where [ind ELPA]/[dir ELPA]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Where is your book?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A:</th>
<th>gcig.byas.na ynal.khri-gang-la yod/yod.red/*’dug maybe bed-top-loc [ego/ind/*dir ELPA]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A:</td>
<td>gcig.byas.na sa-gang-la yod/yod.red/*’dug maybe floor-top-loc [ego/ind/*dir ELPA]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Maybe it’s on the bed, maybe it’s on the floor.’

Both ego and indirect can cooccur with ‘maybe’, but direct cannot.

What makes (25) and (26) different from (27) is that in the former cases, direct can be specific relative to the universal quantification. That is, ‘dug does not lose its specificity in (25) and (26)—that specificity is just
relativized to the quantifier. I take (25) to mean something like (28), ignoring ‘at two o’clock’. (Here, the speaker is x.)

\[ \forall d. \text{day}(d)[\exists l. \text{Dem}(l) \land \text{hunger}(l,x)] \]

Here, since $\text{Dem}$ is subordinated to a universal quantifier, there must now be a separate demonstration for each day.

The problem of (27A) with direct is the same problem that excludes sentences such as (29):

\[ \text{*mí mang.po 'dug-red} \]

\[ \text{person many [dir ELPA]-[ind cop]} \]

Intended: ‘There are many people [here].’

This example tries to subordinate direct under indirect, but it’s universally rejected. What the examples have in common is that they both try to subordinate direct under an epistemic modality, ‘maybe’ in (27A) and $\text{red}$, the indirect copula, in (29).

I take it to be a fundamental property of demonstrative thought that it is realis rather than irrealis, non-modal rather than modal. As a result, the demonstrations in (25) and (26) can vary with respect to the universal
quantifier, since we still only need to consider the actual world, which
contains objects, situations, and places which we can demonstrate. In
contrast, modal quantification requires us to consider non-actual worlds as
well. Subordinated demonstrations such as those in (27A) and (29) would
have to demonstrate objects in non-actual worlds, which I take to be
impossible.  

3.6. Epistemic uses of direct

There are two important uses of direct ‘dug’ which I have ignored up to this
point. These uses have in common that what Dem selects for is clearly not a
standard stage-level situation. In these constructions, ‘dug’ behaves more like
an epistemic main verb. In this sense, not every use of ‘dug’ can be analyzed
in exactly the same way.

One use, which Agha calls a ‘predictive evidential’ [dir pred],
combines ‘dug’ with a clause marked by the ‘presupposed nominalizer’ –pa:

(30)

\[
\text{sang.nyin bkra.shis tshe.ring-la rogs.pa byed-pa-‘dug tomorrow Tashi Tsering-loc help do-[dir pred]}
\]

‘Tomorrow Tashi will help Tsering.’

\[24\] I claim, therefore, that (25) and (26) are based entirely on past and present days, and do not
in fact quantify over future (and thus irrealis) days.
Since the interpretation is future, the origo cannot have perceived the event itself. Rather, as Agha says,

there is some discrete objective event, perceived by the speaker, which serves as the warrant for his judgment. The speaker may have overheard Tashi telling someone else of his intention of helping Tsering. Or, he may have come to know that Tashi is enormously in Tsering’s debt, and from this knowledge he may feel that he can predict with confidence that Tashi is very likely to help Tsering if the latter requires his help; and so on. (Agha 1993:226).

Similarly, in the following example,

(31) \[d.r ng \quad ny.i.ma \quad sk.yid.po \quad lt.as-pa-‘dug\]

today \quad sun \quad pleasant \quad appear-[dir pred]

‘Today the weather will be good.’

there is “a direct appeal to an external or ‘objective’ evidentiary sign which serves as the warrant for the prediction. For example, the speaker may be familiar with the weather patterns around his mountain village, knowing that if there is a light mist on the mountains at dawn, it will turn out to be a sunny day; he sees the mist at dawn, and goes on to utter [31]” (Agha 1993:227).

In the second use, ‘dug’ (though more commonly \textit{shag}) follows the copula \textit{red} to express a surprise discovery of a copular truth:
On the face of it, this data is rather surprising, since ‘dug’ and ‘shag’, which are interchangeable here, are the only items that can occur in this construction—i.e. neither ego yod nor indirect yod.red can occur here. Also, it is normally yin that embeds, not red—yet yin-‘dug’ does not exist.

Regarding examples like those just given, Denwood (1999:160) writes that “the form red.’dug may be thought of as combining the assertive nature of the verb red, relating to an innate quality, with the “witnessed discovery” sense of the auxiliary particle ‘dug. Some such English expression as “I see that...” may often be used in translation.”

In both of these constructions direct ‘dug’ is used as a perceptual evidential. What’s interesting is that what the phrase that precedes ‘dug’ denotes is clearly not what’s perceived. In the predictive sentences (30) and
Agha’s comments make clear that what is perceived is something which leads the origo to conclude that something will take place. As Denwood (1999:154) puts it, “what has been witnessed is not the event itself but some definite evidence that strongly suggests that the event will take place.” Examples (32) and (33) are similar. Recall, for example, that He is a teacher could not occur with [dir ELPA] because being a teacher was not a stage-level predicate. So in (32) the perceived situation cannot be ‘his being a teacher’.

In English, the situation with ‘to see’ is similar. This verb can occur in both direct perception constructions, e.g. I saw him leave, and epistemic perception constructions, e.g. I saw that he left. I have focussed on the direct case in this chapter because it is simpler. In cases of direct perception, it is quite clear what has been perceived, and there are various constraints on such constructions, none of which are particularly surprising upon reflection, given what we understand about perception. We have seen that the same is true in the majority use of ‘dug’.

The epistemic cases are considerably more complex. In such cases it is not clear where to start. Is it a fact that is perceived? That is, should we take the surface syntax seriously and analyze ‘to see’ like ‘to know’? Or is it, as Agha’s description of the Tibetan data might lead one to suggest, that there
is something else that is perceived, something which justifies the fact? These are interesting questions, but I cannot answer them.

3.7. Syntactic Restrictions

In the theory advanced here, direct ‘dug’ is morphologically complex, containing a default ELPA verb component and a demonstrative component, Dem. The evidential value of direct comes when Dem combines with Know, a pragmatic property of assertion.

Given that Know is just a feature of assertion, the grammatical word ‘dug’ itself is just $[V_{ELPA} + Dem]$. This means that we might not be surprised to find ‘dug’ occurring in non-assertive embedded clauses (i.e. complements of verbs other than ‘to say’ and ‘to think’—see Chapter 5).

In fact, the situation is not so simple. Like all three of Tibetan’s evidential modalities, direct does occur freely in assertive complements. However, it does not occur in any other embedded clauses except for conditional protases.

So, while the present analysis can make sense of (34), it fails to explain why (35) are (36) are bad:
(34)  
\[ \text{khyed.rang grod.khog ltogs-gi-‘dug-na zhal.lag mchod} \]
you stomach hunger-[dir imp]-if food eat
‘If you’re hungry, please eat.’

(35)  
* \[ \text{khyed.rang grod.khog ltogs-gi-‘dug-pa nga-s hago-gi-yod} \]
you stomach hunger-[dir imp]-COMP I-erg know-[ego imp]
Intended: ‘I know that you’re hungry.’

(36)  
* \[ \text{kho rgyal.sa-la ‘dug-tsang yong-gi-ma-red} \]
he town-loc [dir ELPA]-because come-[ind neg fut]
Intended: ‘Because he’s in town, he won’t come.’

(34) is made possible because *Know is not an inherent part of ‘dug, while nothing prevents *Dem from occurring in a conditional protasis. However, in order to explain the impossibility of (35) and (36), there must be some additional constraint on *Dem, which prevents it from occurring in certain kinds of embeddings.

I do not have an answer to why (35) and (36) are ungrammatical, and I believe this is an important question confronting continuing studies of direct evidentiality in Tibetan. One possible line of attack however is that

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25 This sentence is no better if the matrix subject is coreferential with the embedded subject.
embeddings such as (35) and (36) differ from conditionals in that they are presuppositional contexts. Perhaps, for some reason, direct ‘dug cannot occur in presuppositional embeddings, i.e. clauses that convey common knowledge rather than knowledge tied to some participant’s point of view.

3.8. Direct in Repkong Amdo

I take the points that I’ve made in this chapter to stand on their own. However, I also believe that when viewed from a sympathetic perspective, certain data from Amdo varieties of Tibetan support some of my claims.

I suggested that Standard Tibetan (ST) ‘dug is complex, being a morphological fusion of *Dem* and a default ELPA verb. In this section I provide evidence to support this complexity. I show that in Amdo varieties of Tibetan, *Dem* is an independent morpheme, and that its behavior is constrained in the same ways that ST *Dem* is.

Amdo is one of the three traditional provinces of Tibet, and as such it is quite large with numerous different varieties. What I’ll say in this section is based on Repkong Amdo (RA), which as far as I know is not described in the
The following discussion is based on consultations with a single 22 year-old speaker, Tsering, who moved to Nepal from Tibet as a teenager. I am very grateful to her for her insights, time, and enthusiasm.
Evidentially, the three RA forms have essentially the same semantic value as the ST verbs. Grammatically, the difference is that the direct form yod-gi is overtly complex, consisting of the ego verb yod together with the Dem predicate gi.

In the RA imperfective, direct can be realized in a few different ways. One way, apparently less common, is morphologically most transparently related to ST: V-gi-yod-gi (cf. ST V-gi-‘dug). However, in normal speech, this is usually shortened to V-ko-gi. I assume this shortening is purely phonological and has no ramifications on morphological structure, which remains the same in the two versions.

In ST, as I have mentioned, the imperfective construction can be used for progressives of active verbs as well as for the present tense of stative verbs. However, as Sun (1993) shows for a closely related Amdo variety, in RA gi marks the progressive. Therefore, we do not find stative verbs in the V-ko-gi construction. Instead, present tense stative sentences occur in direct
mode as V-\textit{gi}, also listed in (37) under the imperfective, although calling it a marker of the imperfective is misleading:

\[(40) \begin{array}{lll}
de.ring & nga/khur.ge & skyid-gi \\
today & I/he & happy-[dir]
\end{array}
\]

‘Today I am happy / He is happy.’

Thus, RA -\textit{gi} can directly suffix to main verbs, not just the default ELPA verb. In other words, unlike ST ‘dug, which is a morphological fusion of two components, the default verbal component as well as \textit{Dem}, RA \textit{gi} is just \textit{Dem}.\footnote{When combined with active verbs, V-\textit{gi} has a recent past rather than present meaning:}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{khur.ge da log-gi}
  \item \textit{he now fall-[dir]}
\end{itemize}

‘He fell just now.’

Now, the fact that \textit{Dem} is an independent morpheme in RA allows me to directly test several of the claims I’ve made in this chapter. First, there is the issue of \textit{gaps in the paradigm}, that is, where we don’t find direct. In Section 3.3.1, I noted that there is no direct copula and no direct in the future. The same is true in RA:
(41) Copular and future constructions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Copula</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ego</td>
<td>yin</td>
<td>yin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td><em>'dug</em></td>
<td>*yin-gi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>red</td>
<td>red</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is, just where one finds no direct in ST, one cannot suffix *Dem* -gi in RA.

A second similarity between ST *'dug* and RA -gi is their behavior with respect to embedding. Like *'dug*, gi is not found in a wide variety of embedded environments. But like *'dug*, -gi can occur in conditional protases:

(42) *\[99\] `khur.ge-s za.ma za-ko-gi-dus \ldots`

he-erg food eat-[dir imp]-when

Intended: ‘When he’s eating ...’

(43) *\[99\] `khur.ge-s za.ma za-ko-gi-na \ldots`

he-erg food eat-[dir imp]-if

‘If he’s eating ...’
Furthermore, the pragmatic constraints on embedding *Dem* in conditional protases are exactly as in ST: the same person asymmetries observed in Chapter 7 for ST hold as well in RA.\(^{28}\)

As with ST ‘*dug*, RA *gi* is also subject to an observability restriction in matrix clauses.\(^{29}\) Thus, while (44) is good, (45) is not (nor would a second-person subject be good):

\[(44) \quad \text{nga da ltogs-gi} \]  
I now hunger-[dir]  
‘I’m hungry now.’

\[(45) \quad \text{*khur.ge da ltogs-gi} \]  
*Intended: ‘He’s hungry now.’

Like what Sun (1993) reported for Mdzo dge Amdo, the class of unobservable predicates in RA is substantial, including: *skom* ‘to be thirsty’, *skyag* ‘to be

\(^{28}\) For those familiar with the phenomena of Chapter 7 already, I have in mind the asymmetry by which sentences with direct evidentiality, volitional verbs, and second-person agents do not normally occur in conditional protases.

\(^{29}\) I do not have data on whether or not the observability restriction holds in conditional protases, although I suspect not.
afraid’, *khu’u* ‘to fall ill, be hurt’, *khyag* ‘to be cold’, *go* ‘to understand’, *ngo.tsha* ‘to be shy, embarrassed’, and many others.\(^{30}\)

More investigation is required to understand why the class of unobservables appears much larger in Amdo varieties than in Standard Tibetan. My guess is that it has something to do with the aspectual properties of ST [dir imp] *V-gi-’dug* as compared with RA *V-gi*. Suppose that *V-gi-’dug* but not *V-gi* can be used to talk about situations that hold over substantial intervals of time. Then, we might expect the former but not the latter to be compatible with unobservable predicates. In an earlier footnote, I indicated that even ‘to be hungry’, the prototypical unobservable predicate in ST, can cooccur with direct for at least some speakers if the interval over which the judgment applies is long. In other words, it may be that the kind of evidence in support of a situation that holds over an interval is different from the kind of evidence in support of a situation holding at an instant. To elaborate, it may be that the only direct evidence for someone having hunger at an instant is that person’s feeling it, while patterns of hunger-behavior may constitute direct evidence for hunger over an extended interval.

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Without question the most unusual and complex type of evidentiality in Tibetan is ego evidentiality. In his survey of evidential languages, de Haan (1998) finds no other (unrelated) languages to have ego evidentials. Within Bodic languages, however, such evidentials are common indeed, and from what we can tell they behave quite similarly from language to language.

The basic diagnostic of ego evidentiality is the fairly strict origo-association it displays. In matrix declaratives, this means that ego constructions can be identified by their association with first-person. For instance, in the following example, taken from DeLancey (1986:204),

(1) བོད་ལ་གཡག་ཡེད

Tibet-loc yak [ego ELPA]

a. ??‘There are yaks in Tibet.’
b. ‘I have yaks in Tibet.’
c. ‘My yaks are in Tibet.’

there is no overt first-person argument. DeLancey claimed that (1) did not have to have an implied first-person argument, and could just mean *There are*
yaks in Tibet, as long as this fact was old knowledge to the speaker, that is, information that has been fully integrated into “the speaker’s overall scheme of knowledge of the world.” He continues that (1) “would be the appropriate form both for a Tibetan, who knows of the existence of yaks through daily experience, and for someone like me, who knows the fact only by hearsay, but has known it for years” (p. 205). Since no Tibetan doesn’t know this fact, a Tibetan who has never been to Tibet could felicitously say (1).

In fact, however, Tibetans systematically reject (1) under interpretation (a). The only possible interpretations are those in which there is an implied first-person argument, like (b) and (c).

This illustrates for one construction and one example the main diagnostic property of ego evidentiality. At this stage in research on Tibetan, it cannot be stated any more precisely, for constructions vary depending on where the first-person argument is allowed to occur. As we will see below, some constructions are very strict, requiring that the first-person be subject (e.g. the past and future), while others (e.g. the copular and ELPA constructions) are rather free, allowing the overt or implied first-person to be a grammatical subject, object, possessor of a subject or object, or even a possessor of a possessor. Nevertheless, all ego sentences share a first-person restriction of some kind.
Previous work in Tibetan linguistics has assumed that ego evidentiality is an inherent property of the verbs *yin* (a copula), *yod* (an ELPA verb), and other ‘ego verbs’ (such as the perfective marker *byung*). Let me call this the ‘lexical view’. The lexical view has not been so named or directly advocated by any linguist in particular; rather, it has been implicitly assumed by everyone.

In this chapter I argue that the lexical view is mistaken. Instead I adopt the ‘default view’, under which ego evidentiality arises as a default inference in the absence of overt evidential marking.

For the default view to succeed, it must also explain the pragmatic and semantic constraints on the use of ego. Most of this chapter is therefore devoted to pragmatic and semantic issues. First, I argue that self-knowledge and attitudes *de se* as conceived in the philosophical literature are subcases of ego knowledge. I show that such knowledge is a variety of propositional knowledge, and should not be treated in terms of properties.

More generally, I suggest that the category of self-knowledge be subsumed under the category of *immediate knowledge*, a theoretical consolidation which better explains certain uses of ego evidentials, including their use in some performative sentences. So, ego evidentiality indicates
immediate knowledge, knowledge which is mediated by neither perception nor inference.

In the final sections of this chapter I examine Tibetan’s ego constructions in depth, aiming to understand the considerable variety of these constructions without losing the merits of the unified default view. In particular, I treat the difference between strong ego and weak ego, constructions which impose stronger and weaker first-person restrictions, respectively. I maintain that such variety does not mean that ego has to be split into several categories, but rather that aspectual factors block certain possibilities in some constructions.

4.1. Arguments for the default view

In this section I show that ego is the unmarked evidentiality. I show that the verbs I’ve been calling ‘ego’ have non-evidential interpretations in embedded clauses, and that ego readings can arise even when there’s no ‘ego verb’ in a sentence. I conclude that ego evidentiality is a pragmatic property of assertion, and not an inherent property of any particular lexical or grammatical words.
4.1.1. Embedded clauses

Most embedders do not license evidential distinctions. For example, the embedder -dus ‘when’ only attaches to ego verbs:

\[
\begin{align*}
(2) & \quad \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \\
& \quad \text{kho/nga} \quad \text{dge.rgan} \quad \text{yin-dus/*red-dus} \\
& \quad \text{he/I} \quad \text{teacher} \quad \text{cop-when/*[ind cop]-when} \\
& \quad \text{‘When he/I was a teacher ...’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(3) & \quad \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \text{\textendash } / \\
& \quad \text{kho-la/nga-la} \quad \text{dngul} \quad \text{yod/*’dug/*yod.red} \\
& \quad \text{he-loc/me-loc} \quad \text{money ELPA/*[dir ELPA]/*[ind ELPA]} \quad \text{when} \\
& \quad \text{‘When he/I had money ...’}
\end{align*}
\]

This restriction holds regardless of the person of the subject. In other words, ego verbs no longer carry any person or evidential restrictions. (2) and (3) with third-person subjects are in no way awkward or unusual, and convey no evidential coloring.

From this data I conclude that ‘ego verbs’ are just verbs, whereas direct and indirect evidentials include something extra. Thus, although yin and yod are associated with an evidential value in matrix clauses, this association is not intrinsic, since in embedded clauses they are just verbs (e.g. yin is the copula and yod is the existential). Ego evidentiality, then, comes not
from the verbs I’ve been calling ego, but rather from some property of assertion in combination with these verbs.

4.1.2. Construction-specific variation

A problem with the lexical view is that it tries to imbue each ego marker, e.g. the copula *yin* and the ELPA *yod*, with an inherent evidential feature, even though the precise nature of the first-person restriction may vary from construction to construction. Why, for instance, is (4) grammatical while (5) is not?

(4) \[\text{ nga‘i bu skam.po yod }\]
\[
\text{my son thin [ego ELPA]}
\]
\text{‘My son was thin.’}

(5) \[\text{ * nga‘i bu ‘gro-gi-yin} \]
\[
\text{my son go-[ego fut]}
\]
\text{Intended: ‘My son will go.’}

If ego evidentiality is responsible for the first-person restriction, and ego evidentiality is inherent to the lexical items involved, then to handle these
facts we have to state a slightly different evidential value for each ego
construction.

Construction by construction stipulation may capture the facts, but as
an explanation of them it leaves much to be desired. One construction is
stipulated to have one property, and another construction another; but why
couldn’t it have been the reverse?

The null view is in a better position to account for construction-
specific variation, because it has two elements to work with. On the one hand,
there is whatever is contributed by that feature of assertion which is held
responsible for ego evidentiality. On the other hand, there is what the
construction itself contributes, including aspectual and other properties.
Suppose that what matrix clauses contribute is a very general ego concept,
which specifies the first-person restriction but not its details. Then various
constraints like that exemplified in (5) may follow not from evidentiality, but
rather from factors introduced by the construction-type. In Section 4.4, I take
just such an approach.
4.1.3. Reduced constructions

Another argument for the default view is that unlike Tibetan’s other evidential modalities, ego evidentiality occurs in a wide variety of constructions that lack what we might want to call ‘ego verbs’.

In various syntactically reduced constructions, we find the origo-association so typical of ego evidentiality showing up even though there is no ego verb. We see this for questions, negatives, and non-inflecting aspectual verbs.

4.1.3.1. Reduced questions

In both the past and the future, there are two second-person question forms. One includes the ego auxiliary *yin, while the other does not:

(6) Second-person questions (w/volitional verbs):

\[\text{a. } \begin{align*}
\text{gyed.rang/*kho/*nga} & \quad \text{ga.par} \\
\text{you/*he/*me} & \quad \text{phyin-pa-yin} \\
\text{‘Where did you go?’}
\end{align*}\]

\[\text{b. } \begin{align*}
\text{gyed.rang/*kho/*nga} & \quad \text{ga.par} \\
\text{you/*he/*I} & \quad \text{phyin-pa} \\
\text{‘Where did you go?’}
\end{align*}\]
It looks like (b) and (d) are derived from (a) and (c) by dropping *yin* (although –*gi-* changes to –*ga-* in the future).\(^{31}\)

Both full and reduced questions impose an origo restriction, i.e. a first-person restriction in statements and a second-person restriction in questions. In terminology to be introduced towards the end of this chapter, in the future and the past both kinds of questions are strong ego.

If the origo restriction arises even when the auxiliary *yin* is absent, why believe that *yin* itself is responsible for the ego interpretation?

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\(^{31}\) For yes/no questions, *-pa-*yin shortens to *-pa*, and *–gi-*yin shortens to *-ga*. Wh-questions also include the wh-question particle *-pas*, which leads to a slightly different pattern: *-pa-*yin-*pas* shortens to *-pas*, and *-gi-*yin-*pas* shortens to *-gas*. 
4.1.3.2. Reduced negatives

Similarly, in some Tibetan dialects, there are two kinds of first-person negative sentences: one with a ego auxiliary, and one with a bare verb. For example, in Standard Tibetan we find:

(7) 

a. ་/ ཡི་ དབྱིན་འབྲོན།  

I/?he  go-[ego neg perf]  ‘I didn’t go.’

b. ་/ * ཡི་  

I/*he  neg-go   ‘I didn’t go.’

V-Neg (a) is preferred to Neg-V (b). However, although (7b) is seldom attested or dialectal, speakers still have strong judgments that it is only possible with first-person subjects, just like the non-reduced form in (7a).

While *ma*-V conveys a negative past meaning, *mi*-V conveys a negative future meaning. Again, *mi*-V is origo restricted, just like sentences with ego *yin*:

---

32 Reduced sentences such as (7b) are the norm in Amdo varieties of Tibetan.

33 Although the second version of (7b) is totally ungrammatical for the speakers I’ve consulted, the second version of (7a) is acceptable under some circumstances. This is because (7a) and (7b) differ in aspect. (7b) is part of the perfective, which is a strong ego construction, while (7a) is part of the perfect, a weak ego construction. See section 4.5 for the discussion of the strong vs. weak ego contrast.
(8) Q: khyed.rang ‘gro-gi-yin-pas
you go-[ego fut]-Q ‘Will you go?’

A: *mi-‘gro
neg-go ‘No, I won’t.’

(9) Q: kho ‘gro-gi-red-pas
he go-[ind fut]-Q ‘Will he go?’

A: *mi-‘gro
neg-go Intended: ‘No, he won’t.’

Although reduced negatives are uncommon or marginal in Standard Tibetan, several Tibetans I consulted nevertheless had consistent reactions to such sentences, judgments which confirmed the findings for questions: reduced constructions are always ego constructions.\footnote{In (7), ‘go’ appears as phyin, while in (8) and (9) it appears as ‘gro. phyin is the perfective realization of the non-past stem ‘gro. In earlier stages of Tibetan, all verbs had distinct perfective and non-past stems, usually related by regular inflectional rules. Nowadays, a much smaller number of verbs have multiple stems, and there are no regular inflectional rules. In general, phyin and other perfective stems occur in what I have called the ‘past’ and ‘perfect’ constructions, while ‘gro and other non-past stems occur in what I have called the ‘imperfective’ and the ‘future’. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to determine the varying effects of the different stems on the modern colloquial language.}
4.1.3.3. Non-inflecting aspectual verbs

In Tibetan, overt evidentiality is pervasive. Many sentences are ‘inflected’ with ego verbs such as *yin* and *yod*, direct verbs such as *’dug* and *song*, and indirect *red* and *yod.red*. Some sentences, however, contain verbs that do not need to inflect:

(10) *dgos* ‘to need’

a. \[
\text{ nga-r snyu.gu dgos-yod } \\
\text{I-loc pen need-[ego perf] } \\
\text{‘I need a pen.’}
\]

b. \[
\text{ nga-r snyu.gu dgos } \\
\text{‘I need a pen.’}
\]

(11) *tshar* ‘to finish’

a. \[
\text{ nga-s khong-lasgang.kha lab-tshar-pa-yin } \\
\text{I-erg he-loc all say-finish-[ego past] } \\
\text{‘I’ve already told him everything.’}
\]
b. \[\text{nga-s} \text{ khong-la} \text{ sgang.kha} \text{ lab-tshar}\]

‘I’ve already told him everything.’

The (a) examples show the verbs *dgos* ‘to need’ and *tshar* ‘to finish’ followed by ego. In the (b) examples, we see that the ego ending is optional—the sentences can just end with these verbs.\(^{35}\)

Again, however, the reduced (b) sentences are only possible because the subject is first-person. Compare with third-person sentences:

(12) *dgos* ‘to need’

a. \[\text{khong-la} \text{ snyu.gu} \text{ dgos-dug}\]
\begin{tabular}{l}
he-loc & pen & need-[dir perf]
\end{tabular}

‘He needs a pen.’

b. *\[\text{khong-la} \text{ snyu.gu} \text{ dgos}\]*

\(^{35}\) Omission of *yod* in (10)—as well as *dug* in (12)—changes the aspect of the construction. (10a) and (12a) are examples of the perfect construction, which can have a present tense reading with certain stative verbs. The sentences in (10b) and (12b) are present-tense, but no longer perfect aspect.
Several verbs and verbal particles share this behavior, including the main verb *byung* ‘to get’, as well as the particles *ga*, *go*, and *chog*, which are all used in volunteering constructions (with meanings ranging from ‘Shall I V?’ to ‘I’ll V’).\(^\text{36}\)

To summarize this section, in reduced constructions we find the same origo restriction we find in clear ego constructions. This shows that the first-person restriction in matrix clauses is not an inherent property of verbs such as *yin* and *yod*. Rather, ego is default evidentiality, and it kicks in when no other evidentials are present. That is, it kicks in when *yin* or *yod* are present, but it also kicks in in the same way when these verbs are not present. In brief, it kicks in in the absence of indirect or direct evidentiality.

Suppose we took the contrary view, and maintained that *yin* and *yod* were ego verbs. To handle reduced constructions, we would either have to

---

(13) *tschar* ‘to finish’

a. *bkra.shis-gis khong-la sgang.kha lab-tshar-song*

Tashi-erg he-loc all say-finish-[dir past]

‘Tashi has already told him everything.’

b. *bkra.shis-gis khong-la sgang.kha lab-tshar*
say that _all verbs_ (or at least all the verbs that can occur in such constructions, a very large number of verbs) are ego, or that in reduced constructions ego arises by default. The former view is absurd, for then virtually everything is inherently (and coincidentally) ego. And the latter view, although on the right track, doesn’t go far enough. That is, if ego is a default for reduced constructions, it should be a default for non-reduced constructions as well.

4.2. Immediate knowledge

In the last section I presented syntactic evidence for the idea that ego evidentiality is default evidentiality. In this section, I pursue the pragmatic and semantic consequences of this idea.

I suggest below that ego evidentiality arises by default, in the absence of direct or indirect evidential marking. It marks that a fact constitutes ‘immediate knowledge’ for the origo, i.e. knowledge mediated by neither inference nor perception.

As I discuss in this section, various kinds of knowledge count as ‘immediate’. Certain explicit performatives occur with ego, as detailed in Section 4.2.3. By far the biggest subcategory of ego, however, is self-knowledge, or attitudes _de se_. In Section 4.2.2, I examine this topic in detail.

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36 The data in (10)-(13) are from an unpublished textbook by Tsetan Chonjore and Asif Agha.
concluding against recent property-based semantic theories of *de se*, and in favor of an evidential or epistemological theory of *de se*.

4.2.1. Self-knowledge and attitudes *de se*

A major use of ego evidentials is in statements that express self-knowledge or attitudes *de se*. This includes ‘I’-statements, i.e. matrix clauses with ‘I’, such as *I am John* or *I am being attacked by a bear*. Perry (1993) has contrasted such examples with referentially equivalent sentences that don’t have ‘I’, such as *John Perry is being attacked by a bear*. The ‘I’-sentences have a unique behavioral effect: if Perry says ‘I’, then we expect him to run; but if he says ‘John Perry’, not knowing that that’s who he is, then we don’t expect him to run, even though the proposition expressed is the same in both cases. I will call ‘I’-sentences cases of *matrix de se*.

The category ego also includes the kind of sentence studied by Casteñeda (1966), which is the embedded version of an ‘I’-sentence. Take the following sentences on their most natural readings:

(14) Heimson believes that he is Hume.
(15) Domingo believes that he is a genius.

(14) says that Heimson believes of himself—that is, the person he knows as himself—that he is Hume. Likewise, (15) says that Domingo believes that he himself is a genius. My awkward phrasings are meant to capture the idea that Heimson and Domingo know that their
belief is self-referring. Or, to put it another way, that if they were to assert the embedded sentence they would say ‘I’.

Of course, this is different from saying that Heimson believes of someone—who we know to be Heimson, although Heimson does not—that he is Hume; or that Domingo believes of someone, who happens unbeknownst to him to be Domingo, that he is a genius. Casteñeda marked this use of the anaphor as he*, to emphasize its special character. For Casteñeda, the difference between de se and de re is the difference between, Domingo believes that he* is a genius (=de se) and Domingo believes that he is a genius (de re). I will call the he* or de se sentences cases of embedded de se.\(^{37}\)

In philosophical work, matrix and embedded cases are discussed separately, since only the embedded cases have any effect on the truth-value of sentences. (I am being attacked by a bear and John Perry is being attacked by a bear have the same truth-value when spoken by Perry.) When focusing on truth, this is a defensible separation. When focusing on psychology, however, there is no separation, and the two cases are perfectly parallel.

De se readings appear to pose a problem for propositional views of self-knowledge. Having de re knowledge about someone who happens to be oneself is quite different from having knowledge that one knows to be about oneself. This has led some authors to claim that the distinction between self-
knowledge *(de se)* and other-knowledge *(de re)* cannot be captured by propositions alone (Perry 1993, Lewis 1979).

As a result of this difficulty, an alternative theory of embedded *de se* has risen to prominence. On this theory, attitudes *de se* involve a relation between an agent and a property, rather than a relation between an agent and a proposition (Lewis 1979, Chierchia 1989, Schlenker 1999). In this section I present several empirical arguments from English against the property-based view, taking Chierchia’s work as representative. I conclude that there is no obstacle to adopting a basically propositional view of self-knowledge. I do not myself develop the details of such a view, but instead refer the reader to previous work in this area (e.g. Boër and Lycan 1980b).

For Chierchia, ‘that’-clauses have at least two different interpretations. They may be propositions, as in the *de re* reading of (15), given below as (16a), or they may be properties, as in the *de se* reading of (15), given below as (16b):

\[\begin{align*}
\text{(16) a. } & \lambda x[\text{believe}(x, x \text{ is a genius})](D) \\
\text{b. } & \text{believe}(D, \lambda x[x \text{ is a genius}])
\end{align*}\]

37 Nobody else uses the phrases ‘matrix de se’ and ‘embedded de se’.
In (a), ‘believe’ relates a believer and a proposition. In (b), however, ‘believe’ is a ‘self-ascriptive relation’ between Domingo and a property, which gives rise to the *de se* reading.

On the property-based view, a *de se* pronoun is bound in a different way from a *de re* pronoun. In the *de re* reading of (15), ‘he’ is bound by the matrix subject. In the *de se* reading, it is bound by the embedded lambda operator, as seen in the embedded clause of (16b).  

Chierchia’s proposal has the consequence that only pronominals (overt pronouns or covert PRO) can trigger *de se* interpretations. This is because only pronominals can be lambda-bound as in (16b). Although he takes this consequence to be an advantage of the property-based view, I argue in Section 4.2.2 that embedded pronominals are not required for embedded *de se*.

In my view, the property-based view of *de se* is incorrect, and empirical arguments from both English and Tibetan can be marshaled against it. Instead, a proposition-based theory should be adopted, but one that recognizes the evidential or epistemological basis of *de se* knowledge. Aside from its empirical shortcomings, what’s missing from the property-based view is an appreciation of the causal factors at work in shaping a *de se* belief. *De se* beliefs are special because they are beliefs reached in a special way. I propose
that we take the information links which cause our attitudes as central, and analyze attitudes *de se* in terms of the unique way they are reached in contrast to the way attitudes *de re* are reached. But first, let me return to the discussion of Chierchia.

The argument that the *de se* reading of sentences like (15) is structurally distinct—(16b) as opposed to (16a)—is not strong. Consider Chierchia’s claim that the ‘that’-clause complement of ‘believe’ can be interpreted in two different ways. That is, from (17a) and (b), one can infer either (c) or (d):

(17)  

- a. Domingo believes that he is a genius.  
- b. Pavarotti believes everything that/whatever Domingo believes.  
- c. Pavarotti believes that he (Pavarotti) is a genius.  
- d. Pavarotti believes that Domingo is a genius.

Chierchia (1989:23) writes, “Here, two patterns of inference become possible, depending on how the first premise is construed. The sloppy inference in [c] is associated with the de se reading of the embedded pronoun.” Or take the following example,

(18) Heimson believes that he is Hume, as do I / and so do I / and I do too.

38 For details on the mechanism required to introduce the lambda operator in (16b), please see Chierchia’s paper.
the second part of which can also be read as either sloppy or strict. It is sloppy if I believe is that I am Hume, and strict if, like Heimson, I believe that Heimson is Hume. 39

Chierchia’s argument has two parts. First, there is the sloppy reading, where Chierchia says that both me and Heimson believe a property (as in 16b), and therefore we both have *de se* beliefs. This is the only way for the reference of the embedded pronoun to covary with the matrix subject. Second, there is the strict reading, where both me and Heimson believe a proposition (as in 16a). Therefore, we both have *de re* beliefs about the same person (Heimson).

To put it precisely, Chierchia links the sloppy/strict contrast to the *de se/de re* contrast. If the continuing ellipsis-reduced sentence is interpreted under sloppy identity, then both sentences report attitudes *de se*. But if the continuing sentence is interpreted under strict identity, with both subjects believing something about the same person, then both sentences report attitudes *de re*.

Both parts of Chierchia's argument are flawed. First, suppose that Domingo believes that he’s a genius, and that Pavarotti also believes he
Domingo) is a genius; or that Heimson believes that he is Hume, and that I believe that he is as well. According to Chierchia, since we have strict identity here, the initial sentence in such cases should be *de re*, not *de se*.

Suppose Chierchia is right, and on the strict continuation the initial sentences must be *de re*. This has serious and unwelcome consequences. To show this, let me return to the examples I started with:

(14) Heimson believes that he is Hume.
(15) Domingo believes that he is a genius.

Recall the starting point for determining what constituted a *de se* attitude. I compared two situations, one in which we represent Heimson and Domingo as knowingly having a self-belief, and another in which we represent them as having beliefs about people who happen, unknown to them, to be themselves. The crucial fact was that there seemed to be a truth-value difference between the *de se* and the *de re* readings. For Chierchia, in fact, the only diagnostic for the *de se/de re* contrast is that *de se* entails *de re* but not vice-versa. In other words, to borrow Casteñeda’s notation, we can’t conclude that *Heimson believes that he* is Hume from *Heimson believes that he is Hume*, since Heimson’s belief may not be a conscious self-belief; although the reverse

---

39 Certain sentences may favor one reading over another. In addition, as Carson Schütze points out, whether or not there is stress on the embedded pronoun also has a significant effect.
Heimson believes that he is Hume from Heimson believes that he* is Hume—is legitimate.

Let me phrase matters in a slightly different way: If there is a truth-value difference between the *de se* and *de re* interpretations of a given sentence, say (14), then this difference comes from the way we represent the attitude holder's mental state. In saying (14), I normally mean to suggest that Heimson has a consciously self-referential belief, but in certain situations I may mean to suggest otherwise. Suppose now that I am representing Heimson as having a consciously self-referential belief (*de se*), but that actually all he believes is that such and such person (who omniscient linguists know to be Heimson) is Hume. We may be inclined to say that there is something funny about (14), or indeed, that it is false in the situation on the intended reading.

What's odd about Chierchia's position is that it implies that the continuing sentence—for example, the second bit of (18)—can have an effect on our intended representation of the initial sentence. So, if (18) is interpreted under strict identity, with me sharing with Heimson a belief about Heimson, then according to Chierchia, the first part of (18) should report a *de re* attitude. That is, Heimson should have a *de re* attitude about himself. If he had a *de se*
attitude, then the continuing sentence would have involved sloppy identity rather than strict identity.

At first glance, this is not a problem for Chierchia. Since as noted above, _de se_ entails _de re_, an attitude _de re_ is consistent with an attitude _de se_. So, the continuing sentence in (18) could be strict, and Heimson could still have a _de se_ belief.

Upon closer inspection, however, there is a problem. Notice that given Chierchia's representational requirements, we must represent Heimson as having a _de re_ belief if (18) involves strict identity. Therefore, under strict identity, an example like (18)—repeated below—should be immune from the kind of ambiguity that plagues simple examples like (14) and (15).

(18) Heimson believes that he is Hume, as do I / and so do I / and I do too.

That is to say, if we interpret (18) under strict identity, where I agree with Heimson that Heimson is Hume, then there should be no pragmatic infelicity in the case where Heimson doesn't know that he is having a self-referential belief. Because the continuing sentence is strict, the first sentence is _de re_ and therefore cannot be ambiguous or unclear.
I find this conclusion completely unintuitive. There is an ‘understanding’ of (18) by which the continuation is strict, but the first sentence is meant \textit{de se}. Just as Heimson believes that \textit{he is Hume} (14) has both a \textit{de se} and a \textit{de re} reading, so too does the first clause in (18). If you intend (14) \textit{de se}, but (14) is a proper characterization of the facts only on its \textit{de re} reading, then I could challenge you by saying, \textit{No, he believes that so and so is Hume—you see, he doesn’t know that he is so and so.}

But the fact of the matter is that I could counter your claim of (18) with exactly the same challenge. Whether my challenge goes to the ‘truth-value’ of (14) and (18) is a complicated question. However, what seems uncomplicated is that my challenge is exactly the same in both cases, and has a similar pragmatic effect in both cases. For Chierchia, however, such a challenge should have no effect at all in the case of (18), given that (18) under strict identity is supposed to enforce an unambiguously \textit{de re} interpretation.

The crux of the matter is that whether the continuing sentence is interpreted under strict identity or sloppy identity should not affect our representation of the attitude of the subject of the initial sentence. Chances are pretty good that Heimson believes the same thing—and we mean to represent him as such—regardless of how we follow up (14).
On Chierchia’s approach, we are allowed to ignore our intended representation of what Heimson believes in the case of (18) under strict identity. But if so, why can’t we also ignore our intended representation in simple sentences such as (14) and (15)?

The second part of Chierchia’s argument involves cases where the continuing sentence gets the sloppy reading, e.g. (17c) is concluded from (17a) and (b). According to Chierchia, in this case both the initial sentence and the continuing sentence should be de se. That is, sloppy identity continuation is only compatible with de se readings. This is also wrong.

In fact, the following chart, along with the examples it indexes, shows that the sloppy/strict contrast is independent of the de sel/de re contrast. Each of the examples in (20)-(23) involves sloppy identity. Each case has two sentences, with two different subjects each self-believing something. These examples show that sloppy identity is not restricted to de se readings, as Chierchia claims. Sloppy identity is compatible with de re as well as de se, which suggests that, contra Chierchia, there is no representational unification of sloppy identity and de se attitudes.

\[40\] There might be a second problem with the property theorist’s rebuttal. The de se interpretation is more specific than the de re interpretation: it entails, but is not entailed by, the de re interpretation. Therefore, if a structure permits both de re and de se, and the interpretation is de re, then Grice’s (1989) principle of Quality should lead us to conclude that de se was not meant. So, if (17a) is meant de re, it should not be interpreted as de se, for if it were meant to be de se it should have been formally given as such.
In interpreting the following examples, a few points should be kept in mind. Examples (21), (22), and (23) are no doubt less natural than (20). But I think this is only because *de re* readings are always more difficult than *de se* readings when both are available. The *de re* reading of (14), for example, requires an unusual context in which Heimson has somehow gained enough cognitive access to an individual to have a belief about him, without realizing that the belief is actually about himself. This is not a standard affair. The cases below are even more complicated, perhaps especially (23), which requires you to imagine not just one, but two *de re* scenarios.

(20) Domingo thinks he’s a genius, and so does Pavarotti.

This is an unexceptional example. Both Domingo and Pavarotti are represented as having consciously self-referential (*de se*) beliefs. Chierchia’s approach is compatible with (20).
Kaplan thought that his house was on fire, and so did Perry. But only Kaplan did anything about it, because Perry didn’t know that it was his own house that he was looking at!

Here, the continuation is sloppy, since Perry has a belief about Perry’s house, not Kaplan’s. However, while Kaplan has a consciously self-referential belief (de se), Perry’s belief is about a house that only the omniscient linguist knows to be his (de re). Property-based theories cannot handle this case, since the only way to get sloppy identity is by copying a property—which should result in a de se reading for the continuing sentence.

Domingo thinks that he’s a genius, and so does Pavarotti. But I like Domingo much better because unlike Pavarotti, he doesn’t know that the singer on those records he listens to is him, whereas Pavarotti does.

This is like (21), but in reverse. The continuation is sloppy and de se, but the initial sentence is de re.

Kaplan said that his pants were on fire, and so did Perry. It was a few moments before they both realized that they were talking about their own pants!

Here, the continuation is again sloppy, since Perry was talking about his pants and not Kaplan’s. However, as evidenced by the second sentence, neither Kaplan nor Perry started with a de se belief.
The point of these examples is not that they are widely used or particularly natural sentences. Rather, the point is that they show that sloppy identity can occur in the absence of *de se* readings, and therefore that Chierchia cannot use sloppy identity as evidence for the claim that the propositional structures copied under ellipsis in *de se* readings are uniquely *de se*—structurally and semantically.

The new data in this section recommends caution. We should not too hastily adopt an anti-propositional view of attitudes *de se*. It may well be, as for example Boër and Lycan (1980b) maintain, that attitudes *de se* are still ‘propositional’ attitudes. Distinguishing between *de se* and *de re* contexts may be a job for pragmatics rather than semantics.

4.2.2. *De se* names

I just argued that certain inference patterns assumed to be evidence for the property-based view of self-knowledge are actually invalid, which puts the property-based view on weaker ground. The view also runs into unexpected empirical difficulties when names behave like first-person pronouns.

According to Chierchia, overt or covert pronouns coreferent with higher subjects facilitate embedded *de se*. For Schlenker, logophors give rise to embedded *de se*. For both, the pronominal nature of the DP is crucial. As
Chierchia (1989:9) puts it, “the basic idea is that sentences containing a pronominal element can act as ‘open’ formulae or unsaturated structures (i.e. properties). This links the possibility of a de se reading of a clause specifically to the presence of a pronominal element.”

As evidence for his claim, Chierchia cites data including,

(24) Domingo believes that Domingo is a genius.

claiming that this sentence “cannot have a de se interpretation. [This] interpretation is specifically linked to the presence of a pronoun that we can abstract over. If however one takes de se interpretations to be just a case of de re interpretations, there would be no reason why [24] should lack a de se interpretation.” (p. 22).

Pace Chierchia, (24) does have a de se reading. To see this, it is easiest to start with cases of matrix de se. Both Shoemaker (1970) and Perry (1993) have noticed that matrix de se does not depend on ‘I’, but rather on intentional self-reference. The following sentences, when said by the person who bears the name in subject position—which that person knows to refer to himself—express self-knowledge:
(26) Joey wants some Post-Toasties.

The phenomenon of self-reference with DPs other than ‘I’ was noticed a good while ago by Sydney Shoemaker:

although self-reference is typically done with first-person pronouns, it can be done with names, and even with definite descriptions—as when de Gaulle says “de Gaulle intends ...,” and the chairman of a meeting says “The Chair recognizes...” In such cases these expressions are “self-referring,” not merely because their reference is in fact to the speaker, but also because the speaker intends in using them to refer to himself. (Shoemaker 1970:270, notes 3&5.)

John Perry has also emphasized that what I call matrix de se bears no necessary connection to the first-person pronoun:

“‘I’ has this peculiar role in the thinking of everyone who understands it. Its having this role is tied to its meaning—not the special meaning it has for each of us, but the common meaning it has for all of us. ‘John Perry,’ on the other hand, does not have this special role in my thinking by virtue of what it means. It means the same for all of us as it does for me, but plays the special role in question only in my thinking... I suspect that my own name acquired a special role in my thinking before I learned that “I” always stood for the person using it, and accepted “I am John Perry”... The importance of the word “I” is not that everyone who has beliefs about himself must use it, or an indexical like it, to think of himself. Rather, it is that because its role in thinking is tied to its meaning, it can be used to characterize that cognitive role in a general way. To accept “I am so-and-so,” a person need not understand the word “I,” but only be in a
state that, were he to understand “I,” would lead him to use “I am so-and-so.”

Suppose a one-and-a-half-year-old, with no mastery of “I”, says “Joey wants Post Toasties.” We say “he says he wants Post Toasties,” where the “he” is a quasi-indicator. We mean that he is in a state that would lead him, if he had mastery of “I,” to say “‘I’ want Post Toasties.” (Perry 1993:62-63)\(^{41}\)

It seems clear, then, that matrix *de se* does not require ‘I’.\(^{42}\) Given the pragmatic parallels between matrix and embedded *de se*, we expect that embedded *de se* will also not be dependent on any specific pronominals. And although the embedded cases are considerably less natural than the matrix cases, and probably far more rare in speech, they seem possible if we have the intended reading in mind:

(27) Michael Jordan says that Michael Jordan will carry the Bulls to the top.
(28) Joey said that Joey wanted some Post-Toasties.

We want to say ‘he’ in place of the embedded name, which is certainly our way of putting it. If, however, we take Michael Jordan’s or Joey’s way of putting it, then these sentences are possible, and note that due to the presence of ‘that’, they cannot be direct quotes. This means that contra Chierchia,

\(^{41}\) One might expect a child precocious enough to be talking about ‘Post Toasties’ to have also mastered ‘I’, but I cannot speak for Perry’s children.

\(^{42}\) Note also Boër and Lycan’s (1980b:460) reference to “Igor, the infamous hunchback of grade-B horror movies [who] always refers to himself as ‘Igor’; [whose] idiolect lacks the first-person altogether.”
nothing rules out (24) as *de se*, and thus pronouns are not the only kind of DP that can associate with *de se*.

My argument hinges on two assumptions. First, I am claiming that names are names, no matter who says them. There is no hidden ‘I’ in (26), and no hidden *he* in (28). I find this to be a well grounded simplifying assumption. If names are rigid designators, as in Kripke (1980) or Kaplan (1989), then the name itself directly harpoons an individual. And all that matters to the semantics is this individual. Names do not have a character, they do not have an indexical linguistic rule. My ‘Garrett’ is your ‘Garrett’.

I am more likely to be challenged on my second assumption, which is that cases like (24)-(28) really are *de se*. Recall that *de se* entails *de re*, so the above cases are also *de re*. Perhaps then, as far as the semantics is concerned,

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43 Readers may need help in constructing plausible uses of sentences like (27) and (28). Here’s one: I ask a reporter what Michael Jordan told him. *What did he say?* I ask. The reporter responds, *He said that MJ always plays his best in the big games*, or perhaps more naturally, *that MJ always plays his best in the big games*. One doesn’t have to look far to find sentences like (25) and (26)—sports and politics are full of such examples. Embedded cases are more difficult for various reasons. Again, the point is not that they are perfect, but that there seems to be nothing wrong with them in principle.

What Boër and Lycan (1980b:438) refer to as ‘Principle C’ may have something to say about why (27) and (28) are difficult examples: “When a purely referential designator occurs transparently, even if within the scope of an operator that is capable of creating opacity, the designator is in the mouth of the utterer of the whole sentence, and in no way in the mouth of any subject to whom the utterer may be ascribing a propositional attitude.” Although I do not think the judgments are as categorical as Boër and Lycan believe they are, their point does seem correct in general. Embedded names such as those in (27) and (28) tend to be words that the speaker would use, rather than words that the matrix subject would use.
that is all they are. Perhaps the *de se* quality of these sentences is a pragmatic feature that arises from the speaker’s knowledge of the situations in context.

Although this is a conclusion I am willing to accept, I think that if the *de se* feeling is a pragmatic phenomenon in the above cases, it is a pragmatic phenomenon across the board. As I showed in the previous section, the only diagnostic for *de se* is the asymmetric entailment intuition, i.e. the feeling that *de se* entails *de re* but not vice-versa. This intuition—and our ability to construct two different kinds of scenarios (*de se* and *de re*) for the same sentence—are at the heart of what we mean by *de se*. The findings of the previous section did not support any semantic or representational difference between *de se* and *de re*, further emphasizing the significance of our intuitions. And if our intuitions suggest that names can be *de se*, then I see no reason not to trust them here if we have been trusting them elsewhere.

Second, as I show in the next section, Tibetan sentences such as (26) are grammatically encoded as self-knowledge. That is, they pattern together with clear cases of matrix *de se* in triggering ego evidentiality.

### 4.2.2.1. Names and ego in Tibetan

An important feature of ego evidentials is that they typically occur in matrix declaratives only if there is a first-person argument in some (prominent)
position in the clause they mark. In strong ego constructions (e.g. the future), there is an absolute first-person restriction, whereas in weak ego constructions (e.g. copular clauses) it is much looser.

The first-person restriction has nothing to do with any properties of the first-person pronoun. The difference between (29) and (30) doesn’t boil down to the difference between ‘I’ and a name:

\[
(29) \quad \text{nga dge.rgan yin} \\
\text{I teacher [ego cop]} \\
\text{‘I am a teacher.’}
\]

\[
(30) \quad \text{yang.chen dge.rgan red} \\
\text{Yangchen teacher [ind cop]} \\
\text{‘Yangchen is a teacher.’}
\]

The reason is that if Yangchen self-importantly\(^{44}\) refers to herself by her own name, knowing perfectly well that she is referring to herself, then she would say (31), not (30):

\[^{44}\text{I say ‘self-importantly’ because Tibetan is like English: normally Tibetans use ‘I’ to refer to themselves, so sentences like (31) are uncommon. Ed Keenan informs me, however, that in Malagasy self-reference with names is a regular occurrence. Similarly, as I have noticed in my own studies of Burmese, in that language names often substitute for ‘you’.}\]
As we would expect, this property is shared by other ego constructions.

The first-person restriction, then, is better stated as follows, following Shoemaker’s definition of self-reference: the ego evidential is used when the speaker uses a DP $x$ intending to refer to herself with $x$.

When a speaker says ‘I’, she cannot fail to know that she is referring to herself. Her knowledge of language, her grasp of the ‘character’ of ‘I’ (Kaplan 1989), means that she must know that she self-refers. Recanati (1993:87-90) argues that this is because the linguistic rule for ‘I’ cannot be dissociated from the ego-mode of presentation. As she produces speech, the speaker feels the words come from her mouth and experiences the cognitive processes involved in the production of speech. It is clear that she is the one who is speaking.

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45 This sentence has various other possible readings, including *Yangchen is my teacher*, and *Yangchen—someone I am close to—is a teacher*. These readings do not bear on the present point.

46 According to Bendix (1993:238), in Newari, a closely related Tibeto-Burman language with a similar evidential system, it is even possible to say *You did it* with an ego marker, provided that the speaker is talking to herself.
The difference between the first-person pronoun and a name is that while one cannot fail to intentionally self-refer with ‘I’, one can easily fail to intentionally self-refer with one’s own name. That is, if N names x, x may say N without knowing, or having forgotten, that N refers to x.

One might object to the idea that both (31) and (29) are cases of matrix \textit{de se}. Surely (31) is different, given that names are different from personal pronouns. In fact, however, the only difference between the two examples is that in (31) Yangchen refers to herself as ‘Yangchen’, while in (29) she refers to herself by saying ‘I’. There is ego evidentiality in both cases, so Yangchen’s epistemic relation to the proposition pairing Yangchen and the property of being a teacher is the same in both cases. In both cases, she knows the proposition in the same (ego) way.

In conclusion, as far as matrix and embedded \textit{de se} are concerned, there is no difference between first-person pronouns and intentionally self-referential names. This shows that Chierchia’s position was too strong: names can be \textit{de se}.

\footnote{In fact, it is not just names that can also be \textit{de se}. So can definite descriptions, as suggested by Shoemaker’s example, \textit{The Chair recognizes...}. In questions, ‘you’ replaces ‘I’ as the origo (cf. Chapter 6). Just as matrix \textit{de se} is possible with ‘I’, names, and definite descriptions; interrogative \textit{de se} is possible with ‘you’, names, and definite descriptions, as numerous authors have noticed:}

(a) A Labour Member—someone like Mr William Molloy, let us say—rises to his feet. ‘Will the right hon. gentleman give way?’ The right hon. gentleman is so engrossed
The important thing is not what kind of DP the speaker uses, but how the speaker is presented with the situation the sentence describes. For Yangchen, both (29) and (31) express intimate and personal knowledge, knowledge that is gained immediately, without mediating perception or inference. Thus, I maintain, *de se* phenomena are governed entirely by epistemological rather than grammatical considerations. Grammatical considerations of the sort discussed by Chierchia are irrelevant to *de se*.

My view leaves a problem: how are we to account for the apparent difference in truth-value between *de se* and *de re* readings of the same sentence? And how are we to account for the different inference possibilities noted above in relation to (17)?

Having argued against the property-based view, I feel that these questions should be solved by some version of the proposition-based view (cf. Boër and Lycan 1980b). I am not in a position to fix the details of such a

in his belief that he does not notice. ‘Will the right hon. gentleman ...’ Again, no response, nothing. (Wekker 1976:65)

(b) Will His Majesty please step this way? (Jenkins 1972)

(c) Will the Secretary of State acknowledge the important role that the Development Corporation for Wales has played in developing exports from Wales? (Palmer 1983:153)

(d) Would the members of the panel please explain why should old age pensioners wait for their promised increase, when Civil Servants receive increases backdated? (Palmer 1983:157)
theory. At this point I would only suggest that it may be helpful to maintain, along the lines of Perry (1993), a distinction between propositions held (believed, asserted, etc.) and the way they are held, or the way they came to be held.

Or, to put it another way, in relation to (17) above, we should not just ask, what makes Domingo believes that he is a genius true? We should also ask, how did he come to believe it? To understand how the sentence is used, we must get at the causal factors which determine Domingo’s relation to the proposition in question. For example, what kind of cognitive access did Domingo have to the constituents of the proposition, if any? How did Domingo access the object we know (and he may or may not know) to be Domingo?48

When such questions are brought to the fore, we step away from a semantical explanation of de se, and move instead towards an evidential or epistemological explanation. I believe that this is where the most illuminating results await us.

48 In a similar vein, Boër and Lycan (1980b:450-53) stress the variety of reasons, ‘ordinary’ and not so ordinary, we may have for believing a proposition. These different reasons may take different causal routes to our brains, and therefore may affect our behavior in different ways—without making any truth-functional difference.
4.2.3. **Performatives as ego**

One special use of ego is with a certain kind of performative:

(32) `mo.Ta 'di khyed.rang-la yin
car this you-loc [ego cop]
‘This car is for you.’ [I’m giving it to you.]

(33) `khyed.rang-gi ming rdo.rje rnam.rgyal yin
you-gen name Dorje Namgyal [ego cop]
‘Your name is Dorje Namgyal.’ [I’m naming you.]

Example (32) is performative. By saying (32), the speaker performs the act of giving the hearer the car. That is, the act of saying constitutes the act of giving. Because of this, the speaker uses ego *yin* in place of indirect *red*, which would have conveyed a simple statement of fact (*This car belongs to you*). Similarly, (33) performs a naming because of *yin; red*, by contrast, would mark a simple statement of fact. A suitable context for (33) would be if the speaker is a lama, i.e. one who has the habit of naming people in Tibetan culture.

Canonical uses of ego impose a first-person restriction, so this data is surprising. That is, although (34a) is perfectly normal and natural, typically Tibetans wouldn’t say (34b), unless the subject is closely related to the speaker, e.g. his son (cf. section 4.5):
Given (32)-(34), three possibilities emerge. Either (i) the performative cases involve the first-person at some level of representation; (ii) there is an evidential link between first-person knowledge and performativity; or (iii) it is just a coincidence that ego is used with both performatives and self-knowledge. Here I argue for thesis (ii), which further supports my view that ego marks immediate knowledge, a broader and more inclusive category than self-knowledge.

Thesis (i) can be discarded by showing that no first-person argument is necessary for the Tibetan performatives to be felicitous. Though one might guess that (32) is elliptical for *This car is for you from me*, in fact no such argument can be added in Tibetan:
Alternatively, there could be a hidden first-person possessor in one of the arguments, e.g. *This car of mine is for you.* However, the grammaticality of (36) shows that this cannot be right:

```
khong-gi mo.Ta ‘di khyed.rang-la yin
he-gen car this you-loc [ego cop]
```

‘This car of his is for you.’

Moving on to (33), *Your name is Dorje Namgyal,* how does one even begin to defend the hidden first-person view? Where would the first-person pronoun go? Could ‘your name’ be short for ‘your name of mine’? Is the name short for ‘my Dorje Namgyal’? Or is (33) short for ‘I name you Dorje Namgyal’? I have found no evidence to support any of these views.

Having rejected thesis (i), I want to argue for thesis (ii), which says that there is an evidential connection between performativity and first-person knowledge. Before doing this, however, the performatives in (32) and (33) must be examined more closely.
4.2.3.1. Explicit Performatives

To my knowledge the only discussion of the Tibetan cases is Agha’s (1993:176-7) brief discussion of examples like (32). He argues that ego *yin* is used in (32) because the speaker is taking a ‘benefactor-perspective’ on a state of affairs. He does not notice that (32) is performative.

Though different in some respects from canonical performatives, (32) and (33) share crucial properties with performatives. Here I focus on so-called *explicit performatives*, namely performatives whose force is other than the assertive force associated with all statements (Levinson 1983). As Austin (1962) observed, explicit performatives tend to have certain peculiar properties not shared by most declaratives. If we consider a promise, such as *I promise to finish my dissertation on time*, we notice that the subject is first-person and the verb ‘promise’ is in the simple present tense. If either feature is changed, the sentence is no longer performative.

Austin also pointed out that many performatives are associated with felicity conditions. For example, *I sentence you to three years in prison* said by me has no force, since I am not a judge. Similarly, *I bet you five dollars* isn’t a bet until you accept my offer. (It *is* an offer of a bet, however.)

One of Austin’s important observations was that performatives are used to *do things*, and as such don’t seem to be true or false like other
sentences. I will question this view later, but for now the observation suffices: clearly there is some *doing* involved in performatives that is absent from most declaratives.

By these rough criteria, the Tibetan sentences are also explicit performatives. First, there is a tense restriction; such sentences only work in the present tense, as (37) and (38) show:

(37a/b)
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{zla.nyin mo.Ta } & \text{`di khyed.rang-la } \text{red/'yin} \\
\text{last year car this you-loc} & \text{[ind cop]/*[ego cop]}
\end{align*}
\]

‘Last year this car was for you.’

(38a/b)
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{lo bcu-`i sngon-la khyed.rang-gi ming rdo.rje rnam.rgyal red/'yin} \\
\text{year ten before you-gen name Dorje Namgyal [ind cop]/*[ego cop]}
\end{align*}
\]

‘Ten years ago, your name was Dorje Namgyal.’

Both *yin* and *red* are compatible with either present or past tense, so we might expect the (a) cases to be good. However, only the (b) cases are good, suggesting that the cases with *yin* are indeed performatives.

Second, such sentences may fail if certain felicity conditions are not met. For example (33) typically succeeds as a naming only if the speaker has the authority to name,

\[49\] (37a) is possible if the adverb ‘last year’ is part of the DP ‘this car’, e.g. *This car from last year is for you.*
e.g. is a lama. Third, there is indeed an intuitive sense in which (32) and (33) are used to perform actions: (32) is a giving, or at least a transfer of ownership; and (33) is a naming. What matters about these sentences is what they are used to do, not whether they are true or false.

I conclude that (32) and (33) are explicit performatives. But unlike the most famous cases of performativity, e.g. promising, christening, and so on, in these sentences there is no verb corresponding to the action they perform (if any), and no first-person pronoun corresponding to the performer. Both sentences are simple linking predications.

4.2.3.2. Truth by say-so

Many philosophers and linguists have criticized Austin’s claim that performatives are non-truth-functional. Early critics include Lemmon (1962) and Hedenius (1963), with more recent critics being Searle (1989), Bach and Harnish (1992), and Recanati (1998). The alternative view is that performatives, like other declarative clauses, are truth-functional, but that some property of them makes them true all or most of the time.

Lemmon suggests that performatives are ‘verifiable by their use’, which is to say that “the very delivery of them in the right way ensures logically the truth of the propositions they in those circumstances express,
without, as is ordinarily required of sentences, reference to circumstances beyond the immediate circumstances of their delivery” (p. 88). Hedenius makes a similar suggestion, saying that a performative sentence $S$ is true “if and only if the utterance of $S$ causes the state of affairs which makes $S$ true and $S$’s social function is to be uttered in those circumstances where the utterance of $S$ causes $S$’s truth” (p. 119).

On the truth-functional view, *I promise to come* constitutes a promise because the utterance of the sentence itself plays a causal role—if not the causal role—in determining that the sentence is true. Contrast this with a non-performative such as *John is playing outside*. This sentence is different: it’s not true just because I say it.

On the truth-functional view, performatives are just like other declaratives in having truth values. Contra Austin, they are not primarily actions. The fact that they seem to perform actions, then, must be derived. Austin’s critics differ greatly in how this comes about. Here I adopt Bach and Harnish’s view, which is that performative utterances are essentially indirect speech acts. That is, just as *Would you mind leaving the room?*, although grammatically a question, is intended and interpreted as a request, so too do various extra-linguistic inferences come into play which guarantee that performatives are understood as performative. According to Bach and
Harnish (1992), when the speaker says *I promise to finish my dissertation on time*, what’s said is just that: the propositional content. The fact that the utterance constitutes a promise is inferred indirectly.

The truth-functional view has several empirical advantages. One is that there is less urgency to come up with a strict algorithm that determines the performative force, if any, for a given sentence. Although the fact that *I promise...* is a promise could be computed by algorithm, since the sentence has ‘promise’ as its main verb, many other cases are more complex. In the Tibetan examples, there is no performative verb: yet we infer that (32) is part of a giving and (33) part of a naming. In general, the performative as indirect speech-act view imposes no requirement that there be any performative element in the clause (Bach and Harnish 1992). In the non-truth-functional view, there has to be a way to identify and set aside the performatives—how else could they be exempt from truth-functional analysis? And if there is such a way, we hope it would be algorithmic rather than arbitrary.

A related advantage is that the truth-functional view deals better with hedged and embedded performatives, e.g. *I regret to inform you...* (Bach & Harnish 1992). Sadock (1974) was forced to propose elaborate syntactic rules to account for the fact that the sentence just mentioned performs an informing.
For Bach and Harnish, however, indirect speech acts are no different from direct performatives, so this case requires no special treatment.

To summarize, I adopt a view in which (explicit) performatives are either true or false, though usually true. Performative statements are associated with actions, but “it is not that the statement is constitutive of the action; rather, the statement provides the audience with a rational basis for identifying the action” (Bach and Harnish 1992).

From now on, I set aside finer details and differences among authors, and refer to the unique property of performative sentences that fixes them as (mostly) true with the phrase truth by say-so. Performative sentences like (32) and (33) are true by say-so. This is not to say that there are no situations in which they are false. For example, the naming might not come off because the namer was not authorized to name, just as someone’s saying I promise... is not enough to make a promise. (Consider: A says But you promised!, and B replies No I didn’t, my fingers were crossed behind my back.) It is just to say that if the speaker is being honest, if the felicity conditions are met, and so on, then the sentence is true—just because the speaker says so.

4.2.3.3. Truth by say-so and evidentiality
In the framework I’ve adopted, evidentiality is an epistemic or perceptual relation between an origo and a proposition or situation. In matrix declaratives, ego evidentiality marks that the speaker knows what she says in a certain way (ego). I call this way *evidential immediacy*, which is the primitive and special way information about oneself is presented to oneself.

What is the connection between evidentiality and performativity? Or more specifically: what is the connection between evidential immediacy and performativity? To repeat, immediacy is a way of knowing a proposition to be true. It is, perhaps, the *most direct* way of knowing a proposition. To take an example, consider (39):

(39a/b)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ nga/*kho} & \quad \text{‘go-[ego fut]} \\
\text{‘I’ll go.’} &
\end{align*}
\]

The future construction, \textit{V-gi-yin/red}, allows the ego form \textit{V-gi-yin} only when the verb is volitional and the subject is first-person. In this construction ego marks the direct epistemic relation between the speaker and her intention to go (DeLancey 1986). The speaker cannot directly know anybody else’s intentions, which is why non-first-person subjects are prohibited (39b). Crucially, the speaker’s own intentions intimate themselves to the speaker.
herself in a unique way—they do not and cannot have the same effect on other people.

Performatives intimate themselves to their performer in a similar way. Performative utterances play a causal role in establishing the truth of what they say. Promising can be done in a variety of ways, not all of which involve saying *I promise...* Still, *I promise...* does play a causal role in creating a promise. Similarly, *Your name is Dorje Namgyal* does play a causal role in making your name Dorje Namgyal.

To say that a performative is true by say-so is to say that its truth tends to be at least partially caused by the speech act itself. The agent of this act, the speaker, is the person who makes the performative true. In this sense, the speaker has privileged access to the truth of a performative. Only one person can make a performative true—the one who speaks it. A third-party might observe the speaker showing signs of performativity, and he might even comment on it in real time, in a vivid style that evokes sportscasting: *John tells Mary he loves her. He promises to come back soon. He jumps in his car. He’s off.* But this would be a *judging*-true, not a *making*-true. If the third-party says *He promises to come back soon*, he may be wrong and there may be
no promise. Whereas if the speaker says *I promise to come back soon*, he tends to have made a promise.\textsuperscript{50}

There is, then, a significant parallel between first-person knowledge and explicit performativity. In a case like *I’ll go* (39a), the speaker presents himself as knowing the proposition to be true by virtue of his intention to make the event come about, and he has a privileged perspective on that intention. In a case like *Your name is Dorje Namgyal* (33), the speaker presents himself as knowing it to be true by virtue of his performative efforts to make it true, and nobody else has the same power at that moment. First-person agency is present in both cases, and so it is not surprising that they pattern together.

\textit{4.2.3.4. Japanese}

If the above argumentation is unpersuasive, one might want to pursue thesis (iii), which says that it is just a coincidence that both performatives and cases of self-knowledge occur with ego evidentials. But this seems unlikely, given that we find exactly analogous facts in Japanese.

\textsuperscript{50} I include the word ‘tends’ because performatives can fail to be true for various reasons.
In Japanese psychological utterances, the direct form of an adjectival verb is possible only when the subject is first-person (Kuroda 1973, Kamio 1995, 1997—the data are from Kamio 1997:60-66).

(40a/b/c) \[\text{Watasi/Anata/Aitu wa sabisii}\]
\[\text{I/you-F/he topic lonely}\]
\[\text{‘I feel lonely.’}\]

(41) \[\text{Anata/Aitu wa sabisii-rasii}\]
\[\text{you-F/he topic seem}\]
\[\text{‘You/he seems lonely.’}\]

Second- and third-person subjects may only occur if there is additional morphology on the adjectival verb, e.g. markers meaning ‘seem’, ‘appear’, or various syntactic subordinators.

Kuroda and Kamio’s explanations for this are essentially evidential. The direct form marks some kind of direct knowledge, and the speaker can only have direct access to his own psychological states. (Kamio makes the further claim that psychological states are externally unobservable.)

Interestingly, there are rare situations in speech in which examples like (40b/c) become acceptable.\(^{51}\) If, for example, a psychiatrist is hypnotizing a patient, he can say (42) to his patient:

\(^{51}\) The direct form is less constrained in ‘non-reportive style’ in written Japanese (Kuroda 1973). Also, the direct form is sometimes found in mother to child speech, when a mother is talking about her child (Kamio 1995).
Kamio (1995:255-6) claims that here, “... in a sense, the hypnotist has entered into the subject’s mind as if the former were directly experiencing the latter’s awareness.” This view is inadequate. Hypnosis is not an art of mental transfer, it is an art of suggestion. The hypnotist does not enter her patient’s mind—rather, she fixes the content of her patient’s mind. Hypnosis, like naming, is performative. At its most successful, hypnosis is truth by say-so.

If a hypnotist says *You are in pain*, what act is she performing? Is she in pain herself? Certainly not. Is she giving pain to her patient? Not really. All she is doing is using her power to make what she says true. And this, I contend, is all that is ever done with a performative.

4.2.4. *Ego as default evidentiality*

At this point two facts about ego evidentiality stand out. On the one hand, it arises by default, without being specifically encoded by any lexical or grammatical items. On the other, it signals immediate knowledge, unmediated by perception or inference, a subcase of which is self- or *de se* knowledge. In this section I propose a way to link these two facts.
4.2.4.1. Saying and knowing

A proposition in context is an assertion. One pragmatic aspect an assertion adds to a proposition is the notion of speaker commitment. Generally speaking, we say what we believe to be true. Moore’s paradox of belief results from this: one cannot sincerely say *John left but I believe he didn’t*. Saying and believing go hand in hand.

*Real beliefs* are never at issue. What is important is not that we believe what we say, but that we present ourselves as believing what we say. Lying shows that this must be so, for how could we lie if we were not expected to tell the truth?

In fact, when we say *John left* we present ourselves as doing more than believing. We also present ourselves as knowing what we say to be true. As Hintikka (1962:78) observes, Moore’s problem also arises with ‘know’, so that *p but I do not know whether p* is just as odd as *p but I do not believe that p*. I elevate this idea to the following principle, repeated from Chapter 3:

(43) An assertion $A$ from $s$ to $h$ of a proposition $p$ implicates that $s$ presents $\text{Know}(s,p)$ as true.

As noted in Chapter 3, this principle is meant to follow in part from Grice’s (1989) maxim of Quality, specifically his idea that one should have sufficient
evidence for what one says. Saying is not mere believing. One ought to have pretty good evidence for what one says.

Philosophers may have focused on the correlation of belief with assertion because, from the point of view of an objective outsider, belief comes closer than knowledge to characterizing what’s behind an assertion. If Bill says “John left”, he may be wrong. And if he’s wrong, he certainly doesn’t know that John left, although he believes it.\(^5^2\)

This last point however is mistaken. We can’t be sure that Bill believes what he says, just that he presents himself as doing so. But with this presentational level in place, there is no longer any reason to prefer talk of belief to talk of knowledge. To the contrary, the argumentation just made gives us reasons to prefer talk of knowledge to talk of belief, for Bill shouldn’t merely believe what he says, he should believe it with a high degree of conviction, he should (pretty much) know it. If we focus on how we would describe things, then we might talk of belief, since we might disagree with Bill. However, if we focus on how it is for Bill, then we should talk of knowledge.

The principle in (43) is an important pragmatic property of assertion. In the next section I’ll put forth the idea that one consequence of (43), which I
sometimes loosely label ‘Know’, is that ego evidentiality arises by default in Tibetan.

4.2.4.2. The evidential hierarchy and inference

de Haan (1998) proposed a universal evidential hierarchy, two links of which are represented below. (To be consistent, I have replaced his ‘inferential’ with my ‘indirect’.)

(44) Direct > Indirect

de Haan accounts for various facts based on the hierarchy, and he also states several generalizations over the hierarchy. One is this: “A speaker of a language with evidentials will choose the highest level on the hierarchy for which he/she has evidence. Furthermore, choosing a certain level on the evidential hierarchy entails in most cases the absence of higher levels of evidence.” Replacing ‘entails’ with ‘implies’, we could say, for example, that the statement John left with an indirect verb implies that the speaker lacks direct perceptual evidence for the event.

52 Here I ignore sarcasm, story telling, and various other rhetorical strategies. In the context of evidentiality, it would be interesting to see if such strategies have an effect on evidential selection. Preliminary evidence suggests that they do.
If (44) is the right hierarchy for Tibetan, the question is what to do with ego evidentiality. On the one hand, it is tempting to place ego at the top of the hierarchy; but on the other hand both the syntax of Tibetan (see above), and existing work on language typology (de Haan 1998) suggest that ego is not a category of its own. I believe that the issue can be solved pragmatically, with the following chain of reason:

(45)  
b. By (43), s presents himself as knowing p.
c. If there is no evidential in p, then s presents himself as knowing p independent of the kinds of evidence specified in the evidential hierarchy.

Read: if s says p, without specifying any evidential basis for his statement, then take s’s presumed knowledge of p to be independent of the evidential bases in the hierarchy. In the case of Tibetan, (45) has the effect that if a sentence occurs with neither indirect nor direct evidentiality, then ego kicks in as the unmarked, default case.

It is important to stress the following point: by using no evidential, s does not implicate that he lacks direct or indirect evidence for what he says. For example, *I am eating* is normally ego. This does not mean that the speaker can’t see himself eating when he eats. It just means that he would still know that he was eating even if he didn’t see himself. Therefore, his
knowledge that he is eating is independent of the direct modality. The same applies for the indirect modality. I might well know that I am eating on the basis of inferential reasoning, but in the normal case, this knowledge is not critical, because I also know that I’m eating independent of such knowledge.

4.2.4.3. The immediacy of self-knowledge

The second task is to explain why the unmarked, default evidential value ends up having ego pragmatics. Why, in particular, do ego sentences represent self-knowledge or knowledge de se?

Wright (1998) maintains that claims of self-knowledge are groundless, in the sense of having no evidential backing whatsoever. He suggests that this is true both of intentional self-knowledge, e.g. the knowledge I have that I am thinking, as well as sensory self-knowledge, e.g. the knowledge I have that I am in pain. I will not adopt his view directly, because I believe that many phenomena—including some accessible only to the experiencer himself—can count as evidence for the existence of a pain or thought.

Still, there is something interesting and correct in Wright’s idea. Self-knowledge is not groundless, but it is immediate (Wright, Smith, and

---

53 Goldstein makes a similar point when talking about the direct marker ‘dug’. He remarks that it is used not merely to indicate that the speaker has direct evidence, but rather to indicate that he would not know what he says were it not for this direct evidence. Thus, neither ego nor indirect verbs are inconsistent with having direct perceptual evidence.
MacDonald 1998). As Wittgenstein (1958a, 1958b) emphasized, much self-
knowledge is gained in a fundamentally different way from knowledge of
others. Knowledge of the deeds of others normally involves an identification
of an individual, and therefore there is the possibility of a misidentification.
In many cases of self-knowledge, in contrast, the speaker does not need to
identify himself at all.

In Shoemaker’s (1968, 1970) elaboration of Wittgenstein’s ideas, there
is, in many instances of self-knowledge, immunity to error through
misidentification (IEM). That is, since the speaker does not identify himself
in the way that he identifies others in statements of other-knowledge, he
cannot misidentify himself as someone else. In normal circumstances, he
cannot, for instance, say I am thinking, and then second-guess himself, only
later to believe that it was someone else who was thinking.

The crucial part, as Evans (1982) emphasizes, is that in IEM cases, if
the speaker has reason to doubt the proposition, then he doesn’t have any
reason to support an existential generalization over the subject of the
statement. For example, if I begin to doubt that I am thinking is true, I won’t
maintain the belief that $\exists x. x$ is thinking. On the other hand, if I begin to doubt
that *Gareth is over there*, I will probably still maintain the belief that $\exists x. x \text{ is over there}$. I just won’t think that it’s Gareth any more.\(^{54}\)

Why is much self-knowledge immune to error through misidentification, and why is this idea connected to evidentiality? The answer is that one is presented with one’s own intentions, beliefs, desires, and other intentional states in a unique way. Knowledge of such states is not mediated by inference or perception, and is therefore not an example of the – or direct evidential modalities. As such, ego knowledge has a unique epistemological status.

The claim that ego evidentiality is default evidentiality amounts to the claim that the immediate knowledge indicated by ego evidentials is the only evidential option aside from direct and indirect evidential modalities. That is, if the speaker neither presents a proposition as known by inference, nor as known by perception, then it must be known in the ego way, i.e. as a proposition that presents itself in an immediate, non-perceptual and non-inferential way to the speaker. Following Wright and others, we can call this way of knowing ‘groundless’, but if so, we should be clear on what we mean by this.

4.3. A survey of ego constructions

In this section, I survey the ego forms in each of the constructions I’ve been focusing. Along the way, I will show that most ego sentences are consistent with my characterization of the pragmatics of ego. That is, most ego sentences have a first-person restriction, and most such sentences report situations or propositions for which the origo has immediate evidence.

Most of the ego constructions are built from yin, the default copula, and yod, the default existential. There is also the ego perfective marker byung, as well as the various reduced constructions mentioned in Section 4.1.3. The following chart summarizes the constructions I’ve been focusing on, with ego given in boldface:

(46)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EGO</th>
<th>DIRECT</th>
<th>VP EGO</th>
<th>INDIRECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copular</td>
<td>yin</td>
<td></td>
<td>red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELPA</td>
<td>yod</td>
<td>‘dug’</td>
<td>yod.red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperfective</td>
<td>V-gi-yod</td>
<td>V-gi-‘dug</td>
<td>V-gi-yod.red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>V-gi-yin</td>
<td></td>
<td>V-gi-red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>V-pa-yin</td>
<td>V-song</td>
<td>V-byung</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So far I have emphasized copular and existential constructions, where generally speaking, ego is used for self-knowledge and the other forms for
other-knowledge. In the future, past, and imperfective, additional parameters enter the mix, including volitionality, VP-level ego, and genericity.

4.3.1. Volitionality

In the past and future, ego is restricted to sentences with first person subjects and volitional verbs. So, while (47) and (48) are good, (49) and (50) are not: (49) because the subject is not first person, and (50) because the verb is non-volitional.

(47) Future (1p vol.)

\[ \text{Sang.nyin nga khyed.rang-gi-nang-la yong-gi-yin} \]
\[ \text{tomorrow I you-gen-house-loc come-[ego fut]} \]
\[ \text{‘Tomorrow I’ll come to your house.’} \]

(48) Past (1p vol.)

\[ \text{Kha.sa nga khong-gi-nang-la phyin-pa-yin} \]
\[ \text{yesterday I he-gen-house-loc go-[ego past]} \]
\[ \text{‘Yesterday I went to his house.’} \]

(49) Future (3p vol.)

\[ *\text{khyed.rang-gi-nang-la yong-gi-yin} \]
\[ *\text{he you-gen-house-loc come-[ego fut]} \]
\[ \text{Intended: ‘He’ll come to your house.’} \]
If the subject is not first-person, then in place of –pa-yin or –gi-yin we get direct or indirect instead.

Aspectually, the imperfective is most versatile construction in Tibetan.

It is consistent with either progressive or habitual aspect. In both cases, we also find ego in first-person volitional sentences:

(51) Imperfective—progressive

\[
\text{nga kha.lag za-gi-yod} \\
I \text{ food eat-[ego imp]} \\
\text{‘I’m eating.’}
\]

(52) Imperfective—habitual

\[
\text{nga nyi.ma rtag.par ‘bras za-gi-yod} \\
I \text{ day always rice eat-[ego imp]} \\
\text{‘I eat rice every day.’}
\]

---

\(^{55}\) In fact one of my consultants accepts this example. For him –na ‘be sick’ is a fluid verb—i.e. optionally volitional—and here it means ‘to pretend to be sick.’
Why do first-person volitional sentences induce ego rather than direct or indirect? For two reasons. First, the speaker’s knowledge of his own intentional states is not mediated by perception or inference. Second, such first person knowledge is immediate. (As such it is subject to immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first person).

These sentences convey information about volitional activities which is gained in the normal way, through the usual channels. In the imperfective version (51), the speaker knows that he is eating because he knows what eating is like, and he’s involved in just such an activity. In the simple past version (48), the speaker knows what he says based on his memory of having been to the house. As Shoemaker (1970) notes, first-person memory statements are typically IEM, because they are subject to the previous awareness condition (PAC): the speaker, at the time of the event, must have been directly aware of it. Memory of this awareness is sufficient to ensure an IEM reading.

In the future version (47), the speaker knows what he says on the basis of his intention to perform the act described. Here it should be noted that the future and past do not occur with verbs that cannot cooccur with the adverb ‘intentionally’ (rkang.tsug.nas). The first-person in (47) is IEM, since the speaker cannot be mistaken that it is his intentions that he is declaring.
The examples above are ego and IEM because they have first-person agents and the information they mark is gained through the usual channels. On non-ego uses of first-person, or if information is gathered through non-standard channels, then different auxiliaries are used.

For example, if I am watching myself on TV, and the me on TV is eating, I would say (53) instead of (51), which would be completely unacceptable:

\[
\text{(53)} \quad \text{(ltos-dang)} \quad \text{nga} \quad \text{kha.lag} \quad \text{za-gi-‘dug} / \ast \text{za-gi-yod}
\]

look-imper I food eat-[dir imp] / *eat-[ego imp]

‘(Look!) I’m eating.’

As we should expect, the first-person in (53) is –IEM, since the following is well-formed: *Look! Someone’s eating. Is it me?*

Direct observation of a duplicated self is just one of the triggers that causes a shift from ego to –ego. Other triggers include surprise, distant past constructions, and expressions of contingency. Several authors have also noticed that ego auxiliaries often shift to –ego when the speaker is talking about something that he did quite a long time ago. One could take this as a case where Shoemaker’s previous awareness condition (PAC) does not hold;
i.e. the event described is so distant that the speaker no longer has any memory of being part of it.

To summarize, ego constructions are ego/IEM because they are used to express intentional knowledge gained through the usual channels, i.e. participatory agentive knowledge (51), a memory trace of past participation (48), or knowledge of intention (47). When knowledge is gained through non-standard channels, equivalent sentences are –ego/-IEM, and must use different evidentials.

Volitionality plays no role in other ego constructions. For example, in copular clauses such as (54),

\[(54) \quad \text{ngag} \quad \text{dge.rgan} \quad \text{yin} \]
\[\text{I teacher [ego cop]} \]
\[\text{‘I am a teacher.’}\]

there is no question of volitionality. Although the speaker may be a teacher intentionally, this is not necessary—(54) could also just reflect the speaker’s unfortunate lot in life.
4.3.2. VP-level ego: byung

The simple past or perfective has the most evidential possibilities of any construction. In addition to the ego form for sentences with +volitional verbs and first-person subjects (48), there is also a second marker of ego evidentiality: the perfective auxiliary byung, used in sentences with first-person goals/experiencers.\(^{56}\)

As a main verb, byung means ‘to get, obtain; to happen, experience’:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{‘di.’dras} & \quad \text{byung-pa-red} \\
\text{like that} & \quad \text{happen-perf-red(indirect)} \\
\text{‘It happened like that.’}
\end{align*}
\]

As a verbal auxiliary, on the other hand, byung is used when there is a first-person goal/experiencer. This includes sentences with non-volitional verbs and first-person subjects of the three major subject cases, ergative, nominative, and dative:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Some ergative subject byung verbs:} \\
\text{thong ‘see’, go ‘hear’, ha.go ‘know’, shes ‘know’, dran ‘remember’, thug / mjal ‘meet’}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{56}\) As will be obvious from the range of examples to follow, nailing down the precise thematic role or argument position that matters for byung is not easy.
(57)  

ngas kho thong-byung  
I-erg he see-[VP ego]  
‘I saw him.’

(58)  

ani gangs.rin.po.che dang tshang.ma  
then Mt. Kailash and everything  
‘Then, Kailash and everything, I got to see Kailash and everything.’

(59)  Some nominative subject intransitive byung verbs:  
na ‘to be sick’, grod.khog ltogs ‘to be hungry’, ‘dod ‘to want’,  
sleb ‘to arrive’

(60)  

kha.sa nga na-byung  
yesterday I sick-[VP ego]  
‘Yesterday I got sick.’

(61)  

bod-la yong dus-tsampa-la am.do dang khams-la  
Tibet-loc come when Amdo and Kham-loc  
‘gro-’dod-med-pa ma-red  
go-desire-[ego neg ELPA]-COMP neg-[ind cop]
When I came to Tibet, it’s not that I didn’t want to go to Amdo and Kham. I...wanted to go. I want to go.

Because of this I didn’t make it to Amdo and Kham.

I found some money on the road.
(65) nga-r snum-gi dri.ma kha-byung
I-dat oil-gen smell smell-[VP ego]
‘I smelled oil’ (Chang & Chang 1980:31)

(66) nga-r tshigs.khebs ran-byung
I-dat ring fit-[VP ego]
‘The ring fit me.’ (Chang & Chang 1980:31)

VP ego byung is also used with VP-internal datives, including indirect objects (68), some direct objects (69)-(70), benefactives (71), and causatives (72):

(67) Some VP-internal dat. =byung verbs:

(68) chu tsha.po bzos-nas nga-la sprad-byung
water hot make-having I-ben give-[VP ego]
‘She made some hot water and then gave it to me.’

a.ni chu tsha.po sprad-nas gzugs.po ‘khrus lab-byung
then water hot give-having body wash(imper) tell-[VP ego]
‘And having given me hot water, she told me to wash myself.’

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(69)

When I arrived in Lhasa, my two friends took me to a friend’s place.

(70)

She went sad, and cried, and then hugged me.

(71)

I made one like that.

My relative ... he helped make one for me.
All of these sentences signal that the speaker has immediate evidence for her assertion. This knowledge cannot be mediated by perception or inference. For example, to use the first half of (68) felicitously, the speaker must be present at the giving, that is he must actually receive the water; therefore, there is no question of his being uncertain or mistaken as to who actually received the water—his experience directly confirms that it was him. If the immediate evidence condition is not met, then direct song or indirect pastred is used instead.\footnote{For many speakers, especially Tibetans from India and Nepal, byung is used quite sparingly, and in fact for verbs like those in (56) and (59), direct song seems to be as common with first-person as ego byung when both are possible. There are subtle differences between byung and song which I do not understand.}

Notice from chart (46) that byung is the only evidential in its column, and that it only occurs in the past, and furthermore only in perfective aspect. DeLancey (1986) suggests that the reason for its absence in other tense/aspect constructions is that only perfective events have endpoints, and thus one can only have direct and immediate evidence of the endpoint of an event if it is complete. Furthermore, as DeLancey suggests, the endpoint of such events is
the first-person. Imperfective events are by definition in progress, while future events have yet to occur.

Although more research needs to be done on byung, it seems clear that byung is indeed an ego form, and that as such it fits into the general rubric of having ego pragmatics.

4.3.3. Genericity

Verb volitionality is sufficient to trigger ego, but it is not necessary. In constructions such as the imperfective, as Denwood (1999) notes, ego can be used in first-person non-volitional sentences provided that the state described is either ‘general’ (generic) or habitual. As a result, the following generic and habitual sentences are perfectly acceptable:

(73)  
\[\text{ nga phyi.log-la 'gro-dus rtag.par grod.khog ltogs-gi-yod} \]
I outside-loc go-when always stomach hunger-[ego imp]
‘Whenever I go out, I’m always hungry.’

(74)  
\[\text{deng.sang nga pas na-gi-yod} \]
thesedays I very sick-[ego imp]
‘These days I’m very sick.’
Two types of genericity license ego with non-volitionals. Either the verb phrase may describe a situation that is essentially a ‘chronic state’ of the speaker, as Denwood puts it, as in (74), or it may be habitual (i.e. iterative), as in (73).

In contrast, the direct imperfective $\textit{V-gi-}'dug$ is used to describe temporary or particular situations involving non-volitional verbs:

\begin{equation}
\text{da.lta rang nga grod.khog ltogs-gi-}'dug/*-yod}
\end{equation}

just now I stomach hunger-[dir imp]/*[ego imp]

‘Right now I’m hungry.’

Further evidence for the non-particularity of ego comes from the following sentences:

\begin{equation}
\text{nga da.lta grod.khog ltogs-gi-}'dug/*-yod}
\end{equation}

byas.tsang nga kha.lag za-gi-yin

I now food eat-[ego fut]

‘I’m hungry. Therefore I’m going to eat.’
In these examples, the first sentence is meant to provide a rationale for the immediate action in the second sentence. With direct ‘dug, the sentences are fine, since direct can and must be non-generic. With ego yod, on the other hand, the sentences are infelicitous. This is because a general claim about the present cannot be used as a rationale for a particular, immediate action.\footnote{At least not given the relation that’s meant to hold between the two sentences in (74) and (75).}

For many speakers, even non-first-person subjects can license ego in the imperfective, provided that the sentence is generic. So, for example, while non-generic (78) is ungrammatical, (79) and (80) are generally both judged grammatical:
Sentences such as (79) and (80) are what Agha (1993) calls cases of ‘personal association’, where the speaker uses a ego form to indicate a close connection to the subject or to some other argument.

For some speakers, even ego sentences with third-person subjects not possessed by the first-person are acceptable if generic:

(81)  "bkra.shis ga.bar ‘gro-na grod.khog ltogs-gi-yod
Tashi where go-if stomach hunger-[ego imp]
‘Wherever Tashi goes, he’s hungry.’"
This phenomenon brings me to the next section, which is an examination of the conditions under which ego may occur in sentences that lack first-person subjects.

**4.4. Strong and weak evidential restrictions**

So far I have said that ego evidentiality is used when there is a first-person subject, and sometimes only when certain other conditions—such as the volitionality requirement—are met as well. Ego forms however are also permitted in some constructions when there is an explicit or implicit first-person in a non-subject position, for example as a subject possessor or as part of the predicate.

In Agha (1993), such examples are analyzed in terms of the pragmatics of ‘personal association’. By personal association, the speaker may speak for others, as if speaking for himself. There are several categories of personal association, including ‘possessor perspective’, ‘benefactor perspective’, and ‘recollection perspective’. The category that applies in a given case comes to the question of what perspective the origo takes on the situation. For example, does the origo have immediate (ego) knowledge of a situation from the point of view of a benefactor, or does she have ego knowledge of a situation from the point of view of a possessor?
Agha’s approach has a serious problem. The problem is that different constructions vary as to whether or not they permit a non-subject first-person pronoun—whether explicit or implicit—to license ego. Repeating some sentences from above, we see that while a first-person subject-possessor is enough to license ego in the ELPA (82), it is not enough in the future (83):

\[(82) \text{ELPA} \]
\[
\text{nga’i bu skam.po yod} \quad \text{[ego ELPA]}
\]
\[
\text{my boy thin ‘My son is thin.’}
\]

\[(83) \text{Future} \]
\[
\text{* nga’i bu ‘gro-gi-yin} \quad \text{[ego fut]}
\]
\[
\text{my boy go- ‘My son will go.’}
\]

Agha gives us no direction as to how to explain why possessor-perspective is possible in the ELPA constructions but not in the future.

As I showed in section 4.2.1 above, in most embedded environments evidentials neutralize to ego forms. I therefore argued that ‘ego verbs’ are not inherently ego. Instead, they are just (default) verbs. Ego evidentiality comes from a property of assertion, and not from verbs like the copula \textit{yin} or the ELPA \textit{yod}.
Given that ego evidentiality arises from a pragmatic property of assertion, the simplest view would be to say that its evidential features are identical in each construction. Otherwise, we would have to postulate multiple pragmatic properties corresponding to the variety of construction types. Although this is a real possibility, we ought first to explore the simpler view, not least for reasons of learnability.

On the simplest view, ego evidentiality arises from the same pragmatic property in all constructions. The difference between (82) and (83), then, has to be explained on independent grounds. In what follows, I argue that these grounds are aspectual: particular aspect behaves like the future (83), while generic aspect behaves like ELPA (82).

To fix terminology, I will say that (83)-type constructions exhibit a strong evidential restriction, while (82)-type constructions exhibit a weak evidential restriction. A strong use of ego (strong ego) is one which blocks Agha’s various exceptional perspectives, such as possessor-perspective; and a weak use of ego (weak ego) is one which allows such perspectives.

The following chart summarizes this behavior—supporting data follows in the next two sections:
4.4.1. The various strengths of ego

4.4.1.1. Weak ego

Since the copular construction is evidentially weak (84a), ego yin may occur even if the subject is not first-person. Not only is yin licensed by first-person subject possessors (85,86), but it is also licensed by some predicate-internal arguments (87):

(84)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Verbal Form</th>
<th>Strong/Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Copula</td>
<td>yin</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) ELPA</td>
<td>yod</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Imperfective</td>
<td>V-gi-yod</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Perfect</td>
<td>V-yod</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Future</td>
<td>V-gi-yin</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Past (agent-oriented)</td>
<td>V-pa-yin</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Past (goal-oriented)</td>
<td>V-byung</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4.1. The various strengths of ego

4.4.1.1. Weak ego

Since the copular construction is evidentially weak (84a), ego yin may occur even if the subject is not first-person. Not only is yin licensed by first-person subject possessors (85,86), but it is also licensed by some predicate-internal arguments (87):

(85)  

ngä-‘i nyu.gu ‘di sngon.po yin  
I-gen pen this blue [ego cop]  
‘This pen of mine is blue [=writes blue].’

(86)  

Q: khyed.rang-gi bkra.shis ga.re yin-pas  
you-gen Tashi what [ego cop]-Q  
‘What is your Tashi?’

59 Recall that the origo shifts from the speaker to the hearer in questions. This is the topic of Chapter 6.
Numerous other examples of evidentially weak *yin* can be found in the literature, especially in Chang and Chang (1984) and Agha (1993). The following examples are from the former source (pp. 608-9):

(88) \[ ng\text{a}'i \text{ } \text{gsar}\text{.pa} \text{ } \text{yin} \]

my this new [ego cop]

‘These of mine are new.’

(89) \[ phu\text{.mo} \text{ } \text{di-ni nga.gnyis-gi snying-gi tshi.lu nang.bzhin } \text{yin} \]

girl this-top we-gen heart-gen fat similar [ego cop]

‘As for this daughter, she is just like the fat of our hearts.’
Notice that in (89), not only is the first-person embedded as a possessor within the predicate (like the fat of our hearts), but more specifically it is a possessor inside a genitive within the predicate.

There are also many examples of weak yod in the ELPA construction.

Cases such as (91)-(93) are generally accepted without hesitation:

(91)

gapa.par bsdad-yod da.lta khyed.rang-gi ca.lag ga.par yod
where stay-[ego perf] now you-gen things where [ego ELPA]
‘Where are you staying now? Where are your things?’

(92)
daq ngati bu gi bu yin-sa-red phal.cher
now my son-gen-son probably probably

gang yin zer na ngati bu mdzub.mo
because my son finger
lag.pa-'i mdzub.mo dang rkang.pa-'i mdzub.mo
hand-gen finger and foot-gen finger

'di.'dras rang yod
like that exactly [ego ELPA]

skam.po gcig yod-s
thin one [ego ELPA]-quotative

“It must be my son’s son. Most likely. Because my son’s fingers, his fingers and his toes were just like this. They were thin,” she said.

As with other weak ego constructions, the examples form a hierarchy of acceptability. Sentences with first-person subjects are universally accepted with ego. Sentences with first-person subject possessors are also often judged acceptable.

The third level of acceptability is rejected by some speakers, and generally requires considerable context to become acceptable. For example, (94) on its own is judged odd, unless the situation involves first-person agency as made explicit by the continuation in (95):
Tashi's daughter is beautiful."

(96)  

'Tashi has Pasang’s books.'
Even in (97), where the possessor argument is possessed by the speaker, still there is the suggestion that the speaker gave his father the ties. If not he should use direct or indirect.

As a result of this implicit first-person agency, certain continuations of ego sentences sound contradictory (e.g. 98), whereas others are quite natural (e.g. 99):

(98)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{khyed.rang-gi deb de.tsho} & \quad \text{cog.rtse sgang-la} & \quad \text{yod} \\
\text{you-gen book they} & \quad \text{table top-loc} & \quad \text{[ego ELPA]}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
?? & \text{yin na’i} & \text{nga-s-gis} & \quad \text{bzhag-med} \\
\text{but} & \quad \text{I-erg-erg} & \quad \text{place-[ego neg perf]}
\end{align*}
\]

Intended: ‘Your books are on the table, but I didn’t put them there.’

---

(97) 

\begin{align*}
\text{nga’i pa’.lags-la} & \quad \text{leng.tas}^{60} \quad \text{mang.po} & \quad \text{yod} \\
\text{my father-loc} & \quad \text{tie many} & \quad \text{[ego ELPA]}
\end{align*}

‘My father has lots of ties.’

---

\[60\) This is a Chinese word I have attempted to write in Tibetan.\]
The use of ego in (98) suggests that it is the speaker who actually placed the books on the table.\textsuperscript{61}

The only other weak ego construction I’ll discuss is the imperfective.

Although we normally find imperfective ego in first-person sentences (100) and not in non-first-person sentences (101):

\textsuperscript{61} One might want to argue that such cases involve an invisible first-person argument and thus mean something like \textit{I have your books on the table}. Since the strongest evidence for this view—the optional appearance of such an argument—is lacking, I will not adopt it.
there are some contexts in which ego may be used in non-first-person sentences. For example, some of my consultants accept the following examples as well:

‘Tashi/my father is eating now, so please come after a little while.’
Tashi-loc / my brother-loc  bother neg-do

khong las.ka byed-gi-yod
he  work  do-[ego imp]

‘Don’t bother Tashi/my brother. He’s working.’

(For (102) imagine that the speaker is talking to somebody on the phone.) As suggested by the absolute infelicity of (101) with ego *yod*, (102) and (103) are constrained in certain important ways. In neither case should the hearer be able to see the subject. The speaker need not see or have seen the subject either. For example, the speaker may know that these sentences are true on the basis of his knowledge of the habits of the sentence subject. Significantly, then, (102) and (103) represent certain knowledge that is not crucially dependent on perception or inference.

Wherever weak ego may occur, it is optional; any of the numerous sentences given above can also occur with indirect in place of ego. Where multiple forms are possible, the interpretive difference is subtle and hard to pin down. Concerning one kind of case, Chang & Chang (1984) write that,
The feature which marks the distinction between *yin* and *red* with first-person genitives is, clearly, a semantic one, which we tentatively define as that of subjective or emotional distance. In the example of the boy viewing his father’s corpse, a translation of ‘that was my father’, rather than ‘this is my father’, might better capture the emotional distancing of *red*. (*di nga’i phapa yin* would be ‘This is my father; may I introduce my father’; *di nga’i phapa da yin* ‘This is my father’s horse’ would be used when the horse is alive.)

In contrast, Agha (1993) emphasizes the personal association feature of ego, as well as its (focal or topical) emphasis on the first-person.

In this area I have nothing to add to Chang & Chang and Agha’s remarks, so I will not discuss the interpretive features of weak ego in any more detail. This is a topic which deserves a much more detailed discussion than I can provide.

4.4.1.2. Strong ego

Examples of strong ego constructions include the future and the past:

4.4.1.2.1. Strong ego: Future

4.4.1.2.1.1. Strong ego: Future: / * nga’i bu / *my son / *go-[ego fut]

Only: ‘I will go.’
The VP-level ego perfective construction with *byung also imposes a strong ego restriction. So, while first-person subjects license *byung in (106) and (107) below, first-person subject possessors do not:

(106)  
\[
\text{nga-s thong-byung}
\]
\[
\text{I-erg see-[VP ego]}
\]
\[
\text{‘I saw it.’}
\]

(107)  
\[
*\text{nga’i jo.lags-gis thong-byung}
\]
\[
\text{my brother-erg see-[VP ego]}
\]
\[
\text{Intended: ‘My brother saw it.’}
\]

(108)  
\[
\text{nga na-byung}
\]
\[
\text{I sick-[VP ego]}
\]
\[
\text{‘I was sick.’}
\]

(109)  
\[
*\text{nga’i jo.lags na-byung}
\]
\[
\text{my brother sick-[VP ego]}
\]
\[
\text{Intended: ‘My brother was sick.’}
\]
By the same token, although some uses of *byung* are triggered by a first-person indirect object (110) or benefactive (112a,112b), non-first-person arguments in these positions don’t cooccur with *byung*:

(110)  

\[ \begin{align*}  
\text{ngə-la & deb & sprad-byung} \\
\text{I-dat & book & give-[VP ego]} \\
\text{‘He gave me a book.’} 
\end{align*} \]

(111)  

\[ \begin{align*}  
\text{*ngə’i jo.lags-la & deb & sprad-byung} \\
\text{my brother-dat & book & give-[VP ego]} \\
\text{Intended: ‘He gave my brother a book.’} 
\end{align*} \]

(112) Agha (1993:199)

a.  

\[ \begin{align*}  
\text{khong-gis & nga-’i sha & bsregs-byung} \\
\text{he-erg & my meat & roast-[VP ego]} \\
\text{‘He roasted my meat [for me].’} 
\end{align*} \]

b.  

\[ \begin{align*}  
\text{khong-gis & nga-’i sha & nga-r & bsregs-byung} \\
\text{he-erg & my meat & I-dat & roast-[VP ego]} \\
\text{‘He roasted my meat for me.’} 
\end{align*} \]
4.4.2. Weak ego, first-person, and weakest ego

Although I began this chapter by speaking of the ‘first-person restriction’
diagnostic with ego evidentiality, strictly speaking, as noted above in
connection to examples (102) and (103), there is no such restriction on weak
ego constructions. Take the imperfective, one construction which allows
weak ego, and compare the following three sentences:

(113) deng.sang nga na-gi-yod
these days I sick-[ego imp]
‘Nowadays I’m sick.’

(114) deng.sang nga’i bu na-gi-yod
these days my son sick-[ego imp]
‘Nowadays my son is sick.’

(115) deng.sang bkra.shis na-gi-yod
these days Tashi sick-[ego imp]
‘Nowadays Tashi is sick.’
As always, (113)—with a first-person in subject position—is acceptable.

Given that the imperfective allows weak ego, the acceptability of (114) is also not surprising.

What’s surprising is that for many speakers, (115) is also acceptable. For example, it is okay if we take Tashi to be the speaker’s son (or some other close friend or relation), as if ‘Tashi’ stands proxy for ‘my son’ or ‘my friend’, or as if ‘Tashi’ is short for ‘my Tashi’, a grammatical possibility for at least some Tibetan speakers (which as far as I can tell means the same as what ‘my Tashi’ means in English). According to some Tibetans, what’s needed for (115) to be good is that the speaker be closely associated with Tashi in some way (cf. Agha 1993). Cases like (115), where there is neither an explicit nor an implicit first-person argument, I shall call ‘weakest ego’.

One approach to these facts would be to say that ego is triggered by the presence of a first-person argument, or by a first person pronoun that is contained within an argument, e.g. as a subject possessor or in some more deeply embedded position. This explains the simple strong ego cases, as well as weak ego cases such as (114), but it does not account for weakest ego examples like (115). If (115) is to fit this theory, it must contain a hidden pronoun.
I find the hidden first-person view as unmotivated here as it was in the ‘names as ego’ cases discussed above. On the simplest and most widely accepted theory of names, ‘Tashi’ refers directly. Why complicate matters by positing silent pronouns and treating the name as a predicate (or anyway as something other than a directly referring term)?

If there is no hidden first-person in (115), and if strong ego, weak ego, and weakest ego are all part of the same evidential system, then the conclusion must be that ego imposes no person restriction at all. That is, it is not that ego requires there to be a first-person argument somewhere, but rather that ego requires that the origo be in a ego evidential relation to the situation she is describing.

I leave it for future research to determine the exact pragmatics of ego evidentiality, and in particular the question of what conditions must be met for attempted weak and weakest ego sentences to be natural. For now, all I can do is set out the problem, and offer an explanation for why weak and weakest ego are sometimes blocked, i.e. why in some cases strong ego is the only possibility.
4.4.3. Towards an explanation of strong and weak egos

In this section I make a few modest suggestions regarding the strong vs. weak/weakest ego contrast. First, I link this contrast to an independent contrast between generic and particular aspects. I show that weak and weakest ego sentences are almost always generic. This leads me to adopt a view in which weak/weakest ego is always available in principle, but is blocked in favor of strong ego in certain aspectually particular constructions. The question then becomes, why does aspect have such a dramatic effect on ego sentences in Tibetan?

To answer this question, I turn to Carlson’s (1995) discussion of the difference between inductive and realist approaches to genericity. He argues that the evidence is against the inductive view, which attempts to derive generic sentences quantificationally from corresponding episodic or particular sentences; and in favor of the realist view, which holds that generic sentences correspond to real structures (e.g. rules or regulations) in the world, and that such structures cannot be quantificationally decomposed.

An important consequence of the realist view is that the kinds of states of affairs which constitute evidence for a particular or episodic statement differ greatly from those states of affairs which constitute evidence for a
generic claim. That is, generic claims are not (directly) supported by observation of instances.

I argue that the Tibetan facts are evidence for the realist view, in that they show that the evidential backing for a generic claim need not be as strong as that for a particular claim. Or, to put it another way, that egocentric certainty is easier to reach in the case of generic truths.

Without resolving the matter, I suggest three different directions. The first is to continue to use the notion of ‘immediate knowledge’ or ‘immediate evidence’, and to maintain that cases of weak and weakest ego involve some kind of exceptional ‘ego access’ to the experiences of non-first-persons. The second is a more radical view, which is to take weak and weakest ego cases as evidence that ego always marks ‘groundless knowledge’, i.e. facts that are essentially believed without reason. The third view takes ego as a combination of these two elements.

4.4.3.1. Weak ego and aspect

There is some evidence to suggest that the difference between strong and weak ego constructions is aspectual in nature. In particular, the volitionality restriction is tightly connected to strong ego.
Recall that sentences headed by main verbs are generally ego if the verb is volitional and the subject is first-person. So, while the first set of sentences below is normal, the second set is not:

(116) Volitional: *kha.lag za ‘to eat’*

a.  

\[
\text{ nya kha.lag za-gi-yin }
\]

I food eat-[ego fut]

‘I will eat.’

b.  

\[
\text{ nya kha.lag za-gi-yod }
\]

I food eat-[ego imp]

‘I’m eating.’

c.  

\[
\text{ nya kha.lag bzas-pa-yin }
\]

I food eat-[ego past]

‘I ate.’

(117) Non-volitional: *grod.khog ltogs ‘to be hungry’*

a.  

\[
\text{ * nga grod.khog ltogs-gi-yin }
\]

I stomach hunger-[ego fut]

Intended: ‘I will be hungry.’

b.  

\[
\text{ % nga grod.khog ltogs-gi-yod }
\]

I stomach hunger-[ego imp]

Intended: ‘I am hungry (right now).’
What’s interesting about the above data is that the volitional and non-volitional cases are not completely symmetrical. While (117a) and (c) are categorically bad for all speakers I’ve consulted, (117b) is bad on only one of its readings, a reading which can be made salient with the adverb *da.lta rang* ‘just now’. That is, (117b) is only bad if it reflects the speaker’s hunger *as experienced at that moment*. If, on the other hand, (117b) is taken to reflect a chronic condition of the speaker, then ego is perfectly appropriate, even though ‘to be hungry’ is still non-volitional.

Numerous other non-volitional verbs share this behavior; in fact, many occur quite frequently with ego in the imperfective. Examples include *shes* ‘to know’, *ha.go* ‘to know’, and others. For example:

(118) Non-volitional: *ngo.shes* ‘to know (a person)’

a. *kho ngo.shes-gi-yin-pas*
he know-[ego fut]-Q
Intended: ‘Will you know him?’
b.  

\[
\text{kho ngo.shes-gi-yod-pas} \\
\text{he know-[ego imp]-Q} \\
\text{‘Do you know him?’}
\]

c.  

\[
*\text{kho ngo.shes-pa-yin-pas} \\
*\text{he know-[ego past]-Q} \\
\text{Intended: ‘Did you know him?’}
\]

Thus, neither [ego fut] nor [ego past] can occur with non-volitional verbs. In fact, this restriction can be stated in terms more amenable to my proposed analysis: neither construction can occur with generic verbs.\(^{62}\)

More generally, it seems that all strong ego constructions, including the [VP ego] with byung (see 4.4.2 above), occur only with episodic predicates. In contrast, weak ego constructions, including the imperfective, as well as the copular and ELPA constructions, all can occur with generic predicates (cf. Chapter 3 for discussion of the copular and ELPA constructions).

If there is a correlation between weak ego and genericity, the next question is, is there a causal connection between the two phenomena? Is weak

\(^{62}\) I can say this because volitional verbs are always agentive. There are no inherently generic volitional predicates. For more detailed discussion of volitionality, see Agha (1993) and Tournadre (1998).
ego caused by genericity? From what I have said so far it should be obvious that I believe the answer to this question is yes.

The candidate correlation is between weak ego and generics, not between weak ego and non-volitionality. This is because not all non-volitional verbs can occur equally naturally with ego and first-person subjects in the imperfective. The sentence must be generic. Stative verbs such as those in (117b) and (118b) occur naturally with ego because they describe chronic conditions of the subject/speaker (cf. Denwood 1999:138,150-51). On the other hand, non-stative non-volitional verbs with causers, such as chags ‘to break (by accident)’, occur with ego only on a habitual, and therefore generic, reading:

(119)  
\[
\text{nga-s dkar.yol rtag.par chags-gi-yod} \\
\text{I-erg cup always break-[ego imp]} \\
\text{I always break glasses.}
\]

4.4.3.2. Evidentiality and generics

I have suggested that there is a correlation between weak ego and generics. The constructions that allow weak ego are the same constructions that can be generic. I should also make a stronger claim, however, which is that weak and weakest ego sentences are always generic.
On the stronger claim, weak ego sentences such as the following, which have been repeated from above, should all be generic:

(88) \[ nga'i 'di gsar.pa yin \]
\[ my this new \] [ego cop]
‘These of mine are new.’

(93) \[ nga'i bu.mo snying.rje.po yod \]
\[ my girl beautiful \] [ego ELPA]
‘My daughter is beautiful.’

(115) \[ deng.sang bkra.shis na-gi-yod \]
\[ these days Tashi sick-[ego imp] \]
‘Nowadays Tashi is sick.’

(102) \[ da.lta bkra.shis / nga'i pa'.lags shal.lag mchod-gi-yod \]
\[ now Tashi / my father food eat-[ego imp] \]
‘Tashi/my father is eating now, so please come after a little while.’
It is true that the first three of these examples, as well as the majority of cases given above, are generic rather than episodic. However, as a progressive, (102) (as well as (103) above) is conspicuously particular. I therefore set aside (102) for the moment, to return to it later.

In the introduction to this section I brought up Carlson’s (1995) work on inductive and realist views of generics. The inductive view says that generics are inherently quantificational, and that generic truths are really just collections of episodic or particular truths. So, for example, I know him (cf. 118b above) is true only if we can find enough instances of me knowing him, each of which is itself an episodic situation.

In Chapter 3, I argued that sentences with temporal quantifiers and direct ‘dug’ should be analyzed as collections of episodics. For each quantificational instance, there was a separate demonstration. However, I agree with Carlson that a realist view of generics is necessary, and so for cases like I know him, there should be no quantification. On the realist view, I know him, if true, corresponds to a real situation in the world, and not a collection of episodic situations.

Examples such as (88), (93), and (115) are generics. As such, if Carlson is correct, they are not a quantification removed from the real world, but rather descriptions of some state of the world. Carlson (1995:235) notes
that the realist view has the consequence that it is now difficult to know whether or not a generic sentence is true. Since the truth-value of a generic sentence cannot be inferred from the study of observable instances, it is no longer clear, he points out, what counts as evidence for a generic claim. If weak and weakest ego reflect generic knowledge, then the conclusion for Tibetan is that it is also not clear what should count as evidence for a weak or weakest ego claim, which seems correct.

Any complete explanation of weak and weakest ego must account for several facts. One is the link with generics. Another is that in sentences such as (88), (93), and (115), ego is optional, not required. So, speakers often use indirect or direct instead. A third feature to explain is the pragmatics of ‘personal association’, as Agha (1993) calls it.

I cannot solve these questions here. Instead, I will present the beginnings of three alternative solutions. One solution is to say that ego always marks immediate evidence. This fits in nicely with argumentation I put forth earlier in the chapter. The challenge for this view is to explain why ego evidentials can be used with non-first-person in generic sentences. Perhaps Agha’s ‘personal association’ could help here. The claim would be that weak and weakest ego are only possible when there is a strong connection between the speaker and the sentence subject, and that this connection
constitutes a kind of evidential link whereby the speaker has especially ‘immediate’ access to other people’s experiences.

The second solution is to say that, consistent with its default status but against our initial impressions, the use of ego indicates that the origo has no evidential grounding whatsoever for her assertion. In other words, ego marks ‘groundless’ knowledge. On this view, we find ego in weak and weakest ego cases because the speaker is saying that she lacks indirect or direct evidence, and thus that she is more or less just stating a hunch. On this view, perhaps surprisingly, first-person volitional sentences would also reflect groundless knowledge. Ego performatives could also be reanalyzed as reflecting groundless knowledge.  

A third view would be to combine the first two views. In some cases, ego would mark immediate evidence, while in other cases, it would mark groundless knowledge. I will let the matter stand here.  

63 In fact, this second view could be framed so as not to be inconsistent with the varieties of immediate evidence we have seen. Such evidential groundings could be seen as merely consistent with ego, but not necessarily connected to it. 

64 Non-first-person progressive weak ego cases like (102) and (103) remain a thorny problem for me. Two factors may be relevant here: one is that such examples are to my knowledge less common and perhaps less readily acceptable than their generic counterparts. The second is that such sentences often seem to have a ‘generic-progressive’ flavor. For example, my consultants sometimes told me that examples like (102) were good assuming that the subject normally ate around that time; if this is true, then although the claim itself may be progressive, the basis for the claim is generic.
4.5. Summary

As indicated at the outset of this chapter, ego evidentiality is the most unusual and complex kind of evidentiality in Tibetan. In this chapter I have tried to present a general view that differs from most previous work on Tibetan.

On my view, ego evidentiality is unmarked, and arises only by default when no evidential marking is present. Ego sentences indicate that the speaker has immediate (or possibly groundless) knowledge of a proposition, i.e. knowledge that is neither based on perception nor on logical inference.

The dominant kind of immediate knowledge is self-knowledge. I argued that self-knowledge must be built from knowledge of propositions and not knowledge of properties.

Sometimes, other-knowledge qualifies as immediate knowledge too. In saying this I am referring to cases of weak and weakest ego, where ego evidentiality is found in non-first-person sentences. I argued that weak ego is always available in principle, but that certain constructions can only be strong ego because they are aspectually particular. Thus, in some cases, other-knowledge and self-knowledge go hand in hand; in fact, both kinds of knowledge can be unmediated by perception or inference.⁶⁵

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⁶⁵ Among the important topics I have not discussed in this chapter are two weak ego constructions: one, what Agha calls ‘recollection perspective’; and another, prospective constructions, which occur with ego V\-pa\-yod. For details see Agha (1993).
Chapter 5

Embedded Assertions

From now on, I begin to look at the distribution of evidentials in embedded clauses. In this chapter I focus on embedded clauses other than conditionals, which are treated separately in Chapter 7.

As noted in Chapter 4, in most embedded clauses evidential oppositions neutralize to ego, which loses its evidentiality. However, full evidential oppositions remain in complements of verbs of speech and thought. That is, those embedded clauses which behave most like root clauses retain all evidential possibilities.

In Chapters 2 through 4 of this dissertation, I emphasized the dependence of evidentiality on assertion. As a performative epistemic modal, indirect was crucially dependent on assertion. Direct, too, was dependent on assertion because the observability restriction arose on account of Know, a pragmatic property of assertion. Know was also held to be the main reason that ego evidentiality kicked in as the default for evidentially unmarked sentences.
In this chapter I argue that not only is evidentiality dependent on assertion in main clauses, but it is dependent on assertion in embedded clauses as well. In Section 5.1, I show that only those heads which embed ‘assertive speech acts’ support evidential oppositions. Assertion embedders include ‘say’ and ‘think’, but not much else. I show that unlike assertive embeddings, presuppositional embeddings do not license evidential oppositions.

In Section 5.2, I briefly compare evidentials with logophors, another embedded phenomenon dependent on assertive speech acts.

5.1. Embedded evidentials and embedded assertions

As we saw in Chapter 4, ego constructions are normally subject to a first-person restriction. For example, [ego cop] is not normally used in matrix declaratives if the subject is not first-person (1). Instead, [ind cop] would be used, as in (2):

(1)  nga/%khyed.rang/%kho  dge.rgan  yin
    I/%you/%he  teacher  [ego cop]
    ‘I’m a teacher.’

(2)  khyed.rang/kho  dge.rgan  red

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In contexts of embedded speech, ego no longer indexes the speaker of the sentence, but rather the matrix subject, i.e. the author of the embedded speech:

(3) \textit{bkra.shis kho dge.rgan yin lab-gi-'dug}  
Tashi he teacher [ego cop] say-[dir imp]  
‘Tashi\textsubscript{\texti} says he\textsubscript{\textj} is a teacher.’

(4) \textit{bkra.shis kho dge.rgan red lab-gi-'dug}  
Tashi he teacher [ind cop] say-[dir imp]  
‘Tashi\textsubscript{\texti} says he\textsubscript{\textj} is a teacher.’

In other words, there is an origo shift in embedded clauses: while the origo in (1) and (2) is the speaker, the origo for the embedded clause in (3) and (4) is Tashi.\footnote{The first to notice the origo shift in embedded speech contexts was Hale (1980), who looked at similar evidentials in Newari, a closely related Tibeto-Burman language. Hale called Newari’s equivalent of ego forms ‘conjunct’ verb forms, and the Newari’s equivalent of indirect ‘disjunct’ verb forms, terminology which emphasizes the conjunct and disjunct reference patterns reminiscent of switch-reference seen in (3) and (4). Following Hale, some work on Tibetan has adopted the terms ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’, which is regrettable if understandable. Once the initial motivation for the names is forgotten, the terms are somewhat opaque. Also, for a language like Tibetan, in which the evidential opposition is ternary (ego, direct, and indirect) rather than binary, as in Newari, two terms do not suffice.}
Not all embedded clauses behave like embedded speech. Most embeddings do not support evidential oppositions—instead there is neutralization to ego, the default form:

(5) ‘Because’ clause:

\[ \text{kho dge.rgan yin-tsang... / *red-tsang ...} \]
he teacher cop-because.../ *[ind cop]-because...
‘Because he’s a teacher...’

(6) Relative clause:

\[ \text{khyi gsum yod / *’dug / *yod.red} \]
dog three ELPA/[dir ELPA]/*[ind ELPA] -comp-gen person that
‘that person who has three dogs’

Recall that when ego forms such as yin and yod occur in such environments, they are interpreted non-evidentially, which is to say that causal and relative clauses do not support evidential oppositions. (This is why I’ve just glossed them as cop and ELPA, i.e. existential, locative, possessive, and attributive.)

Which non-root environments support evidential distinctions, and how is the origo determined in such cases? Among the class of adjuncts, including

Furthermore, the terms strike me as a bit too reminiscent of switch-reference, while evidentiality is more similar to logophoricity than switch-reference (cf. Stirling 1993).
causal adjuncts (5) and relative clauses (6), nothing allows evidential oppositions. Temporal adjuncts, such as ‘before’ (ma-V-gong-la), ‘after’ (V-pa’i rjela) and ‘when’ (V-dus) do not admit evidential oppositions, nor do conditionals (but see Chapter 7).

Among the class of verbs, speech verbs, such as lab ‘to say’, zer ‘to say’, and skad.cha dris ‘to ask’, allow evidential oppositions (cf. 3 and 4 above). Other verbs allowing evidentials include verbs of thought, such as bsam ‘to think’ and yid.ches yod ‘to believe (literally, to have a belief)’:

(7) a. न्यौँस्निध्यन्तीक्षथितिनिविन्दानस्मांत्रिदेशनानि

bkra.shis kho dge.rgan yin bsam-gi-‘dug
Tashi he teacher [ego cop] think-[dir imp]
‘Tashi, thinks he, is a teacher.’

b. न्यौँस्निध्यन्तीक्षथितिनिविन्दानस्मांत्रिदेशनानि

bkra.shis kho dge.rgan red bsam-gi-‘dug
Tashi he teacher [ind cop] think-[dir imp]
‘Tashi, thinks hej is a teacher.’

(8) न्यौँस्निध्यन्तीक्षथितिनिविन्दानस्मांत्रिदेशनानि
нрдннрдн

Because my consultants don’t particularly like relative clauses formed from copular clauses (e.g. ‘the man who is a teacher’), I demonstrate the point with an ELPA (existential-locative-possessive-attributive) construction.
phar.phyogs-la  ma-gnos-pa
others-loc  neg-harm-comp.

phar.phyogs-la  skyon  ma-sprad-nas
others-loc  pain  neg-give-having

‘di.’dra  byed-na  a.ni  ‘di
like this  do-if  and  this

‘di  yag.shos  red  bsam-gi’-dug
this  best  [ind cop]  think-[dir imp]

‘To not harm others, and to not give them pain—I think it’s best if you
do like that.’

Knowledge verbs, such as ha.go ‘to know, understand’ and shes ‘to
know, understand’, do not permit evidential oppositions:

(9) * bkra.shis-gis kho  dge.rgan  yin  ha.go-gi-yod.red
    Tashi-erg  he  teacher  [ego cop]  know-[dir imp]
    Intended: ‘Tashi knows he’s a teacher.’

(10) * bkra.shis-gis kho  dge.rgan  red  ha.go-gi-yod.red
    [ind cop]
    Intended: same as (9).

(11) bkra.shis-gis  kho  dge.rgan  yin-pa  ha.go-gi-yod.red
    Tashi-erg  he  teacher  cop-comp  know-[ind imp]
    ‘Tashi knows he’s a teacher.’
As (9) and (10) show, ‘know’ does not embed full clausal complements. Instead, it embeds a CP headed by the complementizer \(pa\), which itself embeds the neutralized copula (11), but not [ind cop] (12). Note that although the complements in (9) and (11) look similar, only (9) contains embedded evidentiality. (11) cannot be interpreted as containing embedded [ego cop].

Perception verbs also fail to embed evidential oppositions, patterning instead like knowledge verbs:

(13) \*bkra.shis kha.lag za-gi-yod/’dug/yod.red nga-s thong-gi-’dug

Tashi food eat-[ego imp]/[dir imp]/[ind imp] I-erg see-[dir imp]

Intended: ‘I see Tashi is eating.’

(14) bkra.shis kha.lag za-gi-yod-pa nga-s thong-gi-’dug

Tashi food eat-imp-comp I-erg see-[dir imp]

‘I see that Tashi is eating.’
Nor do verbs of desire or emotion support evidential oppositions:

(15) *kho.tsho-s zhi.bde yong-gi-red re.ba byed-gi-yod.red

they-erg peace come-[ind fut] hope do-[ind imp]

Intended: ‘They hope that peace will come.’

(16) kho.tsho-s zhi.bde yong-yag-gi re.ba byed-gi-yod.red

they-erg peace come-nmlz-gen hope do-[ind imp]

‘They hope for peace.’

In the cases examined so far, the origo has always been the sentence subject. In fact, the origo is not grammatically determined, but is rather the source of the speech or thought, which just tends to be the subject (cf. Sells 1987 and Stirling 1993 on logophoricity):

(17) kho ‘gro-gi-yin-se nga-s kho-‘i rtsa-nas go-song

he go-[ego fut]-quot I-erg he-gen side-ABL hear-[dir past]

‘I heard from him that he, she, or it will go.’

(Notice here that the embedded clause contains an evidential (ego) future, and not just a neutralized form.) Although the matrix subject is first-person, the
embedded origo is third-person, since the source of speech, an oblique adjunct, is third-person.

The environments that license non-root evidential oppositions in Tibetan can be summarized quite simply as those whose complements can be headed by the complementizer *se*, which is derived from the verb ‘say’. The role of *se* can be seen in (17) above. In fact, no verb that admits a *se* complement fails to allow evidential oppositions.

This interdependence between evidentiality and ‘say’-complementation has also been noted for Newari (Hale 1980). A similar interdependence between complementizers derived from ‘say’ and logophors has been noted for a wide variety of languages, including Ewe (Clements 1975), Abe (Koopman and Sportiche 1989), Gokana (Hyman and Comrie 1981), and many others (Lord 1993:184).

I suggest that embedded evidential oppositions are limited to complements of verbs of speech and thought because these are the only kinds of predicates that embed assertive speech acts. As I said in the introduction, evidentiality in Tibetan is crucially dependent on assertion, no less in embedded clauses than in matrix clauses.

An adequate account of (3), repeated below, must insure that the origo for the embedded [ego cop] is Tashi.
If lab ‘to say’ selects for an assertive speech act, then the embedded clause in (3), (kho dge.rgan yin), is an assertion $A$ from $x$ to $y$, which can be notated $A_{<x,y>}$. Because lab embeds an assertion, it must also provide a binder for $x$ and $y$. The binder for $x$ is Tashi, the source of speech, and the binder for $y$ is the addressee, presumably the speaker of (3). Supposing this person is Dorje, and Dorje says (3) to Tenzin, then we have something like (18) as the linguistic representation of (3):

$$(18) \quad A_{<\text{Dorje,Tenzin}>} \mid \text{Content}(A_1) = \text{Tashi says } A_{<\text{Tashi,Dorje}>} \mid \text{Content}(A_2) = \text{he is a teacher}.$$

In other words, (3) is an assertion $A_1$ from Dorje to Tenzin, the content of which is *Tashi says...* What Tashi says is an assertion $A_2$ from Tashi to Dorje, the content of which is *He is a teacher*.$^{68}$

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$^{68}$ By ‘assertion’ I do not mean a vocalization of the words ‘He is...’ Verbs of thought also embed assertive speech acts. Assertions are abstract entities, objects which represent our public or private commitments to propositions.
Recall from Chapter 4 that I took ego evidentiality to be the default inference in the absence of any other evidential marking. So, when a speaker $s$ makes an assertion $A$, by doing so he presents himself as knowing what he says to be true. And knowledge is always knowledge of a certain sort, which means that in the absence of other evidentials, $s$ presents himself as knowing what he says in the ego way.

This analysis extends to embedded clauses. Since the embedded copula in (3) is not indirect, we are not representing Tashi as presenting himself as having indirect evidence for his claim. Therefore, we must be representing Tashi as presenting himself as having ego evidence, given that direct is not an option in copular clauses (see Chapter 4).

5.2. Evidentials and logophors

I think it is worth briefly comparing evidentials with logophors, in part because both are dependent on assertion, and in part because interesting similarities between the two phenomena have been pointed out in the literature, most notably by Stirling (1993).

The term ‘logophoric’ was coined by Hagège (1974:287), who proposed that it “designate a particular category of anaphoric pronouns, personal and possessive, which refer to the author of a discourse or to a
particular participant whose thoughts are reported.” An example of a logophor can be seen in the following Ewe data from Clements (1975):

(19) *Kofi* be *yè-dzo*  
    Kofi say Log-leave  
    ‘Kofi said that he left.’

(20) *Kofi* be *e-dzo*  
    Kofi say Pro-leave  
    ‘Kofi said that s/he left.’

The embedded subject in (19) is a logophor, and therefore it must corefer with the matrix subject, Kofi. In contrast, the ordinary pronoun in (20) is used for disjoint reference.

In what follows, I restrict my attention to what Culy (1994) calls *pure logophoric languages*. Pure logophoric languages have special forms that are used only in logophoric domains. Mixed logophoric languages, in contrast, possess reflexive pronouns that have extended use in logophoric domains. Culy shows that there are substantial differences between pure logophors and mixed logophors (e.g. non-clause-bounded reflexives). My discussion will be restricted to the pure variety, as this variety of logophors shares more in common with evidentials.

The first point of similarity between the two phenomena is that the environments licensing non-root evidentials in Tibetan are strikingly
reminiscent of the triggers for logophoricity. Canonical logophoric triggers are verbs of speech and thought (Stirling 1993, Culy 1994), although verbs of emotion, knowledge, or indirect perception may also license logophors in some languages. In some logophoric languages, logophors are also allowed in other, peripheral constructions, such as purpose clauses (Ewe, Clements 1975; Gokana, Hyman & Comrie 1981) or clauses of consequence (Ewe and Gokana) or effect (Ewe).

Example (17) showed that the embedded evidential origo need not be the matrix subject. Rather, the origo is the source of speech or thought, whether that DP is subject or not. This is generally true of the antecedents of logophors as well. Clements (1975), discussing Ewe, points out a variety of constructions in which non-subjects can antecede logophors, and other authors since have noted similar facts.

The third similarity between evidentials and logophors has already been mentioned: both phenomena are often closely connected to assertion and the ‘say’-complementizer.

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69 In his typological study of logophoric languages spoken in Africa, Culy (1994) found that direct perception constructions never license logophors.

70 In some logophoric languages, the antecedent need not even be in the same sentence. In Ewe, for example, logophoric pronouns may occur in free indirect discourse, that is, matrix clauses which are put from the point of view of someone other than the speaker, most commonly found literature or extended narratives. (On free indirect discourse, see Schlenker 1999 and references therein.) In Tibetan, as far as I know, free indirect discourse does not license evidentials.
There are two major differences between evidentials and logophors. The first is morphological. As Stirling (1993:256) notes, logophors typically have person and/or number features. Some logophors derive from third-person pronouns (e.g. Gokana, Hyman & Comrie 1981), and most logophors can have third-person antecedents. Sometimes they can have second-person antecedents, but almost never first-person antecedents. Even when logophoricity is marked as agreement rather than by special DPs, the same person restrictions hold (see Gokana).

Evidentiality, in contrast, is a feature of assertion. While DPs and AGR may have person features, evidentials appear to lack such features entirely (see chapters 2-4). Like epistemic modals, as in *John must be here*, evidentials do require an origo, but they are not to be analyzed in terms of inherent person features on particular lexical items.

As a result of the morphological differences, evidentials differ from logophors in certain important respects. For one, evidentials, but not (pure) logophors, can occur in ordinary (I mean non-indirect-discourse) declarative clauses. In such cases, as we know, the evidential origo is the speaker. One might expect that root logophors might also be licensed in logophoric languages. If allowed, such logophors would have to be first-person, since matrix clauses represent the point of view of the speaker. But given that
logophors almost always disallow first-person antecedents, this possibility can be excluded.

The second significant difference is that logophors, but not evidentials, can occur at an indefinite distance from their trigger. So, in Ewe for example, a logophor can occur within a relative clause, provided that the relative clause is within a logophoric environment, e.g. complement of the verb ‘say’ (Clements 1975:156), as for example in the sentence *Ama$_i$ said that she$_i$ remembered the girl who stayed with her$_i$. In Tibetan, on the other hand, evidentials are not allowed within relative clauses. This is true whether the relative clause is embedded in a logophoric environment or not:

(21) $\text{ki} \text{hyi gsum} \text{ three ELPA} \text{ dog} / \text{*yod \text{ELPA}/[dir ELPA]/[ind ELPA] -comp-gen person that}$

\text{nga-s} \text{ I-erg see-[dir past]} \text{'I saw the person who has three dogs'}
That is, even though ‘say’ licenses evidential oppositions in the clause it immediately subordinates (cf. example 3), it cannot license evidential oppositions in non-immediately subordinate clauses. Note that the facts in (21) and (22) can be reproduced for every embedder that doesn’t allow evidential oppositions. I conclude from this that evidentials, unlike logophors, are directly selected by the head that immediately dominates them.

In a sense, logophors are the indirect speech equivalent of first-person pronouns. If this analogy is helpful, then it is not surprising that logophors can be indefinitely far from their triggers. After all, the first-person pronoun itself can occur indefinitely far from its trigger (taking that to be the matrix context or something similar), as in *Bill was over there because I wanted him to be.*
Evidentials clearly behave differently. What is important to note, however, is that nothing special needs to be said about embedded clauses. The relative clause in (22) disallows evidential oppositions for the same reason they are disallowed in (21). It suffices to focus on matrix clauses and explain the restrictions there, and then the embedded clause restrictions will follow immediately.

The immediate selection constraint on evidentiality is important, but it is not hard to explain given the framework I’ve adopted. For me, the three evidential modalities all depend crucially on assertion. Neither the ego nor direct modalities are overtly marked. Instead, these evidential modalities owe their existence as pragmatic features of clauses to *Know*, a pragmatic property of assertion. Therefore, where there is no assertion, there cannot be any ego or direct evidentiality. Therefore, since they are presupposed rather than asserted, the relative clauses in (21) and (22) cannot be interpreted as ego or direct. Only matrix clauses—or assertive embeddings—are asserted, which means that these evidential modalities can only arise when *yod*, ‘dug,’ and other verbs occur in the root of an assertion.

As for the indirect modality, it is inherently performative. Performatives, too, depend on assertion and are incompatible with
presupposition. Therefore indirect is also restricted to the roots of asserted clauses (see Chapter 2).\footnote{A sentence like That’s someone I promise to tell you about looks like a presuppositional performatve. However, consideration of a wider range of performatve verbs suggests that this data is misleading. For example, That’s the ship I christen Austin doesn’t perform a christening as far as I can tell. (This is a ship I christen Austin seems slightly better but still not good enough.)}
Chapter 6

Questions

Questions are interactive speech acts. The questioner is important, since he asks the question, but the hearer is equally important, since she’s supposed to answer it. Many years ago, Dwight Bolinger (1957:4) wrote that a question “is fundamentally an attitude ... an utterance that ‘craves’ a verbal or other semiotic (e.g., a nod) response. The attitude is characterized by the speaker’s subordinating himself to his hearer.”

As important as the hearer is to questions, her role has been largely neglected. For Hamblin (1973) and Karttunen (1977), questions are semantically analyzed as answer-sets, which are just sets of propositions, i.e. sets of possible or correct answers. Others, such as Ginzburg (1996) and Higginbotham (1996), have emphasized the significance of partial answers and relevant answers. In general, semantic work on questions has proceeded merrily along while focusing on questions and answers, and without paying much attention to questioners and answerers.

Two exceptions to this rule come to mind. First, there are performative decompositions of questioning. Katz and Postal (1964), for example, suggested that the ‘Q morpheme’ meant I request that you answer
A second exception is the work that analyzes questions as epistemic imperatives (Åquist 1965, Hintikka 1978, 1983). Hintikka, for example, paraphrased questions with \textit{[You] bring it about that I know [wh-question]}...

Although performative and epistemic analyses of questions both admit a role for the hearer, the hearer is still ‘outside the question’, so to speak. The question is selected by a verb such as ‘answer’ or ‘know’, while the second-person argument is part of a silent prefix.

In this chapter I present evidence which suggests that the hearer should go inside the question itself. I show that not only does a question expect an answer, but its very form encodes information about how it’s supposed to be answered. In particular, I show that while the evidential origo is first-person in declarative clauses, it is second-person in questions. To account for this fact, I argue that the Hamblin/Karttunen answer-set analysis of questions is correct, but that the answers are not propositions, but assertions.

More generally, my suggestion is that the analysis of questions depends on the analysis of assertion. Both phenomena must draw from the same set of analytical tools, and both must rely on an ontology of objects that includes not just propositions, but assertions as well.

\footnote{In fact, Karttunen also adopted the performative view for root questions.}
6.1. The origo shift in questions

In previous chapters we saw that the evidential origo in matrix declaratives is first-person. For a strong ego construction such as the past, this means that [ego past] is only possible in matrix declaratives with first-person subjects:

(1) 
\[ I/*\text{you}/*\text{he} \text{ Lhasa-loc go-[ego past]} \]

‘I went to Lhasa.’

In Chapter 3, we saw sentences with strictly endopathic (unobservable) predicates such as \textit{grod.khog ltogs} ‘to be hungry’. Such predicates can occur with direct evidentiality in matrix declaratives only if the subject is first-person:

(2) 
\[ I/*\text{you}/*\text{he} \text{ stomach hunger-[dir imp]} \]

‘I’m hungry.’

In questions, the origo shifts from first- to second-person. Thus, the question equivalents of (1) and (2) are (3) and (4) below:
Note that (3) and (4) are identical to (1) and (2) except that a yes/no question particle has been added. Now, only second-person subjects are possible.

Although examples (1)-(4) best illustrate the origo shift, the shift occurs in all questions, regardless of the evidential. So, for example, while (5) implies that the speaker has direct evidence that Tashi has gone to the restaurant,
(6) presupposes that the hearer has direct evidence that Tashi has either gone or not gone to the restaurant, and expects Tashi to answer on such an evidential basis. Thus, (6) would normally be answered with *phyin-song* ‘He went’ or *phyin-ma-song* ‘He didn’t go’, which would reflect the hearer’s evidential point of view.\(^{73}\)

Just as assertions can be embedded by speech and thought verbs (cf. Chapter 5), so too can questions be embedded by verbs of asking:

\[
\text{nga-s bkra.shis-la kho-rang ga.par phyin-pa-yin dris-pa-yin}
\]

I-erg Tashi-dat he-self where go-[ego past] ask-[ego past]

‘I asked Tashi where he went.’

Here there is an embedded origo shift. Since the embedded question contains ego evidentiality (ego past) and the past is a strong ego construction (cf. Chapter 4), the subject of the embedded question must be identical to the embedded origo. Since the embedded subject corefers with Tashi, I conclude that the embedded origo must be Tashi, and not the speaker. This is not

\(^{73}\) It is possible for the hearer to use a different evidential in her answer than what the questioner used in his question. However, as I said, in asking the question the questioner does presuppose that the hearer either knows on the basis of direct evidence that Tashi went to the restaurant, or knows on such a basis that he didn’t go.
The origo-shift has been widely discussed in the Tibeto-Burman literature. The first scholar to notice it was Hale (1980), who analyzed similar data in Newari, a closely related Tibeto-Burman language. Hale suggested that the shift could be explained by the performative hypothesis. A performative prefix such as *I ask you...* or *I request that you tell me...* could provide a second-person to bind the evidential, and thus could make a matrix question like (3) similar to an embedded question like (7).

The shift has also been described as a kind of anticipation. Tournadre and Dorje (1998) refers to the ‘rule of anticipation’ whereby the evidentials used in a question anticipate what the hearer would use in her reply. Hale (1980:99) calls this “very nearly equivalent” to the performative analysis.75

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74 When the embedded subject corefers with the matrix indirect object in this manner, many Tibetans prefer the reflexive pronoun *kho-rang* “he-self” to the unadorned pronoun *kho*.

75 Something like the origo shift may occur in languages such as English, too. Note that the adverb ‘honestly’ is interpreted from the point of view of the speaker in (a), but from the hearer’s point of view in (b):

(a) Honestly, John left. = I tell you honestly that John left.
(b) Honestly, did John leave? = Tell me honestly, did John leave?

Still, this case may be different. If the performative glosses are accurate representations, then perhaps ‘honestly’ is outside of the question proper.
6.2. Self-questions

In the example questions above, the first- to second-person origo shift is immediately evident. In some ‘questions’, however, there is no obvious origo shift. Consider, for example, questions one mutters to oneself under one’s breath:

(8)  
\[ \text{nga sha za-gi-yin-pas} \]
I meat eat-[ego fut]-Q
‘Shall I eat meat?’

(9)  
\[ \text{nga-la lde.mig yod-pas yod} \]
I-loc key [ego ELPA]-Q [ego ELPA]
‘Do I have the keys? Yes, I do.’

If questions such as (8) and (9) were asked of anyone else, they would take direct or indirect evidentials. Because they are asked of the self, however, the evidential remains the same as it would be in a declarative clause.

Nevertheless, I believe that examples such as these still involve an origo shift. They differ from ordinary questions in one small way: the hearer is the same person as the questioner. Because of this, the origo shift is
invisible. But still, it is plausible to maintain that the evidential origo is the hearer rather than the questioner in (8) and (9).

One grammatical environment where self-questions are regularly found is in the Tibetan equivalent of pseudocleft constructions. Consider the following examples:

(10) \[ \text{nga-s ga.re byas-pa-yin zer-na las.ka byas-pa-yin} \]

I-erg what do-[ego past] say-if work do-[ego past]

‘What I did was I worked.’

(11) \[ \text{khyed.rang ga.re byas-pa-red/*-yin zer-na las.ka byas-pa-red} \]

you what do-[ind past]/*[ego past] say-if work do-[ind past]

‘What you did was work.’

Such pseudoclefts are formed by taking a question, tacking on zer-na ‘if say’, and then answering the question. Read literally, (10) means, \textit{If I say what did I do, (then I answer that) I worked.} And (11) is, \textit{If I say what did you do, (then I answer that) you worked.} So, the first half of the sentence is the question, and the second half the answer. Although the question part permits the full range of evidential oppositions, just like matrix questions, as (10) and
show there is no visible origo shift. First-person still occurs with ego (10), while non-first-person still occurs with indirect (11).  

As my literal readings are meant to suggest, I think pseudoclefts are also self-questions. Therefore, they are not counterexamples to the claim that there is an origo shift in questions. Rather, they also show that sometimes the origo shift isn’t visible because the hearer is the same person as the questioner.  

6.3. Posing without asking

Further evidence for the interactive dimension of questioning comes from questions that are posed but not asked (cf. Lyons 1977:355).

Consider ordinary questions such as (12b) and (13):

(12) a. 

\[
\text{bkra.shis dge.rgan yin/red} \\
\text{Tashi teacher [ego cop]/[ind cop]} \\
\text{‘Tashi’s a teacher.’}
\]

[76] The first part of a pseudocleft is interrogative, and therefore unlike non-interrogative \textit{wh}-complements (cf. example 17 in the text). Non-interrogative \textit{wh}-complements of verbs like ‘know’ select for [..V-comp], and not [..V-[ind past]-comp]. I do not have data that goes to the issue of whether or not the question parts of (10) and (11) have exactly the same syntax as matrix questions.

[77] In Newari (Hale 1980) and Sherpa (Schöttelndreyer 1980:129), there is no visible origo shift in rhetorical questions, although such questions do allow full evidential oppositions. I take rhetorical questions to be yet another kind of question where the hearer is the same as the speaker, and thus the origo shift is not noticeable.
Because the copular construction is a weak ego construction (cf. Chapter 4), (12a) and (12b) are possible with either ego or indirect, even though the subject is third-person. As for (13), since the past is strong ego and the subject is third-person, [ego past] is ruled out, although [ind past] is perfectly fine.

The characteristic features of ordinary questions, then, are that (a) there is an origo shift; and (b) evidential oppositions are allowed, although not all evidential possibilities may be available in a given sentence (like [ego past] is blocked in 13)—in other words, there is no neutralization.

A small set of embedded questions differ from ordinary questions in that they do not support evidential oppositions, and therefore, there is neutralization to ego. These are questions embedded under ‘think’, which are
equivalent to sentences with ‘wonder’ in English. Thus, for example, the embedded wondering equivalent of (12b) ends up as (14) but not (15):

(14) \[\text{ngā-’i sam.pa-r } \text{kho dge.rgan } yin-na-min-na \text{ bsam-byung}\]
\[\text{in my thoughts he teacher cop-if-neg cop-if think-[VP ego]}\]
‘I wonder whether or not he’s a teacher.’

(15) \[\text{*ngā-’i sam.pa-r } \text{kho dge.rgan } \text{red-na-ma-red-na bsam-byung}\]
\[\text{[ind cop]-if-[ind neg cop]-if}\]
This construction embeds an ‘if’-clause under ‘think’, with a meaning like *I wonder if... or *I wonder whether... Notice from (14) that for yes/no wonderings the A-not-A structure familiar from Chinese is used. Notice furthermore that the neutralized copula \( \text{yin} \) must be used—as (15) shows, [ind cop] \( \text{red} \) is disallowed.

As another example, consider the wondering equivalent of (13):

(16) \[\text{ltas.mo ‘di } \text{su-s } \text{bzos-yin/*-red } \text{-na}\]
\[\text{film this who-erg make-past/*[ind past] if}\]
‘I wonder who made this film.’
Here again, [ind past] is excluded, and instead we find the neutralized yin, which, notice, was simply not a possibility in (13), the ordinary question.\(^78\)

There is no doubt that these embedded questions are interrogative. That is, they are not like the non-interrogative \textit{wh}-complements of verbs like ‘know’ and ‘tell’, which embed [V-comp], but not [V-yin/red-comp]:

\begin{center}
\begin{equation}
\text{\(17\)}
\end{equation}
\end{center}

\begin{tabular}{lllll}
\text{\(khyed\text{-}rang\text{-}gis\)} & \text{\(\ldots\)} & \text{\(\ast thong\text{-}pa/\ast thong\text{-}pa\text{-}red\text{-}pa\)} \\
\text{\text{you\text{-}erg\text{\ldots}}} & \text{\(\text{who~see-comp/\ast see-[ind~past]-comp}\)} \\
\text{\(nga\text{-}s\)} & \text{\(\text{ha.go\text{-}gi\text{-}yod\text{\ldots}}\)} & \text{\(\text{I\text{-}erg\text{\ldots}}\)} & \text{\(\text{know-[ego~imp]}\)}
\end{tabular}

‘I know who you saw.’

Therefore, the data here shows that in addition to ordinary questions, which admit the full range of evidential oppositions, we must also admit a class of wonderings or defective questions, in which evidential oppositions are neutralized.

\(^{78}\) The wondering construction is a bit unusual in that both the prefix ‘in my thoughts’ and the suffix ‘I thought’ are optional. A root ‘if’-clause is enough to bring out the desired meaning.
6.4. Answer-sets as assertion-sets

Hamblin (1973) suggested that questions be analyzed in terms of answer-sets. For him, a question was a set of possible answers. Karttunen (1977) added the constraint that the answer-set be restricted to the correct answers. Let me take Hamblin’s view, where the answer-set for *Who left?* is defined as follows:

(18) \[ \text{Answer-set(Who left?) = \{p | \exists x . p = x \text{ left}\}} \]

Read: the answer-set for the question *Who left?* is the set of propositions p such that there’s an x such that p = x left.

I want to take over Hamblin’s idea, but modify it slightly. The interactive dimension of questioning requires that the speaker and hearer be put into a question as well. Therefore, I take the answer-set to be a set of assertions, rather than a set of propositions. Thus, the answer-set for *Who left?* is now:

(19) \[ \text{Answer-set(Who left?) = \{A_{<h,s>} | \exists x . \text{Content}(A) = x \text{ left}\}} \]

Read: the answer-set for *Who left?* is the set of assertions A from h to s such that there’s an x such that the content of A is that x left.
At this point, h and s could be anything in (19), so let me clarify what I have in mind. If the question is from Dorje to Tashi, then because there is an origo shift in questions (19) will turn out as (20):

\[
\text{(20) Answer-set} (\text{Who left?}) = \{ A \langle \text{Tashi,Dorje} \rangle \mid \exists x . \text{Content}(A) = x \text{ left} \}
\]

Since the question is from Dorje to Tashi, the possible answers will be from Tashi to Dorje. Therefore the answer-set consists of assertions from Tashi to Dorje. h and s are just free variables in (19), but they are meant to remind the reader of the hearer and the speaker, and thus to emphasize that there is an origo shift in questions.

My account may seem trivial, but that is its appeal. I include no rule of origo shift, because there is no rule of origo shift. Origo shift is a mere pragmatic necessity. Because assertions have authors and (sometimes also) recipients, an assertion must have an origo. The origo is simply the author of the assertion, which is not determined grammatically, but rather pragmatically. For example, if I ask someone a question, the answer-set consists of assertions by the person I’m talking to, i.e. the person right there in front of me, simply because that’s the person who is supposed to answer my
question. No formal machinery is required: the origo shift comes for free as long as assertions have authors and questions have answerers.

Before closing this chapter, I want to argue briefly against an alternative approach. Suppose that in place of an assertion-based view, one instead adopted a proposition-based view, and took evidentials to be shifters with person features, like pronouns such as ‘I’ and ‘you’. Then, there would be two facts to account for. First, as in the assertion-based analysis, one would need to account for the origo shift, i.e. the fact that in questions the answer-set propositions are evaluated from the point of view of the hearer, not the speaker. Second, one would need to account for the change of person features on the evidential. In questions, evidentials would have to index second-person, while in statements they would have to index first-person.

One problem with this view is that it would have to explain why evidentials shift in questions, but other shifters don’t. Suppose I say Did you leave? Notice that this does not mean Did I leave? That is, while there may be an evidential origo shift, there is no pronominal shift. If both kinds of phenomena are shifters, it is not clear why there is shifting in one case but not in the other.

On my view, however, evidentials are not shifters, nor do they have person features, as I have found no evidence to suggest that evidentials have
person features. Evidentiality arises either through a pragmatic property of assertion (in the case of ego and direct), or due to the inherently performative nature of the item (in the case of indirect). Therefore, there is no need to explain any person-shift with respect to the evidential itself, since no such shift occurs. All that occurs is the assertion-level origo-shift, which means that the point of view or origin of the potential answer is different from the point of view of the questioner.

To illustrate my point, it may be helpful to consider an English performative:

(21) I promise to go.
(22) Do you promise to go?

Given that (21) is performative, why does (22) hold promise to be performative from the hearer’s point of view?

Just as there is no behind the scenes shift in (22) from ‘you’ to ‘I’, there is no shift from ‘promise_{you}’ to ‘promise_{I}’. In this particular context, ‘you’ has a fixed reference, namely the addressee, just as ‘promise’ has a fixed meaning. The potential performativity of the answer comes from the fact that the potential promiser is identical to the probable answerer. That is, the answer-set for (22) includes the assertion from the hearer to the speaker of [x promises to go], where x is the hearer herself. Since the hearer is identical
to x, and since the hearer cannot fail to know that fact, the potential result is performative.\footnote{This may be additional evidence against Chierchia’s (1989) view that de se knowledge is dependent on the occurrence of pronominals (i.e. pronominals coreferent with the relevant thinkers, speakers, and so forth—see Chapter 4). In Chapter 4, I noted that we find ego evidentials with both performatives and attitudes de se, suggesting an important similarity between the phenomena. Do you promise to go? counts as a case where the answer-set is potentially performative, although it would not involve a first-person pronoun at any level of representation.}

Evidentials behave just like ‘promise’. For example, indirect does not mean anything different in a question from what it means in a statement. It’s just that in statements the assertion author is the speaker, while in questions it is the hearer, as outlined above.
Chapter 7

Conditionals

In this chapter I defend a new typology of conditionals. This typology is not meant to overthrow previous typologies, such as those of Dudman (1984), Sweetser (1990) or Dancygier (1998). Rather, it is meant to be supplementary, to add yet another variable to those that need to be considered.

Conditionals, I suggest, can be divided into two major types: *hypothetical* and *interactional*. Hypothetical conditionals are pragmatically inert, in the sense that they could be part of a vacuum-packed monologue. Interactional conditionals, as their name suggests, activate conversational inferences and implications, and as such are impossible without a conversational background.

The key feature of interactional conditionals is that their protases (antecedents) must be judged by someone—usually a discourse participant—to be either true or false. Interactional protases impose an anti-first-person restriction to the effect that this ‘judge’ cannot be the speaker.

In Tibetan, there is striking evidence for the view I am proposing. While the anti-first-person effect may be difficult to notice in some languages, it is clearly manifest in Tibetan. Certain verb inflections show visible person-
based restrictions that support the idea that a subset of conditionals are interactive.

The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 7.1, I briefly introduce the distinction between hypothetical and interactional conditionals. In Section 7.2, I examine future protases in English, and show that they are interactional conditionals and thus exhibit the anti-first-person effect. In Section 7.3, I look at two kinds of conditional protases in Tibetan. In the first, the protasis is the volitional future, and in the second, the protasis is the direct imperfective. Both kinds of protases exhibit person asymmetries that fall out from the properties of interactive conditionals.

7.1. Hypothetical and interactional conditionals

The difference between the two kinds of conditionals is grounded in an important but mostly ignored parameter of conditionality: the point of enlightenment regarding the truth or falsity of the protasis. To illustrate, consider (1):

(1) If John leaves today, his wife will leave tomorrow.
The protasis may turn out true or false: John might leave today, but then again he might not. When are we enlightened on the matter? Take $e$ to be the point of enlightenment. If John leaves at $t$, then $e=t$. If John doesn’t leave, then $e$ is today’s end. Eventually we know whether or not John will leave, but crucially, either way, $e$ is in the future. I define a hypothetical conditional to be one where the point of enlightenment $e$ is in the future.

The time of $e$ is not determined by the (apparent) tense of the protasis. $e$ is not future because the verb ‘leaves’ is future. $e$ can still be future even if the verb is past:

(2) If John left yesterday, his wife will leave today.

Although it must be that John either did or didn’t leave yesterday, suppose we have no idea one way or the other. Then our point of enlightenment is the moment when we discover the answer to the question: did he leave yesterday or did he not? So again, $e$ is in the future.

Interactional conditionals differ in that $e$ is not in the future. At first glance this is paradoxical: how could the moment of enlightenment regarding the conditional protasis be the moment of speech (or before)? After all, use of ‘if’ implicates uncertainty, which means that the speaker doesn’t know
whether or not the protasis is true. I grant this point. However, I submit that in such cases, the moment of enlightenment is relative not to the speaker, but to another discourse participant. In other words, interactional conditionals activate the presupposition that somebody other than the speaker knows whether or not the protasis holds (hence the ‘interactional’ part). Therefore, \( e \) is not in the future. Take an example which will be treated in detail later:

(3) If you’ll be alone on Christmas Day, let us know now.

The speaker does not know if the hearer will be alone. But the hearer is presumed to know. Once (3) is uttered, the hearer is expected to articulate her judgment. Failure to inform is deemed a negative judgment.

In this chapter I argue that the distinction between hypothetical and interactional conditionals is a real one, that there is evidence for its existence from both English (7.2) and Tibetan (7.3). In particular, I show that the interactional character of interactional conditionals correctly predicts a number of interesting person asymmetries in the use of embedded evidentials in Tibetan. Finally, in Section 7.4, I conclude by comparing my analysis with a competing analysis in which interactive protases are argued to contain covert performative clauses.
7.2. Future protases in English

In this section, I examine conditional protases in English which contain ‘will’, and compare them to protases containing simple present verb forms. Although only some of this literature is cited below, my discussion has been influenced by a number of fascinating articles and books, including Close (1980), Comrie (1982), Dancygier (1988, 1998), Haegeman and Wekker (1984), Nieuwint (1986), Palmer (1974, 1983), and Wekker (1976).

I will argue that protases with ‘will’ mark interactional conditionals. Such protases must be judged as true or false from the point of view of someone other than the speaker—therefore, they exhibit an anti-first-person effect.

My distinction between hypothetical and interactional conditionals in terms of whether or not the point of enlightenment is in the future is related to a proposal from Dancygier (1998:186). She suggests that while conditionals always mark that the protasis is ‘unknown’ to the speaker (or at least that by using a conditional the speaker does not want to make a public commitment of knowledge), there are two types of ‘unknown’. On the one hand there’s what’s ‘knowable’, and on the other what’s ‘unknowable’.
To see the significance of ‘knowability’, compare the following two sentences (from Close 1980:104,109):

(4) If you’ll be alone on Christmas Day, let us know now.  
(5) If you’re alone on Christmas Day, come round here any time you like.

In Dancygier’s framework, both (4) and (5) express uncertainty: in neither case does the speaker know whether or not the hearer will be alone on Christmas Day. Yet there is an important difference between the two cases: though both protases are ‘unknown’, the protasis in (4) is ‘knowable’, while the protasis in (5) is ‘unknowable’.

In (5), the speaker does not expect the hearer to be able to say for certain whether or not he’ll be home on Christmas Day. In fact, in a sense, such present guesses are irrelevant to (5). Instead, the hearer is just told that if such and such event comes to pass, that is, if the future turns out in such and such a way, then she should come around. In this sense the protasis in (5) is unknowable from the speaker’s point of view. When Christmas comes, we can say whether or not it’s true, but at the present moment it’s anybody’s guess.

(4) is different. The speaker of (4) presents the protasis as unknown but knowable. The knowledge lies with the hearer. As suggested by the
‘now’ in the apodosis, the speaker expects an immediate reaction from the hearer. This reaction, whether verbal or gestural, determines the truth of the protasis.

Suppose the protasis in (5) were combined with the apodosis (consequent, i.e. main clause) in (4):

(6) If you’re alone on Christmas Day, let us know now.

As Close (1980:104) notes, “are could replace will ..., but only if it meant ‘are scheduled to be’, which would be more likely to apply to a busy executive than to anyone in need of charity. It could not possibly mean: ‘If, when Christmas Day comes, you find yourself alone, let us know two weeks before.’”

In my terminology, the protasis in (5) is unknowable because the point of enlightenment e is in the future. Example (4), in contrast, has already been mentioned as a case where e is not in the future, since the speaker takes the hearer to know now whether or not she’ll be alone on Christmas Day.

Consider the following example, said by the Norwegian foreign minister in the wake of a developing disaster (Close 1980:103):

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80 This was posted outside a charity’s office.
(7) If the slick will come as far as Stavanger, then of course I must take precautions on a massive scale.

Again, the effect of replacing ‘will come’ with ‘comes’ is dramatic: “If he had used *comes* instead of *will come*, he would have been saying, in effect: ‘If one can consider the arrival of the slick as actually occurring (rather than as likely to occur), then I must take precautions to prevent a disaster which I envisage as having already taken place’. That would of course have been absurd and totally irresponsible” (p. 103). Indeed, if ‘comes’ replaces ‘will come’, the apodosis in (8) is more appropriate (p. 109):

(8) If the slick comes down as far as Stavanger, then hundreds of miles of our coastline will be spoilt.

These differences support Close’s characterization of the difference between present and future protases in English. Present tense cases such as (5) take the protasis to be an ‘assumed future actuality’. Future tense cases such as (4) and (7) involve ‘assumed predictability’. Or, as Nieuwint (1986: 389) puts it, with future protases “the occurrence of the event predicted in the main clause depends on the question of whether the (hypothetical) prediction in the subclause is considered a fact; in other words it is the predictability of a future event which constitutes the fulfillment of the condition.”
Hidden within the terms ‘assumed future actuality’ and ‘assumed predictability’ is the notion of the point of enlightenment. The ‘future’ in the former is there because $e$ is in the future, whereas it is absent in the latter, where $e$ is not in the future.

Perhaps the best test for diagnosing an interactional conditional is to see if the apodosis can consist of a performative or speech-act with an adverb such as ‘now’.

(9) If John’ll be there, I hereby promise to be there too.
(10) %If John’s there, I hereby promise to be there too.
(11) If I was wrong, sir, I apologize. (Dancygier 1998: 130)\textsuperscript{81}
(12) %If I fuck up, I apologize.

Again, while (9) and (11) pass as interactional conditionals, (10) is only good if the protasis is given a present scheduling reading, as in the only possible reading for (6) above, while (12) just seems deviant.\textsuperscript{82}

As (11) and the following example suggest, interactional conditionals are not limited to those with future protases. As I hinted at already, present and past protases are ambiguous between hypothetical and interactional readings. So-called ‘given’ conditionals (Sweetser 1990, Dancygier 1998), in

\textsuperscript{81} An example from Kurt Vonnegut’s novel, Hocus Pocus.

\textsuperscript{82} This is not to say that the apodoses of hypothetical conditionals cannot consist of non-declarative speech-acts. Example (5), after all, is just such a case. What makes (5) acceptable is its temporal implications: come around any time \textit{on that day} (not now).
which the protasis has already been introduced in the context, whether by language or physical suggestion, are often present tensed, and always interactional. As an example there is the following ‘indicative counterfactual’ (Akatsuka 1986):

(13)  
A. I’m the Pope.  
B. If you’re the Pope, I’m the Empress of China.

A corollary of the claim that $e$ is not in the future for interactional conditionals is the already mentioned fact that if a proposition is taken to be true or false, it must be so from the point of view of someone other than the speaker. That is, an interactional conditional demands that the hearer or someone else other than the speaker be in a position to immediately confirm or deny the protasis. This is not to say that a confirmation or denial is actually required, but just that it is providable in principle. A question arises, then: who judges whether or not the protasis is true?\(^83\)

Dancygier (1998:120) claims that in interactional conditionals the protasis always assumes the hearer’s perspective, i.e. the hearer is always the judge: “In the sentences with will protases, the speaker is not making any prediction herself, but communicates $q$ as a speech act justified against the

\(^{83}\) If such a confirmation or denial were not possible even in principle, then the conditional would have to be hypothetical; in that case, necessarily, $e$ would be in the future.
background of a prediction which only the hearer can make.” Soon, I will present evidence from Tibetan that shows that the judge is only sometimes the hearer. But this point can also be established on the basis of (7). Unlike (4), there is no presumption in the case of (7) that the hearer is in the unique position of being able to determine how far the slick will come. It could be that the foreign minister is reading the paper together with a Norwegian friend of his, and it is the paper that makes the claim. The minister’s friend may be as dependent on the paper as the minister himself, in which case it is clearly not the hearer’s perspective at issue.

Thus, interactional protases are judged from the point of view of someone or something other than the speaker, but not necessarily the hearer. The speaker himself is ruled out because the speaker, in using ‘if’, presents himself as not knowing one way or the other whether the protasis holds.

7.3. Person asymmetries in Tibetan conditionals

In Tibetan, rather dramatic person asymmetries are found in interactive protases. This section explores two constructions, the volitional future $V$-gi-$yin$ and the direct imperfective $V$-gi-‘dug. Both constructions show an anti-first-person effect in conditional protases. This anti-1 effect is a critical diagnostic of interactive conditionality.
Conditional constructions in Tibetan are formed by prefixing the apodosis, a fully inflected main clause, with the protasis. The protasis is suffixed by –na ‘if’:

(14) \[\text{ kho 'gro-na nga 'gro-gi-yin} \]
he go-if I go-[ego fut]
‘If he goes, I’ll go.’

As in English, tense and aspect possibilities in the protasis are severely limited. Thus, the protasis in (14) just consists of the subject and a verb stem, which is impossible as a matrix clause, let alone one with future meaning:

(15) \[\text{ kho 'gro *(-gi-red)} \]
he go *(ind fut)
‘He’ll go.’

Not surprisingly, given that conditional protases are not asserted, and evidentiality depends crucially on assertion (cf. Chapter 5), most evidential
oppositions are neutralized in conditional protases. Indirect forms such as red and yod.red are totally excluded.\textsuperscript{84}

(16) a. *\begin{verbatim}
*kho dge.rgan red-na ...
he teacher [ind cop]-if
‘If he’s a teacher...’
\end{verbatim}

b. \begin{verbatim}
kho dge.rgan yin-na ...
cop-if
‘If he’s a teacher...’
\end{verbatim}

ego verbs, on the other hand, occur as default forms, and as such lack any evidential impact. That is, one can vary the person of the subject in (16b) with no evidential effect whatsoever (see Chapter 4).

Direct evidentials, on the other hand, may occur under ‘if’:

(17) \begin{verbatim}
kh\text{\textsuperscript{yed}.rang} grod.khog lto\text{gs-gi-‘dug-na} ...
you stomach hunger-[dir imp]-if
‘If you’re hungry ...’
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{84} This point is also noted in Tournadre (1998). In my own consulting I occasionally came across speakers who would accept limited instances of red-na, but preliminary evidence suggests that such judgments may reflect interference from other varieties of Tibetan.
Part of this section will be devoted to trying to understand sentences like (17) with –‘dug-na. Though such sentences have been noted in passing (Tournadre and Dorje 1998:166, DeLancey 1990), they have not been systematically explored (see also Chapter 3).\textsuperscript{85}

Before discussing ‘dug and direct, I will look at the Tibetan equivalents of the English sentences discussed in Section 7.2. A distinction parallel to the English one between ‘will’-marked protases and simple present protases will emerge. The Tibetan data will be shown to support my proposed dichotomy between hypothetical and interactional conditionals.

7.3.1. Future protases in Tibetan: $V$-gi-$yin$-$na$

As indicated above, one way for a protasis to have a future sense is to use the verb stem strategy (as in 14). This is a case where $e$ is in the future. Another strategy is to use the $V$-gi-$yin$ future construction:

\footnotetext{85}{As I said in Chapter 1, I will not be looking at the [dir past] construction. In fact, (18) has several interesting properties, one of which being that it is read as future tense and not past tense.}
Thus, we have in (14) and (19) a contrast parallel to the contrast between the two English translations, ‘if you go’ vs. ‘if you’ll go’. 86

Recall that in matrix declaratives, the ego future V-gi-yin can only occur with 1P subjects and +volitional verbs:

(20) \[ / * / \]

nga/*kho 'gro-gi-yin
I/*he go-[ego fut]
‘I’ll go.’

(21) \[ / * / \]

nga na-gi-red/*na-gi-yin
I sick-[ind fut]/sick-[ego fut]
‘I’ll get sick.’

In conditional protases, there is still a volitionality requirement on the use of V-gi-yin. Compare the following:

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86 This contrast has been briefly noted without discussion by Tournadre (1998:168) and Denwood (1999:157).
ltad.mo ‘di lta-gi-yin-na nga-la kha.dpar btang shog
film this watch(+vol)-fut-if I-dat phone send imper
‘If you’ll watch this movie, give me a call.’

kho lam.khag-la thong-gi-yin-na nga-la skad btang
he road-loc see(-vol)-fut-if I-dat language send
‘If you’ll see him, call out to me.’

khyed.rang gzhas ‘di nyan-gi-yin-na skyid.po byung-gi-red
you song this listen(+vol)-fut-if pleasant get-[ind fut]
‘If you’ll listen to this song, it’ll be pleasant for you.’

khyed.rang gzhas te.tsho go-gi-yin-na skyid.po byung-gi-red
you song those hear(-vol)-fut-if pleasant get-[ind fut]
‘If you’ll hear those songs, you’ll have a good time.’

gam ‘di cag-gi-yin-na ‘di-i nang-la gser yod
box this break(+vol)-fut-if this-gen inside gold [ego ELPA]
‘If you’ll break this box, I’ve got gold inside it.’

gam ‘di chags-gi-yin-na ‘di-i nang-la gser yod
box this break(-vol)-fut-if this-gen inside gold [ego ELPA]
‘If this box will break, I’ve got gold inside.’
Only volitional verbs such as *ta* ‘watch’, *nyan* ‘listen’ and *cag* ‘break (intentionally)’ are allowed with future *V-gi-yin* in a protasis. Their non-volitional counterparts, *thong* ‘see’, *go* ‘hear’ and *chags* ‘break (spontaneously or unintentionally)’ are not allowed.

The English translations of the unacceptable sentences also sound weird, so one might wonder if the volitionality requirement is just an artifact of the examples chosen. It is possible to show however that this is not the case; in fact, whenever the future *V-gi-yin* is embedded, it retains a volitionality requirement:

(28) \[kho \text{ltas.mo te } \text{ltag-i-yin-pa } \text{unga-s ha.go-gi-yod}\]

he film that watch(+vol)-fut-comp I-erg know-[ego imp]

‘I know he’ll watch that movie.’

(29) *\[kho \text{tshong.khang de thong-gi-yin-pa } \text{unga-s ha.go-gi-yod}\]

he store that see(-vol)-fut-comp I-erg know-[ego imp]

Intended: ‘I know he’ll see that store.’

(30) \[ye.shes-gis rgya.mi dkar.yol ‘di cag-gi-yin-pa nga-s ha.go-gi-yod\]

Yeshe-erg Chinese cup this break(+vol)-fut-comp I know-[ego imp]

‘I know that Yeshe will break this Chinese cup.’
In other words, the *V-gi-yin* future construction cannot shed its volitionality requirement, whether it occurs as a matrix clause, or embedded under ‘if’ or ‘that’.

What about the person restriction noted in (20) above? There is no person restriction imposed on *V-gi-yin* in ‘that’-complements: (28)–(31) all have third-person subjects, but first- and second-person subjects are also possible. The situation is different in conditional protases:

(32) \[ \text{khyed.rang 'gro-gi-yin-na nga-ya'i 'gro-gi-yin} \]

you go-fut-if I-also go-[ego fut]

‘If you’ll go, I’ll go too.’

(33) \[ ? \text{kho 'gro-gi-yin-na nga-ya'i 'gro-gi-yin} \]

he go-fut-if I-also go-[ego fut]

‘If he’ll go, I’ll go too.’
All speakers I’ve consulted accept second-person examples like (32) immediately. First-person examples such as (34) are universally rejected. Third-person examples like (33) lie somewhere in between, with my consultants ultimately finding them acceptable, though tending to prefer the verb stem form (‘gro-na).

Summarizing, it seems that conditionals reverse the origo effect found in matrix clauses. In matrix declaratives, the ego future \( V-gi-yin \) can only occur with first-person. But in conditional protases, it cannot occur with first-person.

This anti-first-person (anti-1) effect is reminiscent of the anti-1 effect observed above with respect to who judges the truth or falsity of an interactional protasis. I believe that the two phenomena should be unified, and that (32)-(34) are examples of interactional conditionals.

The anti-1 effect can be accounted for by combining one fact and one assumption. The fact is that—for apparently independent reasons—the future \( V-gi-yin \) retains its volitionality requirement when embedded, as shown by
(22)-(31). The assumption is that these are interactional conditionals, and therefore that \( e \) is not in the future.

In (32), the protasis is ‘you’ll go’. On my view, since here \( e \) is not in the future, by using (32) the speaker takes the hearer to know whether or not she’ll go. This is presumably because the hearer is taken to be aware of her intentions. So (32) presents no problems.

Why is (33) somewhat less natural? Accounting for this difference requires a short digression. Recall that the use of an interactional conditional implicates that the protasis is known (by somebody other than the speaker) to be true or false, that somebody or something can in principle immediately confirm or deny the protasis. In second-person cases, this condition never fails to be met, because the second-person herself is always present, and therefore able in principle to confirm or deny the protasis.\(^{87}\)

\(^{87}\) Conditionals that call for interaction with the second-person require not only that the hearer be present, but that she be conscious, too. To see this, imagine that I would like to go to a certain party provided that a gorgeous woman I know goes. Now imagine two scenarios. In scenario (i), I am having a conversation with the woman. In scenario (ii), she’s sound asleep, but I’m right there to point to her and say ‘you’ as I scheme to myself. Example (b) is natural enough in both scenarios, but interestingly, example (a), the futurate conditional, is only natural in scenario (i), where the woman is conscious. This suggests that interactional conditionals require genuine interaction.

(a) If you’ll go, I’ll go.
(b) If you go, (baby,) I’ll go.
If the point of view is not the second-person’s, however, the situation becomes more complex. To my ear there is a difference between (35) and (36), depending on where the subject is located:

(35) If John’ll go, I’ll go.
(36) If he’ll go [pointing], I’ll go.

Take (35) to be about John, who is not present in the discourse. Take (36) to be about Bill, who is sitting on the floor following our discussion. My impression is that (36) is more natural than (35), and that this is because we are in a position to find out more or less immediately from Bill, but not John, whether or not he’ll go. In case (36), either Bill will volunteer the information, having heard us, or it will be easy enough for me or my interlocutor to find out, given that Bill is so close at hand. Note here that I am making the crucial assumption that the source of this information must in some sense be Bill. His self-attribution of intention is more trustworthy than anyone else’s attribution of intention to him.

Finally, the first-person case (34) can be excluded on the same grounds that first-person point of view was ruled out for protases of other interactional conditionals. The argument runs as follows. First, if I intend to go (=volitional future going), then I know that I intend to go. If I don’t intend to go, then I know that I don’t. Second, using a conditional requires that I
present myself as not knowing one way or the other whether the protasis is true. This is because the element of assertion is absent in conditional protases. Third, using an interactional conditional requires that the protasis be true or false, and that somebody other than myself be able to judge it. Fourth, if someone else is to find out whether or not I am going, the source of that information must be me. When these points are combined, there is no way that (34) could be good, assuming I am in control of my faculties and we are not talking about a split-self of mine. The points together demand that somebody else find out something from me, which I explicitly declare myself as not knowing via use of the conditional.

The typology I have defended, which distinguishes between hypothetical and interactional conditionals, thus facilitates a relatively parsimonious pragmatic account of some person asymmetries in English and Tibetan futurate conditionals.

7.3.2. Direct protases: ‘dug-na

It has been noted in passing that direct ‘dug may occur under ‘if’ in the various constructions in which it occurs (DeLancey 1990, Tournadre and Dorje 1998), but no account of when this is and isn’t possible has yet been
proposed. In particular, the person asymmetries discussed here have not been noticed.

In this section, I will explore the asymmetries, which I take to be evidence for two separate conclusions. First, as concluded in Chapter 3, the demonstrative component of ‘dug’ can be split from its evidential component, which shows that the demonstrative component is part of the word ‘dug’ itself, while the evidential component is a property of assertion. Second, I conclude that conditionals with ‘dug’-protases are interactional, since they too show anti-1 effects.

7.3.2.1. Direct in matrix declaratives

Recall the distribution of the direct verb ‘dug’—the following paragraphs review the facts. On the one hand, ‘dug’ is used to report directly observed situations, including all volitional situations perpetrated by non-first-person and some non-volitional situations. Typically the subject in such cases would not be first-person:

(37)  

\[
\text{kho/%nga} \quad \text{kha.lag} \quad \text{za-gi-‘dug}
\]

\`He’s eating.’
In Chapter 3, I called this use of direct *exophoric*.

On the other hand, there is the use of ‘dug with non-volitional internal sensory predicates, including predicates of bodily function, emotion, and feeling. Such predicates take ‘dug when the subject is first-person:

\[(38) \quad \text{nga} \quad \text{na-gi-’dug} \]

\[\text{I sick-[dir imp]}\]

‘I’m feeling sick.’

Following Tournadre (1996), I called this use of direct *endopathic*.

Recall that verbs that admit endopathic readings divide into two classes: those that also admit exophoric readings, and those that do not. The latter are what Sun (1993) calls *unobservable* predicates. Unobservable predicates can only be verified on endopathic—internal sensory—grounds, which is a complicated way of saying that you can’t observe someone else experiencing such a state. In matrix declaratives, unobservable (or *strictly endopathic*) verbs—such as *grod.khog ltogs* ‘to be hungry’, and *kha khom* ‘to be thirsty’—may cooccur with direct evidentials iff the subject, i.e. the experiencer, is first-person:
Unobservable verbs differ from verbs like *na ‘to be sick’, which admits both endopathic and exophoric readings. That is, unlike (39), (38) can occur with non-first-person subjects as well.

7.3.2.2. Direct in conditional protases

Here, there are two cases to consider. First, interestingly, the distinction between strictly endopathic (i.e. unobservable) predicates and endopathic/exophoric predicates disappears. Neither predicate occurs with direct ‘dug’ in a protasis with a first-person subject:

(40) Unobservable

\[
\text{\textit{khyed.rang/*nga}} \quad \text{\textit{grod.khog}} \quad \text{\textit{ltogs-gi-’dug-na}} \\
\text{you/he/*me} \quad \text{stomach} \quad \text{hunger-[dir imp]-if}
\]

‘If you’re/he’s hungry …’

(41) Endopathic/exophoric

\[
\text{\textit{khyed.rang/*nga}} \quad \text{\textit{na-gi-’dug-na}} \\
\text{you/he/*me} \quad \text{sick-[dir imp]-if}
\]

‘If you’re/he’s sick …’
Here, too, conditional protases induce an anti-1 effect, which diagnoses these sentences as interactive conditionals.

The fact that unobservable predicates can cooccur with a third-person subject and direct ‘dug’ in conditional protases shows (a) that the first-person restriction found in matrix declaratives with such predicates (see 39 above) comes from a feature of assertion, and not direct per se; and (b) that Dancygier’s (1998) proposal, cited above, that interactional protases are evaluated from the hearer’s point of view, cannot be universally correct. For if hunger is an unobservable state, then the only one who can directly know whether or not \( x \) is hungry is \( x \). Therefore, the point of view taken in (40) with a third-person subject must be third-person, not second-person.

The anti-1 effect in (40) and (41) is a result of the endopathic use in combination with direct. If direct ‘dug’ is replaced with ego yod, any person can be subject, and there is no evidential coloring:
(43) Unobservable

\[ \text{khyed.rang/kho/nga} \quad \text{grod.khog} \quad \text{ltogs-gi-yod-na} \ldots \]

you/he/me stomach hunger-imp-if

‘If you’re/he’s/I’m hungry ...’

(44) Endopathic/exophoric

\[ \text{khyed.rang/kho/nga} \quad \text{na-gi-yod-na} \ldots \]

you/he/me sick-imp-if

‘If you’re/he’s/I’m sick ...’

(45) A full example

\[ \text{khyed.rang grod.khog ltogs-gi-yod-na} \quad \text{zhal.lag mchod} \]

you stomach hunger-imp-if food eat

‘If you’re hungry, then please eat.’

Speakers are initially reluctant to accept examples like (43) with first-person subjects, but this is only because of the self-intimating character of the experience involved: one normally knows whether or not one is hungry. If a context is provided where one does not know that one is hungry, for example

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88 Both this example and the one in (42) are possible. The most salient difference for my consultants is that the version with direct ‘dug’ is more polite. Arguably this is because (42), the version with direct, is an interactional conditional rather than a hypothetical conditional. By uttering (42), the speaker takes the hearer to be in immediate possession of the relevant knowledge, and so the utterance has the effect of ‘checking’ the hearer’s desires. (45), by contrast, phrased as a pure hypothetical, does not involve the hearer to the same extent. It is polite to involve the hearer in the interaction, because it recognizes the presence of the hearer.
when the predicate is used in a clinical sense (e.g. ‘If I’m hungry, how come I don’t want to eat?’) or in a counterfactual, as in the following example, then \textit{yod-na} is fine, while ‘\textit{dug-na} is still disallowed:

\begin{equation}
\texttt{nga kha skom-gi-yod-na nga chu thung-gi-red}
\end{equation}

‘If I were thirsty (now), I’d drink some water.’

My account of the anti-1 effect here is the same as it was for future protases in Tibetan. Again, I take conditionals with direct ‘\textit{dug} to be interactional. Therefore, the protasis $p$ must now be known to be true or false. The speaker who utters the conditional cannot be the one who possesses this knowledge, since by using a conditional she explicitly disavows such knowledge. However, if the knowledge in question is endopathic, as it is in such cases, then it must originate from the experiencer herself. So, if anyone else is to know, say, that the speaker is hungry, they must find this fact out through the speaker. Given that the speaker doesn’t know it, this is impossible. Therefore, the only possibility is for her to use a hypothetical conditional with \textit{yod} instead.

\text{and gives her choices as well. I suspect that, generally speaking, and cross-linguistically, interactive conditionals are perceived as more polite than hypothetical conditionals.}
The situation with volitional verbs is slightly more complicated, though it can be descriptively characterized by the following generalization: Direct ‘dug’ can be used in a conditional if the hearer would use ‘dug’ if she were to declare the protasis true. For example, as already noted, I could use ‘dug’ to make an observation about what someone else is doing (47), but not (normally) about what I’m doing (48):

(47)

I-gen home loc Tashi work do [dir imp]
‘Tashi’s working in my house.’

(48)

I now work do [ego imp] [dir imp]
‘I’m working now.’

In a conditional protasis, parallel judgments apply, except that second-person takes over the role of first-person:
The version of (50) with direct ‘dug is normally marked, but it is not ungrammatical. In Chapter 4, I briefly discussed contexts where one might use ‘dug in place of yod with volitional verbs, e.g. contexts of surprise discovery, watching oneself on television or in a dream, and so on. In these contexts of course (50) with ‘dug-na is also fine. This is consistent with the above mentioned generalization, that the protasis allows ‘dug with second-person if the hearer would use ‘dug if she were to assert the protasis.

If the subject is first-person and the verb volitional, yod-na is preferred to ‘dug-na, although again this is not an absolute. Use of ‘dug would imply
that somebody else—probably the hearer—knows better than the speaker if
the protasis is true, a situation which is possible, but not common. For
example,

\[ (51) \]

\textit{nga las.ka byed-gi-‘dug-na \ ga.re byed-gi-‘dug}

\textit{I work do-[dir imp]-if \ what do-[dir imp]}

‘If I’m working, what am I doing?’

implies that the speaker isn’t aware that he’s working, and must rely on the
hearer for this information. And this is a somewhat marked context, since
normally we are aware of what we are doing.

Summarizing the data for volitional verbs, we find that the basic
generalization—that direct ‘\textit{dug}’ is used in a protasis if the hearer would use
‘\textit{dug}’ if he were to assert the protasis—is somewhat at odds with my other
findings. The data suggests that if these are interactional conditionals, the
judge is always second-person, and never third-person. Up until now, there
has been no pro-2 effect, only an anti-1 effect. How can we explain the robust
difference between (49) and (50)? That is, how can we explain the fact that
‘\textit{dug-na}’ is ok with a third-person subject, as in (49), but not with a second-
person subject, as in (50)?
The question, then, amounts to the following: why can’t the protasis occur with direct ‘dug’, a volitional verb, and a second-person subject, such that the speaker expects the question of the protasis to be resolved by some third-person rather than the hearer? In other words, why is (50) marked?

I believe that principles of politeness and conversational interaction exclude this possibility. So far, protases involving a non-2 judge (including 7, 33, 36 and 40 with kho ‘he’ as subject) have all shared an assumption in common: namely that the second-person was not in a position to confirm or deny the protasis. Two of the cases—(33) and (36)—involved a third-person’s intentions, and throughout I have taken it as foundational that x’s intentions are directly available only to x. A third case, (40), involved an endopathic state, which by definition is also directly available only to its experiencer. Finally, (7) on the relevant reading was taken to reflect knowledge derived from a newspaper or from some public announcement, with the hearer as unenlightened as the speaker.

I have also assumed in several of these cases that since conditionals are communicated to a hearer, and not in general to third-parties, if a third-person is in a better position than the second-person to know whether or not the protasis is true, then the way to sort matters is for either the first-person or the second-person to go ask the third-person (in principle if not in practice).
To put it another way, the speaker does not have direct conversational access to the third-person in the way he does to the second-person. The speaker and hearer can cooperate to gain access to a third-person; but they don’t have it directly and immediately.

Combining these plausible assumptions, we expect that (50) should not naturally occur with ‘dug’ in the protasis, if that ‘dug’ is to be associated with a third-person’s point of view. For if ‘dug’ were used there to imply a third-person point of view, the speaker would have to ignore the second-person’s role in the interaction. As hearer, the second-person has the right (and perhaps the obligation) to resolve the protasis if she can, and in a normal circumstance for (50), she can.

There is, however, another possibility that needs to be excluded: why can’t ‘dug’ in (50) be associated with the hearer’s point of view? In the special situations mentioned just after the example, it can, but what about normal circumstances—I mean, situations where the hearer has volitional (more generally, *de se*) knowledge of her volitional activities?

This question amounts to: why does the fact that the hearer wouldn’t normally *assert* the protasis with direct ‘dug’ have an effect on what the speaker uses in a conditional protasis? After all, *there is no assertion in a conditional protasis.*
To answer this question, we must return to example (37) above, which raises some rather fundamental issues.

(37)  
\[\text{he/\%me} \quad \text{food} \quad \text{eat-[dir imp]}\]

\text{‘He’s eating.’}

The relevant point is that (37) is not natural with a first-person subject. If the subject is first-person, then [ego imp] \text{V-gi-yod} is used. In Chapter 4, I suggested that this was not for any grammatical reason, but rather because of a Gricean implicature. True, when I am eating I normally have direct perceptual evidence of that fact. But it was pointed out that in the case of volitional predicates, I would still know that I was engaged in such an activity \textit{without} such evidence. Thus, to use the direct form would be to imply that I \textit{don’t} have anything other than direct perceptual evidence, i.e. that my evidence for my eating is on a par with evidence I might have that someone else is eating. Ego evidentiality came in by default, when the other brands of evidentiality were immaterial.

The point is that in matrix declaratives, [dir imp] \text{V-gi-‘dug} is blocked just in case the [ego imp] \text{V-gi-yod} is appropriate, because to use direct in such
circumstances would implicate that the demonstrative and perceptual evidence was criterial.

Recall from Chapter 3 that the direct character of ‘dug’ was argued to arise from its deictic/demonstrative link to the external world. The demonstrative component of ‘dug’ is part of its meaning; therefore, just as it is present in matrix declaratives, it should also be present in conditional uses of ‘dug’. As a result, the demonstrative link to the world would also be present in conditional protases such as (50).

If this reasoning is correct, then the same Gricean argument used to account for the oddity of (37) with a first-person subject can be used to explain the oddity of (50) with ‘dug’ on the second-person point of view reading. If the speaker uses ‘dug’, then he expects the hearer to resolve the protasis on the basis of demonstrative-based perceptual evidence, thus implicating that the hearer cannot resolve it on the basis of non-demonstrative or pre-perceptual evidence. But this is exactly what goes wrong in (37). Since the activity in (50) is volitional, the hearer should be expected to have pre-perceptual (i.e. ego) evidence for whether or not she is working. Therefore ‘dug’ is infelicitous. Notice that this Gricean solution is applicable even though occurrences of ego verbs in conditional protases are completely non-evidential.
7.4. An alternative (and unsatisfactory) account

My explanation of the person asymmetries found in Tibetan conditional constructions has relied on a new category of conditionals, interactional conditionals, in combination with elaborate and extensive pragmatic inferences. I have attempted to keep the syntax simple, at the expense of enriching the pragmatics. My proposals have been guided by a what-you-see-is-what-you-get approach to syntax.

An occasionally proposed alternative analysis takes just the opposite approach, capitalizing on the fact that many future protases are ‘contextually given’ (see Dancygier 1998 and Sweetser 1990 for discussion and references), as in the following cases:

(52) A. I’ll be there.
    B. Well, if you’ll be there, ...

(53) A. I’m the Pope.
    B. If you’re the Pope, I’m the Empress of China.

Many have observed that given protases—not limited to future protases—can be paraphrased with ‘as you say’, ‘you think’, and so on:

(54) a. If you’re the Pope, as you say, then ...
    b. Well, if you think you’ll be there...
Wekker (1976) proposes that such protases formally include a higher performative element, either *If you think that...*, or *If it is the case that...*

This kind of analysis, which I call the *covert performative analysis of interactional conditionals*, initially seems to have promise in accounting for the person asymmetries I’ve been exploring. The question of who judges an interactional protasis true or false could be reduced to the question of who the subject of the embedded performative is. A second-person judge would come from *If you say...,* while a third-person judge would come from *If he says...*

However, the covert performative analysis runs into serious problems. First, if a conditional is to include *If x thinks that*... or *If x says that*..., the semantic problem known as the performadox arises (cf. Böer and Lycan 1980a). If the performative layer of the protasis is interpreted, then the wrong semantics results. *If you’re the Pope, then...* does not mean *If you say you’re the Pope, then...* If it did, then B’s utterance in (53) would cease to make sense. What B is doing is linking two absurd propositions. If his absurd apodosis follows from his protasis, then his protasis must be equally absurd. But *you say you’re the Pope* is certainly not absurd: your claim may be absurd, but your saying it is surely not.

For the covert performative analysis to work, the performative layer must be present to derive interactional *point of view*, but it must be invisible
for the purposes of interpretation. If there is an analysis which avoids this paradox, it should be preferred.

A second objection is that not all interactional conditionals have given protases. Future protases in English, for example, are often given, but they need not be. Consider (55):

(55) If you’ll go, I’ll go.

Certainly this conditional can stand on its own; it need not have been preceded by you saying *I’ll go* or intimating as much. The fact that (55) is a volitional use of ‘will’ does not affect matters, since givenness is not a requirement of predictive uses of ‘will’ either, as (7) shows.

One could sidestep this objection by making sure that the covert performative verb is not one that implies givenness, like ‘say’ in the ‘as you say’ locution, but one that simply gives us someone’s point of view, like ‘think’. Although this paves the way for a possible retreat, it also clearly shows the difficulty of formulating the covert performative analysis precisely. For the right verb must be chosen, and given that there is nothing overt to guide this choice, it is likely to be a difficult choice indeed, and it could well be that no single verb could cover all the cases.
There is also a Tibetan-internal objection to the covert performative analysis. If the performative is a verb of speech or thought, as is generally assumed, then it should be expected to behave more or less like overt verbs of speech or thought. In Tibetan, such verbs are unique in that their complements admit the full range of evidential oppositions, as the following example illustrates (see also Chapter 5):

(56)  
\[ ë-7ië-#Ü-8ë+/7ië-#Ü-7¸¥#-/7ië-#Ü-8ë+-9è+-/#Ü-7¸¥# kхо 'gro-gi-yod/'dug/yod.red lab-gi-'dug \]

\[  he go-[ego imp]/[dir imp]/[ind imp] \]
\[  say-[dir imp] \]

‘He says he’ll go.’

As we have seen, however, conditional protases do not share a common syntax with such verbs. In conditional protases, indirect verbs such as *yod.red* are totally excluded, while ego verbs occur, but without evidentiality. It must be concluded, then, that if the covert performative analysis is correct, the covert verb is nothing like overt ‘say’ or ‘think’.

I conclude, then, that the covert performative analysis of interactional conditionals has little to recommend it, and that the pragmatic alternative is to be preferred.

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89 The embedded subject may or may not be coferent with the matrix subject, depending on which evidential is used in the embedded clause.
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