


TERENCE PARSONS/MARCUS KRACHT/BENJAMIN KEIL
ANSWER KEY TO HOMEWORK DUE 2005/10/26



Ex 3.1 Establish two different logical forms for

Some governor does not smoke.

(1) a. Make sure you first write down a sentential structure:



b. then continue with the QR step: (we have two choices)



c. and then perform the translation into LF:

(i) $\text{some } x \{ \text{governor } x \} \neg \text{smoke } x$


(ii) $\neg \text{some } x \{ \text{governor } x \} \text{smoke } x$

Ex 3.2 Here is a sentence:


Some kangaroo eat every leaf.

- (2) a. Establish (up to renaming of bound variables) four different derivations that you can get with the help of QR.


First we establish the base surface structure:



Now we apply QR... there are two choices: we can (i) QR the subject or (ii) the object.



Now we have to apply QR again; for each choice we made above, there are two S nodes that QR can target—(1) the higher S and (2) the lower S—so we'll get four derivations.



- b. Which ones give different LF's?
 (i.1) and (ii.2) are different from (i.2) and (ii.1).

Ex 3.3

- (3) a. Explain why an utterance of the following sentence on its own by speaker A will implicate that he does not know that Penguins do not fly.

When a speaker utters “I believe that penguins do not fly,” it implicates the the speaker does not know that penguins do not fly because we assume that the speaker is being cooperative. Assuming that the speaker is being cooperative we judge the speaker’s actual utterance against similiar utterances that the speaker did not make. In particular, we note that the speaker has not said, “I know that penguins do not fly.” Following the rules of cooperation, this hypothetical utterance is as relevant as the actual utterance, it is equally concise, and equally clear; it differs in quantity of information. Knowing something necessitates believing that thing, but believing something does not necessitate knowing it. If the speaker knew that penguins do not fly—assuming again that the speaker was being cooperative, was aware of the scalar relation between ‘believe’ and ‘know’, and also believed that the listener was aware of that scale—he would have chosen the more informative utterance over the less informative utterance, as they are equal with respect to the other rules of cooperation.

- b. Is it a logical consequence of the sentence below that speaker does not know that Penguins do not fly?

It is not a logical consequence of the above reasoning that the speaker does not know that penguins do not fly. The conclusion that the speaker lacks this knowledge is only reached with additional assumptions about the speaker’s willingness to be cooperative, the speaker’s knowledge of scales, and the speaker’s beliefs about the listener’s knowledge of the scales involved. Each one of these assumptions is easily challenged, and there are situations in which the assupions are even likely not to be true. In these cases the implicature does not arise, and so it the conclusions drawn from analyzing the speaker’s choice of utterance cannot be said to follow logically from that choice.

I believe that Penguins do not fly.

Ex 3.4 Find an example of a scale in English. It should not be in the manuscript and should not involve numbers. Explain also why your example is a scale.

- (4) *Here are some examples:*
- a. *possible, probable, certain*
 - b. *some, many, most, all*
 - c. *sometimes, often, always*
 - d. *try, succeed*