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A NEW INTERPRETATION OF LINES C 3-9 OF THE XANTHOS STELE
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The discovery and prompt publication of the Trilingual of the Lētōn have brought dramatic progress in our understanding of the Lycian language and the individual Lycian texts. However, the longest Lycian text by far, that of the inscribed Stele of Xanthos (TL 44), has remained largely obscure. This is due in large part to problems with the lexicton. Nevertheless, I believe that with the help of the Trilingual we can make some modest further advances in elucidating this difficult text.

I will focus my attention on lines c 3-9, but in order to make my arguments clear, I cite the text from the last incomplete word of b 64 through c 9:

(2) [κίν]αν: ζιμύδιον: τε: 
(3) [μέ]σην: ζιμύδιον: τε: 
(4) [σ[π]ομ]ε: ζιμύδιον: τε: 
(5) [κιν]αν: ζιμύδιον: τε: 
(6) [με]σην: ζιμύδιον: τε: 
(7) [σπόμε]ν: ζιμύδιον: τε: 

(1) "The Spartans (?) -ed to -(!) Tissaphernes, son of Hydarnes, and the Persian(s) in Kaunos, and the (allies) of the Spartans (1),
(2) "when (?) they were fighting against Athens,
(3) "I became judge (=arbiter) for them,
(4) "They issued a double (?) guarantee (1),
(5) "Both in Hytenna a stele shall be set down for Malia -
(6) "In place(on) the spot ... the fighters(!) ... -
(7) "And in Kaunos likewise (!?) a stele shall be put down for the local precinct and for Malia and for Artemis and for the King of Kaunos."

The lacunae at the beginning of column c make a coherent interpretation of the first two-and-a-half lines impossible. I must emphasize that my restorations and division into sentences (1) and (2) above are provisional. The overall sense of these lines is hardly in doubt and has been known since the early days of Lycian studies. Given the mention of Sparta or the Spartans, Tissaphernes, and Athens, we can conclude that the passage refers to events in the Peloponnesian War.

Already Budge, FS f. O. Biennourd (1988) 235 proposed "schlugen" for ζιμύδιε in sentence (2). Compare also "(be)siegen" in Meriggi, FS f. H. Hütt 2 (1937) 272, followed...
by Neumann. Weiterelehen (1961) 50 and Lykisch 379, who correctly compares Hittite zahhiya– "to fight". The Lycian stem ἅγιος is equal to a virtual Hittite *zahhašša-. I believe we may also now equate the Lycian adverb/preverb tribhī-"against" with HLaüvian tara-/pi- (ταρπί) in the expression tara-/pi CRUS (+ dative) "to oppose", i.e. "to stand against". Whatever the details, then, we have a military context in which the Persians and their Greek allies were fighting against Athens.

The sentence numbered (3) above begins with the well-known Lycian conjunction me. I have recently presented elsewhere evidence that the Lycian enclitic -me (with geminate nasal) is not a mere variant of the third person accusative pronoun -ne/-me, but a distinct form representing the third person dative plural pronoun "to" for them". Lycian enu (or perhaps emu with elision) is the orthotonic first person singular pronoun "I, me". I follow Larocque FAX 6 (1979) 74 et 98 in interpreting maro as "judge", derived from mara "law" with the productive Lycian suffix -am marking members of professions and social classes. As an a-stem, maro may be either nominative singular or dative plural.

We are left with oýgarī, which appears to be a verb in the preterite first singular. We are thus led to take εμα as the subject. Depending on our syntactic analysis of tovost, we arrive at either "I-ed (as) judge for them" or "I-ed to them (as) judges." We are forced to assume an intransitive verb in either case and in the first instance specifically a "linking" or "equative" verb. Given these restrictions, I propose to analyze oýgarī as "I became" i.e. the already attested Lycian verb a- "do, make" plus a preterite first singular middle ending -garī which may be equated mutatis mutandis with Hitt. pret. I"sg. mid. ḫabāri. For the use of a- "do, make" in the middle as "become" compare in particular Olavian agari "becomes". I refer readers to my article cited in note 3 above for a full discussion of the evidence for the middle voice in Lycian.

Sentence (3) thus reads in full: "I became judge for them." In the context I take "judge" to mean "arbiter, arbitrator." The author of the stele is claiming to have acted as an arbiter in a dispute between some of the parties cited in the preceding sentences (1) and (2). I will return below to the question of just who these parties were.

A successful arbitration implies an agreement of some kind, and if my analysis of sentence (3) is correct, we would expect mention of such an agreement in the following lines. I believe that the following sentences do refer to an agreement, as I will now attempt to demonstrate. I wish to skip over sentence (4) temporarily and focus on sentences (5) and (7) as I have numbered them.

Note first of all the change in tense: the verb staiti of sentence (5) and (7) is present-future in contrast to the preterites of sentences (1) – (4). This fact implies that (5) and (7) are something other than part of the past narration. Notice further that these both consist of conjunction se "and", followed by staita "stele", the adverb ēti and the one or more relational adjectives in -ašī. The only difference is the two sentences is the word me in (7).

What is crucial is that thanks to the Trilingual we now can analyze every word of (7) except ἰδέ. The noun žhde unexpectedly turns out to be the Lycian name for the city of Kaunos, here surely in the locative. The verb staiti is intransitive "stand" or "be placed in a standing position", not "erect, cause to stand" as previously thought. The loanword staita "stele" is an animate a-stem and thus here must be the subject in the nominative singular. Lycian ēti may function as an adverb, preverb or proposition. Since there is no apparent object noun here, I take it as a preverb with staiti meaning

1. I cannot accept the conclusion of A. Morris-Rolfe Davies regarding HLaüvian tara-/pi in PS Rorsch (1986) 134 ff.
"down": cf. TL 58, 3 ḳi ... sijēni "shall lie down" and see the discussion by Laboche, *FAX* 6. 89.

The following relational adjectives are most reasonably taken as animate nominative singulars modifying atala "stele" (contra Melchert, *Lyc. Lex. 18. and passim*). For the reading se(i) = * fancē; see Laboche, *BSL* 62 (1967) 54 and Neumann, *Ge Kronos* (1982) 154. On atala, atula, ṭi, qa(hi) e(hi)j(eh) and "the King of Kaunos" (also a deity) see Laboche, *FAX* 6 passim. The precise sense of me is not yet clear, but its overall pattern of occurrence suggests an adverb: I translate it here according to context as "likewise".

The meaning of (7) is thus: "And likewise (1) a stele shall be set down in Kaunos for the local precinct and for Maliya and for Artemis and for the King of Kaunos." I stress that except for me this interpretation is fully assured by evidence from the Trilingual.

The parallel structure of sentence (5) demands a similar analysis. In particular, atala must be the subject of the verb atati, which is intransitive. The word uđana thus cannot be the subject, and the previous equation with the personal name Oξύνης and accompanying interpretation "O. erects the stele" are false: cf. already the doubts of Laboche, *FAX* 6. 89 note 9.

The parallelism of ypāde in sentence (7) argues strongly that Uđana in (5) is locative singular of a place name, and a suitable candidate is available. As I have already cited in Melchert, *Lyc. Lex. 77*, we find in Step. Byz. Ὄτενα listed as a city of Lycia. See also Zosura, *RO* (1984) 656 for a discussion of the emended form Ὄτενα at Herodotos 3.90. Neither the initial aspiration nor the epsilon of the Greek forms is an obstacle to the equation. Compare Ποτάμιν beside Lycian Ekatomia with no initial h-.

For Greek epsilon rendering Lycian a note Αρκεσία for Ἀρκέσια at Herodotos 3.90. Whether the Hytenna lay within Lycia or nearby, its existence seems assured, and the equation with Lycian Uđana makes sense phonologically, contextually and geographically. I take the initial as of sentence (5) as coordinate with that in (7) and translate thus:

"Both in Hytenna a stele shall be set down for Maliya ... and in Kaunos etc.". The coordination of the two sentences is important: the simultaneous erection of steles in both cities reflects the practice of depositing written evidence of treaties in the sacred precincts of those deities called upon as witnesses. Compare the provisions of a treaty between Athens and Sparta described in Thucydides 3.18.9–10.

Sentence (6) and those sentences following (7) which I have not cited should contain further provisions of the agreement reached. Unfortunately, their meaning remains obscure, at least to me. Only ṭaddāti "place" (dative-locative singular) and ṭaddāti "fighters, warriors" (nominative or genitive plural) are identifiable in sentence (6).

If sentences (5) and following in the present-future contain provisions of an agreement reached by the arbitration referred to in (3), then sentence (4) must express the agreement itself. The words of (4) are compatible with this interpretation, but their precise sense is not as clear as I would wish. The verb ḳāṭ is now tolerably certain: pret. 3rd pl. of ka- "let go, release" (see Melchert, *Historische Sprachforschung* 102 (1989) 39–41). It seems reasonable that a verb "let go" (from the hand) could mean "issue" (an agreement).

The word ubv is most plausibly accusative singular of an animate o-stem noun with the frequent change of nasalized d to u. At present I can only translate according to context as "guarantee, surety" or the like and tentatively compare Hittite (or rather Luvian) šek-, which means something like "land-grant". Both Lycian ubv- and Luvian šek- are obviously related to the verb which appears in Lycian as ubv- and Luvian as sps- (with single -p-). Only when we understand more fully the use of the verb will we be able to determine more precisely the meaning of the related nouns.

The remaining khjēti is transparently a derivative of ḳīti: "two" and formally may
easily be an adjective. A meaning such as "double, twofold" or "joint" follows naturally enough. The sense "they (have) issued a double guarantee" or the like is thus quite in order for sentence (4), but at present less than assured.

My analysis of sentences (3), (5), and (7), which is firmly based on evidence from the Trilingual, therefore leads me to conclude that the author of the Xanthos Stele successfully arbitrated a dispute between some set of parties mentioned in sentences (1) and (2). The reference of "ask for them" is quite ambiguous, and we must turn to extra-linguistic evidence to answer the question of who the disputing parties were.

It seems to me unlikely that a Lycean could have acted as an arbiter between the Athenians and their enemies. We know from other sources that there was no negotiated end to the Peloponnesian War. Furthermore, if the Athenians were one of the involved parties, what would it mean to erect an evidentiary stele in either Kamos or Hytenna, both Asian cities with no known connections to Athens?

I find it far more plausible that the Lycean arbitrated a dispute between the Persians and their Greek allies. We know from Greek sources that their alliance was a troubled one, with many ups and downs. Kamos was a key contact point between the Persians and the Greeks, and it would not be surprising if it were chosen as the site for the stelae testifying to the treaty on behalf of the Greeks. I cannot, of course, answer the question as to why Hytenna was chosen as the other site, but the city lay firmly in the Persian sphere. I can only infer that it was an administrative center of some sort.

There are several direct references in Greek sources to agreements between the Persians and their Greek allies: see e.g. Thucydides 8. 17-18, 8. 36-37, and 8. 57-58. Obviously, it would be a welcome confirmation of my analysis if an equation could be made between the agreement I claim to have found in the Xanthos Stele and one of these. However, Lycean and Greek history of the period is well beyond my competence, and I must leave to others the task of deciding whether any identification is possible.

In conclusion I do wish to stress two points. First, even if no such identification can be made, this result is not necessarily fatal to my interpretation. The main text of the Xanthos Stele is in Lycean, a language surely not accessible to most Greeks or Persians. The text is manifestly intended for local consumption, and its contents are surely a glorification of the current Lycean dynasty and its forebears. Based on what we know of other such inscriptions, we can safely assume a fair degree of hyperbole. It is quite possible, then, that the true role of the Lycean dynasty was no more than that of a glorified messenger-boy in a dispute too minor to rate mention in the Greek histories. This fact would not have prevented the author from exaggerating the episode and his role in it for his Lycean audience.

I also wish to emphasize that my analysis is based on independent facts of Lycean grammar, many of which are confirmed by evidence from the Lëdon Trilingual. I believe it does offer a coherent and internally plausible interpretation of a portion of the Xanthos Stele, and I offer it to historians and other specialists in Lycean studies for their consideration.

* We need not assume that the reference to Maliya in Hytenna in sentence (5) necessarily applies to the native Lycean goddess. We know from N 307r that Maliya, as the chief goddess of the patitikon, could stand for Greek Athena. I therefore find it possible that the name could also stand for a Persian deity in the present instance.